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ABSTRACT 
 
Electricity Market Reforms and Renewable Energy:  
The Case of Wind and Solar in Brazil 
 




This dissertation investigates the relationship between electricity market reforms and the 
development of renewable energy through interviews with policymakers, energy experts, and 
industry representatives in Brazil. Within the context of market-oriented power reforms initiated 
in the 1990s, policymakers have attempted to diversify the energy supply and reduce the 
country’s reliance on hydroelectric power. However, Brazil’s pre-existing hydropower 
infrastructure has hindered the diffusion of alternative options. By looking at energy auctions and 
net-metering regulations for wind and solar energy, this research explores the role of independent 
regulators in facilitating the development of non-hydro renewable sources of energy. While 
academic and policy debates center on designing public support schemes for renewable energy, 
this research argues that adaptive regulation can provide opportunities for new technologies that 
policy instruments alone are unable to achieve. In particular, the governance characteristics of 
regulatory agencies are critical to the effective articulation of renewable energy policies. Three 
subnational case studies further demonstrate how states and regions contribute to developing and 
deploying wind and solar energy technologies.
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“Carbon, like the state, is not withering away.” 
 




In the 1980s, a global pro-market shift sought to dismantle the public ownership and 
provision of basic services. Advocates of free market principles called for the privatization and 
deregulation of critical infrastructure industries. For electricity sectors, the general understanding 
was that providing electricity should be an apolitical, technical enterprise. State-run energy 
utilities were to give way to an efficient and low-cost private sector model of service delivery. 
Independent regulatory agencies were fundamental to these new economic governance 
arrangements, which were intended to administer a hands-off, rule-based approach to the 
correction of market failures (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012), as opposed to regulating for 
reasons of distributional justice, rights protection, and environmental degradation (Prosser, 
2010). These developments gradually crystallized into what has been referred to as the “standard 
model” for power sector reform (Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008; Joskow, 2008; Victor & Heller, 
2007). Driven by ideology, financial crises, and early success stories, most countries have drawn 
on the basic tenets of the standard model to reform and, on occasion, remake their electricity 
sectors. 
 As governments embarked on power reform agendas to increase competition and private 
sector participation, other social and environmental goals were coming to the forefront. The 
OPEC oil crisis in 1973 and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 had alerted countries not 
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only to the degree to which they depended on fossil fuels, but also to the need for safe and 
renewable sources of energy. The growing awareness that the majority of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs) were a by-product of the dominant energy production technologies further 
solidified the notion that decarbonizing electricity sectors was an urgent matter, and a few 
countries began to make concerted efforts to utilize small hydropower, biomass, and wind power. 
Yet, academic and policy debates over electricity reforms largely focused on creating 
independent regulatory agencies and competitive markets (Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001). Public 
support for renewable energy was seen as distorting electricity markets and providing an “unfair 
advantage” for environmental technologies. As a result, there has been less attention given to the 
social and environmental implications of power reforms (Dubash, 2003; Dubash & Morgan, 
2013). 
Furthermore, the literature on evaluating policy instruments for renewable energy often 
assumes that carrying out a given policy framework is a purely administrative or apolitical 
process (Menanteau, Finon, & Lamy, 2003; Wiser, Barbose, & Holt, 2011). When policies fail to 
effectively increase a country’s share of renewable energy, policy analysts prescribe clearer rules 
or more carefully designed incentives to improve implementation outcomes. A policy’s design 
features, however, say little about its implementation – in this case, the processes and program 
activities that occur between high-level consensus on instrument design and the successful 
construction of a renewable power facility. This observation is particularly relevant to 
restructured electricity markets, where renewable energy programs often lie in the hands of 
regulators who monitor sector investments. Regulators apply and interpret policies in individual 
cases, constituting policy on the ground while dealing with unforeseen issues that policymakers 
did not, or could not, anticipate. 
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This dissertation examines the role of sector reforms and regulatory institutions in the 
integration of wind and solar energy into electricity production in Brazil from 1992-2017. To this 
end, I conducted 43 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with regulators, policymakers, and 
energy professionals to investigate how the Brazilian Energy Regulatory Agency (Aneel) has 
supported the diffusion of renewable energy. I also conducted expert interviews in the states of 
São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte to analyze the institutional and political 
mechanisms that shape the market formation of renewable energy at the regional level. 
An ongoing trend in regulatory reforms is to re-organize electricity sectors around 
economic arguments. To this extent, regulatory agencies are expected to focus wholly on 
economic and supportive administrative matters and treat the regulated industry as a problem of 
technical management. Countering this reform model driven by economic considerations, and 
top-down understandings of policy implementation, I found that the line between policy and 
regulation is not so clear. Political and administrative settings shaped regulators' values and 
interests, and thereby influenced how they translated renewable energy policies into practice. 
Moreover, rather than lagging behind or opposing technological change, regulators have taken on 
an enabling role for new renewable technologies. In so doing, the standard model for electricity 
reform would predict a highly inefficient energy sector shunned by private investors. In fact, 
Aneel’s willingness to lead in regulatory policy-making has improved the sector’s legitimacy and 
credibility. A closer look at regulatory practice is thus critical for understanding how electricity 
reforms affect renewable energy outcomes. 
The Brazilian electricity sector reveals how electricity reforms and institutional settings 
can create opportunities for renewable energy development. Brazil is distinguished by its 
centralized state involvement and an electricity mix dominated by hydropower. Capturing the 
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energy of falling water, hydroelectric plants generate up to 85% of the country’s electricity on a 
given day, whereas the global average wavers around 16% (IEA, 2014). It is also the 9th largest 
producer of electricity in the world (CIA, 2015). In the midst of an economic crisis aggravated 
by the poor financial performance of state-owned companies, Brazil entered the worldwide trend 
of market-oriented reforms in the 1990s. The power sector was rebuilt on the idea that new 
regulatory agencies would govern the private sector companies henceforth responsible for energy 
infrastructure. At the same time, the conventional view shared by politicians, utilities managers, 
and the general public was that the country should continue to exploit its “natural abundance” in 
hydrological resources, implying that non-hydro energy sources were to have a limited role. 
Therefore, while carbon emissions from electricity generation in Brazil are low compared to 
other countries, the hydroelectric system has created a situation of “lock-in” (Unruh, 2000). In 
other words, hydropower’s institutionalized features and characteristics have made it difficult to 
introduce alternative energy technologies that could improve the electricity sector by bolstering 
supply security and offering new solutions to providing power to consumers.  
Within this technological and institutional landscape erected by hydropower, the cases of 
wind and solar illustrate how regulators have gained authority to facilitate the deployment of 
emerging renewable technologies. To analyze the case of wind energy, I focus on how the 
energy regulator, Aneel, has administered Brazil’s main policy support instrument, energy 
auctions, to increase its renewable energy capacity. Following electricity reforms, in 2004 the 
Brazilian government enacted an auction scheme to set target levels of investment in renewable 
energy. In practice, auctions do not guarantee that renewable energy projects will be built. 
Awarded projects can experience delays, or become abandoned after an auction has taken place. 
By mediating “troublesome” wind projects on a case-by-case basis, the success of Aneel’s 
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implementation strategy depended on how it held project developers liable to their obligations as 
market participants. Aneel also collaborated with industry stakeholders to find adaptive solutions 
to regulatory problems that emerged during implementation. Auction results may thus initially 
look favorable and lower the price for electricity, but Aneel’s reputation for enforcement and 
being a collaborative problem-solver in the electricity sector contributed to the effective 
implementation of wind energy.  
In the case of solar energy, Aneel has taken the lead to promote small-scale photovoltaic 
(PV) systems. My examination of solar differs from the case of wind energy in that it presents a 
chronological analysis of the development of distributed generation regulations. When the 
electricity industry was re-structured in the 1990s, the new rules of operation were rebuilt around 
the characteristics of large hydroelectric generators. Specific rules and regulations did not exist 
for small-scale generation systems. Aneel has used this policy gap as an opportunity to advance 
the widespread deployment of distributed generation technologies. Since 2008, Aneel has built 
out the governing framework for net-metering to compensate small-scale system owners for the 
electricity they supply to the grid, using each regulatory review as an opportunity for learning 
and iteration. At the same time, incumbent utilities have often proven hostile to new policies, 
speaking out against Aneel’s authority to provide regulatory support for distributed generation. 
In response, Aneel has had to defend its authority while using public consultation procedures to 
consolidate a broad coalition that supports distributed generation technologies. Regulators have 
strategically used the dynamic nature of the implementation process to adapt the electricity 
system to the characteristics of small-scale solar energy.  
This study further examines the transition of the energy system by focusing on the 
regional scale. While much of the academic discussion about energy systems has centered on the 
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policy positions of national governments to replace fossil fuels with low-carbon alternatives 
(Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004;  Kern & Smith, 2008; Verbong & Geels, 2008), scholars have 
pointed to how conditions in particular locations support technological alternatives and energy 
transitions (Bulkeley et al., 2010; Smith, 2007; Truffer, Murphy, & Raven, 2015). The three 
Brazilian states of Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and São Paulo were chosen as 
comparative case studies to analyze the regional factors that have supported or impeded the 
implementation of wind, solar, and distributed solar energy generation. The main questions 
addressed in this study are: What regional initiatives and policy processes have emerged to 
stimulate the deployment of wind and solar in Brazil?  Furthermore, to what extent can regional 
transition processes and policies complement or strengthen national energy planning and 
prerogatives? 
I found that state governments have an underappreciated role in devising initiatives to 
support wind and solar energy technologies. In addition to natural resource endowments, each 
region has its own geography, industrial base, and political context that lend more or less 
credibility to arguments about what energy sources should be developed within its borders. 
Renewable energy programs in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte have convinced federal 
authorities that solar and wind technologies could compete in energy auctions, breaking political 
inertia at the federal level. Prior investments in energy infrastructure and hydroelectric expansion 
also structure energy governance at the regional level. For example, moving large amounts of 
hydroelectricity to power cities in the South was the overriding principle in planning long-
distance transmission lines. Under this system, semiarid states in the Northeast were not 
conceived of as energy producers because of their lack of hydrological resources. The 
consequent absence of transmission lines to connect these regions of high wind potential is one 
7 
 
of the main barriers to developing wind energy in the country. Similarly, São Paulo’s choice to 
emphasize natural gas and biogas, instead of wind and solar, can be explained by the state’s 
plentiful offshore oil and natural gas reserves and status as the main sugarcane ethanol producer 
state in the country.  
The main contributions of this dissertation speak to the debate over how institutional 
arrangements influence the implementation of renewable energy markets. The standard model 
for power reform has approached “politics” and “weak institutions” as barriers to be cleared in 
order to sideline the state and provide space for markets to operate properly (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Victor & Heller, 2007). Similarly, the “politics” of regulation are often 
overlooked for renewable energy policies, where policy analysts focus almost exclusively on 
design elements to improve project outcomes. By drawing attention to the institutional and socio-
technical dimensions that govern renewable energy policies, I argue that the implementation of 
renewable energy programs is inextricably tied to the institutional values of regulators. Given 
that energy regulators have to enforce rules and decisions that are regularly challenged by private 
actors and other public authorities, they seek to ensure support for wind and solar energy in ways 
that reinforce their legitimacy and authority in the electricity sector. Aneel’s credibility in 
negotiating the tensions between regulatory stability and adaptive policymaking is critical for the 
long-term governance of wind and solar energy. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents the theoretical literature 
on which this dissertation is based. It first reviews the “standard model” for electricity reform 
and the contested purpose of utilities regulations, aiming to show the progression of regulation 
from its conception as economic management to the gradual recognition of regulation’s diverse 
political and social objectives. It also surveys the use of public policies to stimulate renewable 
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energy and analytical approaches to studying socio-technical transitions in energy systems. 
Chapter Three then summarizes the research design and methodology. Chapter Four traces the 
processes and power sector reforms that have influenced the present regulatory structure in the 
Brazilian electricity sector. Public support schemes for renewable energy are shown to be 
influenced by the rules and socio-technical characteristics of an electricity system defined by 
hydroelectric power. Seen in this light, the work of regulators gains importance in aligning the 
institutional setting to the needs of non-hydro technologies. Chapter Five turns to the regulatory 
approaches for wind and small-scale solar energy, and how and why energy regulators have 
prompted distinctive organizational processes for each type of energy technology. Chapter Six 
examines the three state case studies of São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte, 
describing under what conditions states exercise autonomy to set policy agendas for solar and 
wind technologies. 
Chapter Seven presents this dissertation’s conclusions and policy implications. Together, 
these findings demonstrate that independent regulation, a central element of electricity 
restructuring, is also a potentially effective site for social and environmental policy. In Brazil, 
regulators have frequently taken the lead to ensure the implementation of wind and solar 
technologies which have been characterized, to varying degrees, as less compatible with the 
underlying policy regime. It is thus more useful to jettison the false dichotomy of policymaking 
versus economic regulation. An inherent part of what regulators do is fill in the details of broad 
government policy. The fact that they oftentimes accomplish this in ways that adhere to their 
organizational values and preferences does not necessarily conflict with their regulatory 
mandate. Rather, the regulatory setting is an overlooked aspect for understanding effective 
renewable energy policies. Within this changing policy environment, state governments 
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demonstrate a wide range of policies and responses. States that exhibit a strong commitment 
have contributed to the learning and technological development of renewable alternatives that, 





















Since the 1980s, the utilities industry has transitioned from a model of government 
ownership to market-based paradigms. Independent regulatory agencies emerged as a key 
component of a globally applied model for reforming and restructuring electricity sectors. 
Theoretically insulated from political pressures, independent regulation was intended to ensure 
economic efficiency and provide stability for market participants. It has generally not been 
considered an effective nor appropriate means for achieving policy objectives, such as the 
development of renewable energy. In this regard, opponents of government intervention have 
stressed that regulatory activities should be restricted to maintaining industry efficiency, while 
advocates of renewable energy have often portrayed regulations as barriers to innovation. As a 
result, little attention has been paid to the possible enabling role of regulators and regulatory 
frameworks in energy transitions.  
This chapter begins by reviewing conventional and alternative perspectives to restructuring 
and regulating public utilities. It then surveys the use of public support schemes to promote 
renewable energy sources, and analytical frameworks for studying how energy-based socio-
technical systems develop, diffuse, and block new renewable energy technologies. A main 
feature of these approaches is that institutional and regulatory change is crucial to the successful 
diffusion of renewable energy. It then discusses previous contributions to local and regional 
approaches to energy transitions research.  The chapter concludes by explaining how this 




2.1. The Standard Model for Electricity Reforms 
Largely due to ideological reasons, the 1980s marked a fundamental rethinking of the 
government provision of basic services. The traditional justification that utilities should be 
publically owned and operated was called into question. In particular, the idea of “state failure” 
came to explain a range of challenges facing electricity, telecommunications, water, and roads. 
Opponents of Keynesian ideas held the state responsible for a legacy of underinvestment in 
infrastructure, poor service quality, and insufficient revenue (Furlong, 2012, p. 2722).  In a few 
short years, there was a rush to anoint a new conventional wisdom—that privatization and 
competition in utilities sectors was not only possible, but inevitable (Dubash, 2003, p. 144). The 
shift from public monopolies to governance arrangements that encouraged private sector 
participation came to be seen as the more appropriate and efficient means to manage 
infrastructures (Graham & Marvin, 2001; Sanyal, 1994, p.7).  
In developing countries, the state-led provision of basic services was also under attack by 
both the right and the left. In the 1950s and 1960s, economic policy had assigned the state a 
substantial role in economic development and industrialization (Bresser-Pereira, 2009; Johnson, 
1982; Wade, 1990; 2003). The dominant development paradigm at the time was defined by 
government intervention oriented towards the long-term growth needs of underdeveloped 
economies. By the 1970s, however, the project of development had yet to deliver on its robust 
promises and many countries were still experiencing disappointing economic performance. 
Consequently, development economics and its focal actor, the state, were charged with the 
intellectual responsibility for what went wrong (Hirschman, 1981, p.19-23; Sanyal, 1994). This 
growing distrust in the ability of the state to provide conditions for economic development 
provided a critical opening for neoclassical economists who were finally able to gain traction and 
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express misgivings that state intervention was inefficient, even perverse (Lal, 1983). Moreover, 
in unexpected agreement with the neoclassical critique, neo-Marxists echoed political capture 
theories, claiming that the developmental state had been co-opted and had stymied real systems 
change (Hirschman, 1981, p.14; Sanyal, 1994). 
As a result of this far-reaching intellectual shift, proponents of a new model called for the 
withdrawal of the state and more involvement of the private sector. The privatization of 
government services and infrastructure began to be touted as a solution to the problems of big 
government, fiscal deficits, and the need to rebuild infrastructure and expand the provision of 
basic services. Simultaneously, the philosophies embodied in the “new public management” 
emphasized forced budget reductions and the contracting out of additional responsibilities to the 
private sector or third-party organizations when government involvement could be judged as 
inefficient or redundant (Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Wilks, 1996, p. 541). 
These reforms sought to increase administrative efficiencies and provide greater autonomy and 
higher levels of consumption based on individual utility. The growing currency of the term 
“service delivery” reflected individual claims to consumption, not collective ones, and the 
treatment of basic services as commodities (Herman & Ausubel, 1988; Whitefield, 2001).  
In short, the pro-market shift deeply transformed both the goals and the means of public 
policy. According to Majone (1997), in the post-war era of economic reconstruction, mainstream 
public policy in the West centered on discretionary macroeconomic management and industrial 
planning.  In contrast, it now centers on making markets and making them work (Majone, 1997, 
p. 147). The Washington Consensus further consolidated and transmitted these characteristically 
“neoliberal” policy recommendations to debt-ridden countries in the global South. International 
lending institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
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International Development Bank began to approach privatization as a necessary, technical matter 
(Goldman, 2006, p. 60; Kapur & Lewis, 1997).The selling off of state-owned utilities assets to 
private firms was often required in their project lending for large capital investments. 
For electricity sectors, a “standard model” for reform gradually replaced state ownership 
and operation. First informed by developments in primarily industrialized countries, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway, this model has been applied throughout the 
developed and developing world (Gilbert & Kahn, 1996; Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008, p.567). 
Previously, government ownership of electric utilities monopolies was often justified on the 
grounds that the state was the best custodian of the public interest (Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008). 
These public utility companies were typically vertically integrated and offered a full range of 
power services, including transmission, distribution and generation, all of which they directly 
controlled to ensure coordination among these different segments. These firms in turn were 
granted exclusive franchises to supply electricity to residential, commercial and industrial retail 
consumers within a defined geographic area (Joskow, 2008). The main difference across 
countries was whether the utility monopolies were publicly or privately controlled, with the 
United States, Germany and Japan exhibiting significant private ownership, albeit with heavy 
government regulation of the industry. Most countries, however, opted for public ownership 
(Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008, p. 3949).  
Under the standard model, private sector participation was highlighted as the means to 
improve sector performance and make electricity production more efficient and less costly. 
Ideology played a significant role, and reforms were meant to address utilities’ ostensibly poor 
financial management and restrict the state’s ability to use public utilities to pursue costly 
political agendas. In practice, improving sector competition translated into separating generation 
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and retail supply from segments that continued to be regulated, such as distribution and 
transmission. This “unbundling” of the electricity-supply function from distribution was based 
on the theory that only the wires (the fixed network system) constituted a natural monopoly, 
whereas the generation of power did not (Lazar, 2016, p. 9). These reform efforts were also 
meant to attract investments in infrastructure as the public sector was seen as no longer able to 
provide the requisite funds for system expansion (Jamasb, 2002).  
The establishment of credible regulatory agencies was seen as a fundamental step to 
restructuring electricity sectors (Jacinct & Morgan, 2012; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Vogel, 
1996; Wilks, 1996). Reformers argued that the growing reliance on the private sector 
necessitated a governmental capacity to manage public-private relationships (Kettle, 1980, p.6), 
while maintaining a critical distance from the traditional bureaucracy. In this light, independent 
regulatory agencies were placed at the center of redesigning infrastructure sectors. In developing 
countries, they were often part of loan conditions set by multilateral development banks that 
prescribed deregulation and restructuring (Dubash & Morgan, 2013). 
Studies of electricity reform have focused on the optimal design for these new regulatory 
agencies. Above all, the literature has underscored that agency independence and autonomy 
should insulate utilities from other branches of government. An enduring concern in regulatory 
policy-making is that of political manipulation, whereby arbitrary government actions can 
undermine regulatory credibility and consequently discourage private investment (Dubash, 
2005). Relatedly, a common practice has been for governments to use state-owned electricity 
utilities to play a number of political functions such as industrial growth and macroeconomic 
stabilization (Victor & Heller, 2007). Governments have often required electric utilities to supply 
low-priced electricity or have manipulated electricity prices as part of anti-inflationary programs. 
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For example, during bouts of hyperinflation in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s, the price for 
electricity was reduced, only to be drastically increased later (Spiller & Martorell, 1996, p.91).  
The debate over regulatory design also centers on financial independence and sector-
specific training. In order to be able to dispense the right incentives, reward or punish 
performance, and establish reliable rules, a common argument is that regulatory agencies should 
have their own source of revenue removed from the general budget process. If the regulatory 
agency were to depend on general appropriations from the treasury, it could be subjected to 
“political retaliation” for its decisions. Furthermore, regulatory policy should be administered by 
a professional class of experts equipped with a more competent understanding of technical 
issues. Prior to the establishment of independent regulatory agencies, untrained politicians or 
civil servants had generally not been recruited based on merit or specialized technical knowledge 
of the sectors that they administered (Guasch & Spiller, 1999, p. 77; Jordana, Levi-Faur, & 
Marín,  2011). They thus lacked the expertise to make decisions about technical matters. A lack 
of academic training was also believed to compromise a regulator’s dedication to unbiased 
decision-making, leading to judgements based on political considerations. Therefore, it has been 
recommended that regulatory agencies recruit and retain qualified and experienced employees. 
2.2. The Politics of Utilities Regulation 
While regulatory agencies have been central to market-oriented reforms, the normative 
debate continues to be polarized by those who favor and those who oppose regulations based on 
ideological grounds. Critics often treat regulation as imposing a burden. While regulation may be 
needed, they portray regulatory intervention as a second-best choice to markets and private 
orderings (Shleifer, 2005, p. 440). Competition and “freer” markets are advanced as the preferred 
solution to protect consumer welfare and prevent industry from abusing its market position 
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(Costello, 2009; Prosser, 2010). On the other hand, proponents of regulation emphasize an 
agency's role in protecting public interests. Such actors involved in the regulatory process are 
said to seek the “best” policy, in some civic sense, and are not motivated principally by 
individual self-interest or the prospect of personal gain. As part of their mandate, regulators 
exercise authority to protect the public from the abuse of private economic power, particularly 
monopoly behavior (Levine & Forrence, 1990, p. 168; Vogel, 1996, p. 10).  
Stemming from this underlying ideological debate, the purpose of utilities regulation 
varies with one’s perspective. Economic theories have greatly influenced approaches for 
designing and evaluating systems of regulation. Economists see regulation as a means to exploit 
economies of scale from natural monopolies while reducing economic loss in markets with 
imperfections, such as high entry barriers and insufficient information (Hempling, 2013). The 
challenge for regulators is consequently to strike a balance in order to protect consumers and 
enhance efficiency without choking off private initiative. When a market is characterized as a 
natural monopoly, which has traditionally been the case for water and electricity, or when a 
sector that was once dominated by a handful of state-owned firms is privatized, regulation is 
often seen as necessary to avoid rent-seeking behavior. Another task for regulators is to devise a 
“rate-of-return” regulation or some form of cost-based pricing which sufficiently remunerates the 
investments of private investors while penalizing inefficiency. For example, in setting prices for 
electricity, regulators are often directed to set rates that are “just and reasonable” to provide the 
utility an opportunity to earn fair returns (Lazar, 2016).  
A related perspective based on economic institutionalism contends that regulations are 
the best method to enforce contracts that safeguard the interests of both consumers and 
producers. For utilities and infrastructure sectors characterized by high fixed costs and 
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government concessions, long-run contracts play an important role. Influenced by transaction 
cost economics (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1975; 1998), regulations are viewed as fundamental 
to the establishment and enforcement of property rights that provide the security needed for long-
term investments and adequately handling market opportunism and uncertainty. Through 
regulatory agencies, government can formalize and institutionalize its commitments to protecting 
consumers and investors by maintaining contracts. Regulators and commissioners have the 
power to monitor, enforce, and review contracts and, in particular, to modify these contracts 
following a review (Stern, 2012; Williamson, 1998). In upholding the goals of economic 
regulation, contract monitoring and enforcement assures that consumers receive goods and 
services from private providers at a reasonable price, while protecting private investors from 
sudden changes to the “rules of the game.” 
In recent years, this paradigm of the public utilities regulator that restricts its activities to 
economic management has been challenged. One view from political science is that the 
recalibration of state–market relations in the 1990s transformed both the goals and the means of 
public policy. In this sense, regulatory institutions have increasingly been responsible for social 
and political goals that the welfare state once handled directly (Majone, 2007; Vogel, 1996), in 
addition to managing markets. In a similar manner, there has been concern that few studies on 
regulations and infrastructure provision accurately reflect the experiences of developing 
countries. When it comes to social provisions, there has been a historical inadequacy to achieve 
universal access to electricity or to mitigate the environmental impacts caused by certain energy 
choices. In cases where urgent policy concerns have not been adequately solved by direct state 
intervention, policy-oriented regulations could be more appropriate remedies. Scholars of 
developing countries have notably emphasized that the neat distinction between efficiency and 
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social interests, a frame often used by economic theories to evaluate systems of regulation, may 
not take into full consideration the unique social and political conditions facing infrastructure 
sectors in developing countries (Dubash, 2005; Dubash & Morgan, 2013; Gratwick & Eberhard, 
2008). 
In addition to changing models of political economy, scholars and practitioners have 
broadened the concept of utilities regulation to consider a wide range of rationales that include 
social functions and responsibilities (Prosser, 2010, p.2). The view that economic, social, and 
distributive goals are typically inseparable has gained traction with critics of the standard model. 
A major point of contention is that efficiency-enhancing regulations do not necessarily guarantee 
that markets can adequately supply public goods. For example, a major concern is that power 
sector reforms will be harmful to the poor and low-income households (Dubash 2003; Haber, 
2010; von Schnitzler, 2016). Even in a functioning market and regulatory regime in which 
suppliers meet all regulatory demands, citizens may still face high energy bills or disconnection 
due to an inability to pay. Instead, regulation may be a first choice to administer an arena of 
social provision for which markets are considered inappropriate (Prosser, 2010, p.3).  
Scholars further argue that utilities regulation is necessarily a political endeavor. Since 
regulatory agencies operate at the intersection of both public and private sector influences, it may 
not be useful to maintain conceptual boundaries between “policymaking” and “regulating.” In 
practice, both policymakers and regulators make policy (Brown, 2003). The distinction is that 
policymakers define the fundamentals and parameters within which policymaking is delegated to 
regulators. Within the scope of authority granted to them by the government, regulators exercise 
discretionary power in pursuit of regulatory goals. An inescapable fact of regulatory life is that 
regulators make choices as to what aspects of their regulatory remit they will try to achieve, and 
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those that it will not (Black, 2006, p.157). In cases where they have limited policy guidance from 
government ministries, regulators have a capacity to pursue a goal in ways that best promotes 
that goal, or in areas where rules are absent, ambiguous, or conflicting (Forsyth, 1999). In effect, 
regulators carry out their mandates and adjudicate priorities in ways that deviate from their 
original apolitical design, and this is a natural part of the policymaking process. 
Therefore, as the administrative patrons of broader polices, regulators have the discretion 
to reinterpret what a policy means. They can choose to act or refrain in ways that reconstructs its 
form and function (Yanow, 1996). By recognizing the agency of regulators in the policy process, 
it becomes apparent that regulation shares much in common with studies of policy 
implementation. In a basic sense, implementation studies examine the factors that lead to policy 
success. For example, Pressman and Wildavsky’s classic Implementation traces a promising 
policy that gets derailed because of actors with divergent interests, an unclear policy mandate, 
and a lack of resources and political support. This strand of implementation theory measures 
implementation based on policy outcomes that can then be used to develop generalizable causal 
theories to solve policy problems. 
The “top-down” perspective further sees policy designers as central actors in the 
implementation process. Local actors are often viewed as impediments to implementation since 
the emphasis is on clear and consistent goals that can carry a policy from its enactment to a 
desired state of affairs (Matland, 1995). In contrast, “bottom-up” approaches to implementation 
argue that carrying out any new policy or reform entails more than just a well-designed set of 
policy instructions and procedures. Furthermore, while outcome information about a particular 
policy is important in and of itself, it does not say much about the programs that produced them 
(Matland, 1995, p. 147). This approach fundamentally takes issue with top-down and linear 
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models of policymaking that oversimplify the policy process by assuming that ideas lead to 
enactment and enactment leads to implementation. In the actual working-out of policy on the 
ground, however, the ideas that went into policymaking are reexamined and reinterpreted. A 
policy with successful outcomes thus results not from getting first the ideas and then the 
implementation right, but from groping toward workable ideas (Lin, 2002, p. 37). Lipsky’s 
(1980) main premise in Street-Level Bureaucracy, that service deliverers ultimately determine 
policy, is a major tenet of the bottom-up model. The purposes and values of those who 
implement policy, which may differ greatly from those of policy designers, have a crucial role in 
reconstructing what a policy means and how it is executed. A given policy, therefore, cannot be 
easily described by what exists on paper in a law, a regulation, or an agency memo, but is given 
form by actors who implement policies.  
In this light, regulators have an important role in the policy process by applying broad 
policy to specific circumstances and cases. Moreover, policymakers cannot anticipate all issues 
when enacting a policy: unforeseen issues inevitably arise, and market conditions change over 
time. For example, regulators routinely clarify definitions of what constitutes improper exercise 
of market power in electricity generation, and contemplate their role and authority in reducing 
carbon emissions (Bateman & Tripp, 2014; Knee, 2011; Owen, 2008). In fact, while 
policymakers and government officials design policies, regulators make policy in reaction to 
matters raised in specific cases or disputes (Brown, 2002). In so doing, they encounter matters 
that require detailed interpretation of policy or filling in gaps left by policymakers. This is an 
inherent part of what regulators have to do in order to carry out their mandates. The degree of 
flexibility in the regulatory process allows regulators to make appropriate incremental changes 
and avoid undue politicization of relatively minor issues (Brown, 2003). Ensuring that 
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policymaking by regulators is accomplished under the delegation of authority from the state is 
checked by policymakers who possess the ultimate authority to change policy on a prospective 
basis. Appellate review also provides a means to contest the legal basis of regulatory decision-
making.  
The attention to regulatory practice has led scholars to look at what regulators actually do 
in order to rethink principles for evaluating regulatory agencies. Sociological and 
governmentality theories particularly associated with Ayres and Braithwaite’s (1992) Responsive 
Regulation have centered on how regulatory responses are an essential strategy of market 
governance. The basic idea of “responsive regulation” is that governments should be responsive 
to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist 
response is needed. The concept also suggests that participation of third party groups in the 
regulatory process can assure the accountability of discretion. This underlines the view that 
regulation should be viewed as a process through which regulators consider stakeholder interests 
(Prosser, 2005). From this perspective, regulatory legitimacy lies in wide participation in 
decision-making rather than mere technical expertise (Prosser 1999; Hira, Huxtable, and Leger 
2005). This approach goes against theories of regulation that advocate for a clearly defined 
program or a set of prescriptions concerning the best way to regulate. On the contrary, the best 
strategy depends on context, regulatory culture, and history (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p.5).  
2.3.      Policy Support Schemes for Renewable Energy 
The privatization and commercialization of electric utilities occurred at the same time as 
governments made greater efforts to increase their shares of renewable energy. According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), renewable energy resources are, “energy 
resources that are naturally replenishing but flow-limited; inexhaustible in duration but limited in 
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the amount of energy available per unit of time” (EIA, 2017). They are not depleted when used. 
Renewable energy resources for electricity generation include hydro, solar, wind, biomass, 
geothermal, ocean thermal, wave action, and tidal action. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) further specifies energy derived from biogases and the 
renewable fraction of municipal waste as part of its overall definition of renewable energy.1 
Conventional fossil fuels – petroleum, natural gas, coal – are considered nonrenewable because 
they take millions of years to form and are available in limited supplies. Fossil fuels are the 
dominant source of energy in the world, contributing about 66% of global electricity production 
in 2016 (World Bank, 2016).   
Internationally, the first oil crisis in 1973 encouraged investments in alternative energy 
technologies (Nemet, 2009). A greater use of renewable energy sources was seen as one way for 
governments to reduce their reliance on oil imports. In addition to improving long-term security 
of supply, environmentally-motivated organizations and initiatives also began to argue for the 
potential of renewables to address environmental problems and serve as a sustainable alternative 
to nuclear energy. The environmental movement of the 1970s supported renewables as being less 
polluting and less likely to contribute to environmental degradation. The Our Common Future 
report, published by the United Nations Brundtland Commission in 1987, further drew attention 
to the need of reducing air pollution and anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions (Breukers, 2006, p.22; WCED, 1987). In general, governments created policies that 
stimulated renewable energy sources that were already relatively mature at the beginning of this 
period, such as large-scale hydropower and certain types of biomass.  
 
                                                          
1 In line with this definition, nuclear energy is not considered a renewable source of energy because conventional 
nuclear fission relies on finite stores of uranium that have been extended only through technological improvements 







“New renewables” such as wind and solar began to gain a modest proportion of the 
market in the 1980s. For wind energy, early actors at the national level included the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany, and the United States (Street & Miles, 1996). This first “Wind Rush” 
centered on investing in large, utilities-scale wind turbines that could be manufactured by firms 
involved in aerospace technology or agricultural machinery (Heymann, 1999). Over time, wind 
energy has become the fastest growing renewable energy source in the world. At the end of 
2015, wind energy reached a global installed capacity of 487 GW (IRENA, 2016). Countries 
outside of Europe and North America have emerged as markets for wind power production and 
domestic manufacturing. For instance, in 2010, China’s cumulative installed capacity in wind 
energy reached approximately 45 GW, which enabled it to surpass the United States and become 
the world’s largest wind market (Ru et al., 2012). Technological advances since the time of the 
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oil crisis have made a range of commercial wind turbines available, including the exploration of 
offshore and ocean-based wind power. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the development of solar photovoltaic technologies increased 
dramatically as an outgrowth of space exploration. While Japanese and U.S. companies were 
early leaders in solar PV manufacturing, solar energy lagged behind more mature sources of 
renewable electricity. In the United States, the enactment of the federal Public Utility Regulatory 
Policy Act (PURPA) and the Energy Tax Act (ETA) in 1978 spurred the creation of new utility-
scale solar and wind electricity systems which encouraged homeowners to invest in energy 
conservation and solar technologies through tax credits. Germany joined this momentum for 
solar energy in the mid-1980s. A national feed-in tariff program guaranteed grid access to 
renewable energy power producers as well as long-term price guarantees for the electricity they 
generated, spurring global cost reductions for solar. The boom of the solar cell industry in China 
and Taiwan in 2006 has driven prices down even farther. Today, China produces more than two 
thirds of the world’s PV – more than the United States, Japan, and Germany combined (Brown, 
2015).  
Once viewed merely in terms of the environmental movement, renewable energy 
technologies have made considerable progress in substituting fossil fuel-based sources of 
electricity. Not all alternative energy technologies, however, are commercially mature or have 
reached adequate levels of economic performance. In part, this is because renewable energy has 
confronted a variety of economic, regulatory, or institutional disadvantage relative to other forms 
of energy (Beck & Martinot, 2004, p. 366). A common economic argument is that the full social 
costs of greenhouse-gas emissions are not reflected in current market prices for fossil fuels. This 
“mispricing” of fossil fuels suppresses the demand for technological substitutes for fossil fuel 
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technologies. In addition, incumbent technologies have benefitted from past R&D subsidies and 
other forms of government support. The mass production and extensive operating experience 
with these technologies has reduced uncertainties about their performance and reliability 
(Menanteau, Finon, & Lamy, 2003, p.800; Mowery, Nelson, & Martin, 2010, p. 1013). 
2.3.1. Comparing Renewable Energy Policies 
A growing objective among governments has been to create a more level playing field for 
renewable energy technologies. The liberalization of electricity markets was originally thought to 
provide the necessary opportunities to create competitive markets for renewable energy. In 
theory, energy producers, suppliers, and consumers would have more freedom to choose between 
different types of electricity. Consumers would no longer be bound to one supplier, and those 
who wanted to pay for an “environmental good” could purchase green electricity directly from 
renewable energy producers. The experimentation with energy market liberalization in United 
States, Germany, and the Netherlands, however, has shown that consumers’ willingness to pay 
for renewable energy is relatively low (Menanteau, Finon, & Lamy, 2003, p.800). In case studies 
which have allowed consumers to purchase renewable energy, the proportion of green electricity 
purchases is around 2-3%, except in situations where there are strong incentives in the form of 
tax exemptions (Jegen & Wüstenhagen, 2001). These experiences suggest that individual choices 
do not fully reflect the real value that the public may place on developing renewable 
technologies. 
Since market forces cannot guarantee the development of renewable technologies, a 
number of policy instruments have been formulated. Financial instruments, such as tax credits 
and loans with below-market interest rates, have been used to provide incentives for renewable 
energy by reducing the costs of such investments (Olmos, Ruester, & Liong, 2012). Notably, an 
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ongoing debate has centered on “demand-pull” and “technology-push” policies (Nemet, 2009; 
Peters et al, 2012). Demand-pull policies aim to increase the market demand for renewable 
electricity through subsidies and other financial incentives, and in turn spur further innovation. In 
contrast, technology-push policies are supply-driven and are meant to foster technological 
options by directly supporting research in science and technology. Influenced by the success of 
“Big Science” in the 1940s,2 the core idea is that advances in scientific understanding determine 
the rate and direction of innovation and satisfy market needs. The balance between demand-pull 
policies and technology-push policies has strongly shifted toward demand-pull in recent years 
(Hoppmann et al., 2015), although a general agreement exists that promoting specific 
combinations or “policy mixes” from both of these categories is needed (Peters et al., 2012). 
The decision to design policies based on setting prices or quantities forms the backbone 
of demand-pull policies. In the case of price-setting policies, favorable pricing regimes are 
established for renewable energy relative to other sources of generation. The quantity of 
investments obtained under such regimes is unspecified, but prices are stated in advance. Feed-in 
tariffs (FITs) are common price-setting mechanisms which provide developers with long-term 
power purchase agreements for the sale of their electricity. These purchase agreements typically 
offer a specified price for every kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity produced and are structured 
by contracts ranging from 10-25 years (Klein, 2008, Lipp, 2007). In the United States, the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policy Act was the first program to use of a feed-in policy that required 
electric utilities to purchase renewable electricity at the projected wholesale or “avoided cost” of 
conventional or fossil fuel-based electricity (Martinot, Wiser, & Hamrin, 2005). Countries such 
                                                          
2 ‘‘Big Science’’ refers to government investment in science and technology which began in the 1940s, led by the 
United States. Technical change was seen as a process in which scientific discoveries automatically led to useful 




as Denmark, Italy, Austria, France, and Netherlands have adopted feed-in tariffs as their main 
electricity support schemes, combined with quota obligations or other tax incentives (Haas, et al., 
2011). The cost of subsidizing producers is covered either through cross-subsidies among all 
electricity producers, taxpayer monies, or a combination of both systems to share the burden 
more equitably (Menanteau, Finon, & Lamy, 2003, p.802). 
In contrast, quantity-forcing policies define a certain percentage or amount of renewable 
electricity to be developed. The final price for the electricity generated is then decided in the 
marketplace. The two main quantity-forcing policies are renewable energy obligations and 
energy auctions, also known as competitive bidding or tendering schemes (Beck & Martinot, 
2004, p. 370; Bergek & Jacobsson, 2010).  Renewable energy obligations require a minimum 
share of renewable energy in the electricity supply. Obligated utilities must ensure that targets 
are met either through their own generation, renewable energy purchases from electricity 
producers, or direct sales from third parties to the utility’s customers (Beck & Martinot, 2004, p. 
372). Early national examples of energy targeting in Europe include national legislation, such as 
the United Kingdom’s Renewables Obligation (RO) (Haas et al., 2001; Reiche & Bechberger, 
2004). In the United States, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) have been widely used by 
state governments to encourage the deployment of renewable energy (Rabe, 2004; Wiser, 
Barbose, & Holt, 2011). 
2.3.2. Energy Auctions 
While feed-in tariffs have been the most common support mechanism for renewable 
energy, auctions have gained popularity and have been implemented in over 60 countries, 
including Brazil (Ferroukhi, Hawila, & Vinci, S, 2015). An energy auction is a type of quantity-
based policy that is used to procure renewable electricity. To carry out an auction, the 
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government typically issues a call for tenders to procure a certain capacity or generation of 
energy. Project developers who participate in the auction typically submit a bid with a price per 
unit of electricity at which they are able to realize the project. The auctioneer evaluates the offers 
on the basis of the price and other criteria and signs a power purchase agreement with successful 
bidders until the targeted level of electricity is reached. The auction winners are guaranteed the 
purchase of their renewable electricity for a specific period of time at the pay-as-bid price. The 
United Kingdom’s Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) scheme, introduced in 1989, pioneered 
the usage of this type of mechanism. Early auction schemes also existed under France’s Eole 
program to promote wind energy (Menanteau et al., p.802).   
The debate on the relative advantages of auctions versus other policy options generally 
centers on costs, ease of implementation, and technological innovation. Unlike feed-in tariffs, 
which have proven to be costly in terms of subsidies payments to producers, an advantage of 
competitive bidding procedures is that they can lead to rapidly declining prices for renewable 
energy. The level of subsidies for renewable electricity generation can be controlled, where the 
organization of successive tendering procedures progressively reveals the shape of the cost curve 
for renewable electricity. In general, auctions are advanced as encouraging technology cost 
reductions (Beck & Martinot, 2004, p. 371), while reducing support payments to incentivize 
renewable energy (Menanteau et al., 2003, p.807).  Several mature renewable energy markets, 
including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, have transitioned from FITs to using 
competitive procurement as a way to remedy subsidy budget deficits, high costs, and managing 
market saturation. Similarly, emerging markets have used auctions to procure cost-competitive 
renewables without subsidies (Munsell, 2017).  
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Despite the positive features of energy auctions, a major criticism is that competing 
participants bid below their true costs in order to secure contracts. After an auction has taken 
place, project developers are at times unable to meet the terms of the bid or end up insolvent 
(Beck & Martinot, 2004, p. 370), where project delays have also been a recurring concern. 
Specific to auction mechanisms, participants frequently engage in speculative strategic behavior 
by underbidding. This occurs when an auction participant submits an unprofitable bid price 
either knowingly or due to lack of experience. Bidders may seek to strategically influence the 
auction results through deliberate underbidding in order to increase their chances of winning, or 
when they have underestimated their own project costs (i.e., the “winner’s curse”). 
As a result, contracts awarded to low bidders do not always translate into projects on the 
ground, creating higher administrative costs for the organizing agency. For example, 
implementation rates of the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) in the UK between 1990 and 
1998 were at 38% of selected projects and only 26% of the contracted capacity. Similarly, in 
France and Italy, more than half of auctioned projects in solar and wind energy had not been 
finalized by their deadlines (Gephart, Klessmann, & Wigand, 2017). Moreover, in comparison to 
feed-in tariffs, energy auctions are argued to offer fewer incentives for technological innovation 
that enable manufacturers to invest more heavily in R&D. The prevailing policy concern, 
however, is whether auctions can effectively deliver targeted deployment levels as experience 
shows that winning projects may not always be implemented.  
The existing literature on energy auctions argues that observed weaknesses of auction 
schemes can be remedied by design choices. The goal is to identify and eliminate specific fail 
factors in auction designs in order to improve auction implementation rates. Typical fail factors 
include general risks related to project development and undesirable strategic behavior, namely 
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underbidding (Gephart, et al., 2017, p.151). Risks related to project development are not unique 
to auctions but exist for all policy support schemes for renewable energy, such as not obtaining 
planning consent or not having transmission lines to connect a project to the grid. A project 
developer may also lack sufficient experience which can result in unexpected cost increases and 
make the project economically infeasible.  
To correct these problems, the literature almost exclusively focuses on auction design 
elements to increase implementation rates. These design principles attempt to ensure that auction 
winners will deliver awarded projects. Common to most auction designs are material 
qualification requirements which require that participants provide evidence of planning consent 
and grid connection agreements in their project proposals. Other qualification requirements 
include proof of a bidder’s financial or technical capability. This includes “bid bonds” that need 
to be submitted together with the bid and which are reimbursed after project completion. 
Technical capability can mean providing evidence, for instance, of a certain amount of years of 
experience in developing similar projects. Predefining the period until project completion is 
another design element that is combined with qualification requirements and penalties to 
improve the effectiveness of an auction. Lastly, financial and non-financial penalties address the 
risk of unwanted strategic behavior by penalizing the non-implementation or delay of projects 
(Gephart et al., 2017, p.153).  
While the literature identifies factors that can influence auction success, there is little 
empirical evidence which shows how changes to design elements affect market outcomes. In 
part, there is less information about the long-term performance of renewable energy auctions 
since they have not been in operation as long as conventional feed-in tariffs and other support 
mechanisms. A combination of theoretical insights and empirical examples suggests that the use 
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of penalties and planning consent are important design elements that can improve the delivery of 
projects (Toke, 2015). For instance, Anaya and Pollitt (2014) comment that the absence of 
penalties was a factor in the failure of the United Kingdom’s Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) 
in the 1990s. Bayer et al. (2018) found that changes to auction designs in Brazil reduced project 
delays due to transmission grid issues. However, since the financial risk for transmission delays 
was transferred to the project developer in future auctions, the bidding price included an 
additional risk premium. In general, a drawback to enforcing higher implementation rates is 
increased risks for bidders, which can in turn increase auction prices (Gephart, et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the literature rarely discusses circumstances in which auction design 
changes have a negligible effect on mitigating project delays and non-delivery. In cases where 
options to alter auction design are limited, studies tend to focus on quality of project 
management. For example, to ensure access to a reliable supply of equipment, project developers 
can sign binding supply contracts before an auction occurs. However, supply problems can also 
arise due to the bankruptcy of commissioned equipment suppliers. These cases are beyond the 
control of the project developer and cannot be prevented by an advanced auction design (Bayer 
et al., 2018). Other policies that lie outside the auction design are not addressed, or are assumed 
to be secondary factors. For example, processing times for environmental licenses have 
historically caused significant delays for energy projects (Hochstetler, 2011), and for auctioned 
wind energy in particular (Nation Research Council, 2007). The literature focuses on improving 
outcomes directly through the auction process, rather than exploring the extent to which other 
policies facilitate or hinder implementation.   
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2.3.3. Distributed Generation and Net-Metering  
The traditional way to support renewable energy has been to offer financial incentives to 
construct renewable energy facilities. Examples of these incentives include aforementioned price 
and quantity-based mechanisms, research and development grants, and tax credits. Another 
popular incentive has been to support renewable electricity through distributed generation. 
Distributed generation – the production of electricity at or near the location where it is consumed 
– does not apply to only renewable energy, but can strongly influence renewable energy 
investments (Beck & Martinot, 2004, p. 380).3 Globally, the growing use of distributed 
generation has been a major driver of solar energy produced by photovoltaic panels (IEA, 
2017a). Most systems are “grid‐tied” and are connected to the distribution and transmission 
network. They send their excess electricity back to the utility to be used by other customers. 
Some distributed generation systems are not connected to a utility’s power grid and are thus 
considered “isolated.” This requires that distributed generation systems operate synchronously 
with the electric system, making them subject to certain operational and equipment requirements 
usually specified in an interconnection agreement or energy tariff (Lazar, 2016). 
The use of distributed generation systems raises important question for how systems 
owners should be compensated for the electricity they sell to the grid. A common pricing scheme 
is referred to as “net-metering.” Under this approach, the distributed generation customer’s meter 
“runs forward” to purchase electricity when less power is produced than needed. When a 
distributed generation system produces more power than is needed, the meter “runs backward” 
and sends the excess power to the grid. At the end of the billing period, the customer is billed for 
the net power used at the retail electricity rate, which is the volumetric rate a residential customer 
                                                          
3 Most customer-sited generation is “behind the meter,” which means that it operates on the customer’s side of the 
utility’s meter.  
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pays per kilowatt‐hour (kWh) of electricity. In practice, there are significant variations among 
net-metering compensation programs. The way that a net-metering framework is designed 
significantly influences the profitability and viability of on-site energy generation. Net-metering 
policies are often revised to take into account utilities considerations, such as special fixed 
charges for net-metering customers and a buy‐back price below the retail price of electricity 
(Revesz & Unel, 2017). 
Utilities companies, which play a key role in the transmission and distribution of 
electricity, have attempted to slow the growth of distributed generation. When distributed 
generation represents a small percentage of overall electricity production, it poses little threat to 
the utilities’ model and profits. As more customers adopt distributed generation systems, which 
is the current trend globally, the amount of electricity they sell decreases. This reduction in 
earnings further means that utilities have fewer financial resources to cover the costs to maintain 
and operate the grid, commonly referred to as stranded investments. As a result, utilities have 
frequently supported legislation that reverses policy support for solar energy and distributed 
generation (Hess, 2016).  
2.4. Energy Transitions and Technological Change 
Scholars have increasingly used the term “energy transitions” to refer to the 
transformation of fossil fueled-based energy regimes to ones with greater shares of renewable 
energy.4 Rather than limiting the analytical focus to individual policies, the concept emphasizes 
that efforts to reduce carbon emissions and diversify energy supplies must be understood in 
connection with the institutional systems in which new policies are developed. In particular, the 
                                                          
4 Bridge et al. (2013) note that, although “energy transition” and its implication of a change in conditions is clear 
enough, there is no consensus on a desired end state. Furthermore, while the concept is commonly associated with 
energy production, it can also encompass patterns of consumption and energy use. 
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technical change and innovation systems (TIS) and multi-level perspective (MLP) frameworks 
are widely used to study the dissemination of renewable energy technologies (Geels, 2002; 
Verbong & Geels, 2007; Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000). While these frameworks differ in several 
respects, they both ground their analyses in the concept of a socio-technical regime (Hughes, 
1983), in which previous technological choices, institutions, and engineering practices have 
resulted in a dominant or “normal” way of doing things (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; van 
Eijck & Romijn, 2008, p.312). In this way, the established energy system and associated 
institutional framework often prevent the adoption of potentially superior alternatives (Foxon, 
2002; Unruh, 2000). Actors must thus change the institutional setting to create space for 
renewable technologies which have suffered economic, regulatory, and institutional 
disadvantages relative to other forms of energy (Beck & Martinot, 2004). 
The TIS perspective focuses on the processes through which a new technology emerges 
and is diffused (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004; Markard & Truffer, 
2008). This framework emphasizes that the co-evolution among physical technologies and 
institutions is responsible for the relative stability of a socio-technical system (Unruh & Carrillo-
Hermosilla, 2006). As a result, a new technology may suffer a disadvantage from incumbent 
technologies that have been able to undergo a process of increasing returns (Arthur, 1988). This 
tends to associate the new energy technology with a higher market price based on lack of scale, 
inexperience, and a set of institutions which are culturally biased to favor existing technologies. 
In this sense, “cost” and “market failure,” traditional concepts influenced by neoclassical 
economics and that are used to assess innovation policy, are not necessarily the factors that 
hinder the development of a new technology. Since institutions have established practices that 
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favor incumbent technologies, they block the introduction or expansion of alternative options 
(Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000, p.633; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004, p. 817).  
The TIS approach further attempts to delineate the actors and structural elements in a 
given energy-based technological system. Common actors within a technological system are 
firms and manufacturers of specific technologies. For example, in the case of solar cells, these 
include firms that manufacture machinery to make thin film solar cells, engineering firms 
designing and delivering solar installation systems, and electricians and architects. “Networks” 
of actors constitute important channels for the transfer of both tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Technological and policy networks may be built around markets and may therefore be conducive 
to the identification of problems and the development of new technical solutions (Jacobsson & 
Bergek, 2004, p. 818; Rao, 2004; Smith, 2000). Together, these actors can create powerful 
political forces to lobby on behalf of a given technological system (Unruh, 2000, p. 823). 
In socio-technical systems designed by and for specific technologies, institutions stipulate 
the rules and norms that regulate interactions between actors and technologies (Edquist & 
Johnson, 1997; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2008, p. 818). The legitimacy of a new technology and its 
actors, their access to resources, and the formation of markets are strongly dependent on the 
institutional framework. If the framework is not aligned with the qualities and needs of the new 
technology, it may be blocked from being adopted. The process of institutional change is 
characterized as a struggle in the political arena between proponents of the new and incumbent 
technological systems. The centrality of institutional alignment implies that actors in rival 
technological systems not only compete in the market for goods and services, but also try to gain 
influence over the institutional framework (Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000, p.631). 
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The TIS approach attempts to delimit analytically the borders of an energy system. By 
arranging empirical material in terms of functions within a system, it seeks to trace the way 
through which a particular combination of actors or a specific institutional set-up shapes the 
generation, diffusion, and utilization of a new technology (Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004, p. 819). 
Moreover, drawing on the literature on product and industry life cycles, the transformation of the 
energy system is generally characterized by two main phases: a formative period and one of 
market expansion. With respect to the formative period, the newness of the technology presents 
entrepreneurial actors, investors, policy-makers with high levels of uncertainty. A market for the 
technology may not exist or be underdeveloped.  “Niches” or “nursing markets” are normally 
required so that actors can learn about the characteristics of the new technology and expectations 
can be formed (Erickson & Maitland, 1989; Kemp et al., 1998). The formative stage is also 
marked by the establishment of networks with the objective of shaping the institutional 
architecture. For a new technology to develop, technology-specific coalitions and networks need 
to form and gain influence over institutions. One way is that coalitions argue that a particular 
technology is a solution to wider policy concerns (Bergek, Hekkert, & Jacobsson, 2008, p.22-23; 
Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004, p. 821-822).  
Following a formative stage, the TIS framework contends that government support and 
investments generate a system which can sufficiently “change gear” and grow in a self-
sustaining way. The expansion of markets and institutional alignment propel the new technology 
in a process referred to as “cumulative causation.” TIS studies that focus on the learning aspects 
of technological change also liken this stage of development to systems concepts of “dynamic 
loops” and “circular processes.” A successful deployment program is one which initiates a 
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technology learning process that brings down costs and improves technological performance 
(Wene, 2008).  
The multi-level perspective takes a broader approach than TIS theory. Developed by 
Dutch researchers interested in applying socio-technical theory to government energy policy, the 
MLP posits three levels for understanding energy transitions: a landscape (macro) level that 
encompasses the dynamics of deep cultural, economic and political patterns; a regime (meso) 
level that refers to the current practices, routines and dominant rules that prevail in a socio-
technical system; and a niche (micro) level which represents the space where actors experiment 
with radical innovations that may challenge and break through into the prevailing regime (Geels, 
2002; Eijck & Romijn, 2008; Verbong & Geels, 2007). Unlike the TIS approach, the landscape 
is an important analytical level which externally conditions the interaction of actors and their 
decision-making. While regimes refer to rules, regulations, and technical infrastructures that 
enable and constrain activities, the landscape refers to wider, technology-external factors. These 
include oil prices, economic growth, war, and environmental problems (Geels, 2002, p.1260). 
For example, internationally, the first oil crisis in 1973 was an important landscape factor which 
encouraged governments to reduce their reliance on oil imports and invest in alternative energy 
sources.  
In line with the TIS perspective, niches have important functions as innovative spaces 
which are insulated from “normal” market selection in the regime, acting as “incubation rooms” 
for radical novelties (Geels, 2002, p.1260; Schot, 1998). The importance of early markets for 
learning processes is a fundamental concept among approaches to energy transitions (Kemp et 
al., 1998). In the initial state of niche formation, experiments with a new technology tend to be 
few and isolated. The principal aim of niche learning is to reduce uncertainty about future socio-
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technical development. Once this has been achieved, and a promising technical design has been 
developed, a “technological niche” is said to have been created (Eijck & Romijn, 2008, p. 312). 
From the MLP perspective, niches are crucial for technical change because they provide a means 
for change and open up new pathways for socio-technical regimes.  
These three levels form a nested hierarchy. Regimes are embedded within landscapes, 
and niches within regimes. A distinct feature of the multilevel perspective is that the success of a 
new technology is not only governed by processes within the niche. In comparison to TIS, which 
focuses on technological systems, the specific innovation activities in niches are linked to large-
scale transformations at the regime and landscape levels (Essletzbichler, 2012, p. 795). 
Developments at the level of the existing regime and the sociotechnical landscape reinforce or 
hinder processes within the niche to determine if an opening for new technologies will occur. 
Radical innovations break out of the niche-level when ongoing processes at the levels of the 
regime and landscape create a “window of opportunity.” This analysis of niche, regime, and 
landscape change to explain transitions offers a perspective of how new socio-technical regimes 
rather than a single technology or sector emerges and eventually becomes dominant. Landscape 
factors that exert pressure on the regime can serve as an overarching source of technological 
change. 
Scholars have used the TIS and MLP frameworks to analyze the diffusion of renewable 
energy technologies (Bergek & Jacobsson, 2004; Foxon, 2007; Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Kern 
& Smith, 2008). Government policies and support schemes are often studied for their role in 
inducing the dissemination of renewable energy technology. For instance, Bergek and Jacobsson 
(2003) examine the growth of the German, Dutch, and Swedish wind turbine industries. They 
identify several factors contributing to the relative success of the German industry, including the 
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creation of technological diversity in an early phase of development, the establishment of social 
legitimacy for wind energy, and the use of advanced market creation policies in a later phase. 
Foxon and Pearson (2007, 2008) have closely studied improvements in UK low-carbon energy 
policy through an innovation systems lens. They emphasize the importance of widespread social 
acceptability in sustainability innovation, particularly a shared vision between government, 
industry and the research community for each sector, as well as the need for policy incentives to 
overcome specific system failures (Foxon et al, 2005, p. 2135). 
2.5. Renewable Energy and Regional Policy Development 
The application of energy transitions frameworks has advanced our knowledge of how 
the transformation of energy systems and institutions takes place. The literature’s early focus on 
national energy policies, however, have made it vulnerable to criticisms (Bridge et al., 2013; 
Truffer & Coenen, 2012). A major criticism is that such studies focus on the deployment of 
specific technologies without explicitly considering the role of space or geography in 
technological change. For example, the TIS framework seeks to include all relevant actors in the 
diffusion of an energy technology in order to address national-level policy concerns. The fact 
that many provincial and sub-provincial governments have created renewable energy policies is 
not a central concern. Despite taking into account major historical shifts in energy systems at 
national and global scales, contemporary work on low-carbon energy transition has paid only 
very limited attention to questions of scale and space (Bridge et al., 2013, p.332). 
Several contributions have outlined how energy systems and technological change 
processes are constituted spatially. Responding to the European Union’s restructuring of national 
and transnational policy processes, the multi-level governance perspective has drawn attention to 
the changing relationships between different levels of government in carrying out energy policies 
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and highlighted instances where regions and subnational governments have exercised wider 
authority and autonomy (Bulkeley & Newell, 2010; Cowell, 2017; Smith, 2007). For example, 
Smith (2007) analyzes the regional dimensions of multilevel governance structures in England. 
She differentiates between “Type I” and “Type II” forms of renewable energy governance: the 
former emphasizes top-down commits for regionalization, while Type II commitments are less 
formal and more “soft,” and regional government try to exercise wider authority and autonomy. 
Multi-level studies tend to focus on the changing relationships between different levels of 
government rather than the causal relationships between regional drivers and increases in 
renewable energy sources. 
Urban studies in particular has demonstrated the strategic role of cities and regions in 
creating policies to promote renewable sources of energy. Several contributions have outlined 
the different roles that cities hold in transition processes (Bulkeley et al., 2011; Hodson and 
Marvin, 2010, 2012; Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). Hodson and Marvin (2012, p.424) 
characterize cities as “an actor in its own right, a niche for experimentation to think about new 
ways of  organizing relationships between energy producers, consumers and flows through the 
city.” Geels (2011, p. 14) stresses that cities can either be primary actors and seedbeds of 
national transitions, or play a limited role. 
Prevalent energy transitions frameworks have also been adapted to analyze local and 
regional processes. Economic geography and studies of industrial clustering have long 
recognized the significance of regional institutions in contributing to the development of new 
technologies and markets (Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1995), providing infrastructure, spillovers of 
knowledge associated with proximity to universities, and specialized input suppliers and 
services. Scholars have increasingly drawn on this literature to provide conceptual clarity to 
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energy transitions research. For example, Coenen et al. (2010) explore how geographical 
proximity explains why certain niches evolve and to what extent local experiments influence the 
wider institutional framework. In a similar way, Mattes et al. (2015) couple the TIS approach 
with literature on regional innovation systems to analyze policy developments in two regional 
“subsystems” in Germany. They emphasize the importance of informal, personal networks and 
the limited number of political actors involved in local energy decision-making. Collectively, 
these studies offer productive insights for explaining how energy choices and outcomes are 
shaped in particular places. 
Studies on environmental and climate politics provide further insights into how regions 
can set agendas in policy implementation. They have shown how governments often carry out 
policies that have been developed at the federal level, but can also take policy action when the 
government has not decisively acted on an issue (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003; Schreurs, 2008). 
Rabe (2004a; 2004b) demonstrates that issue framing can shed light on why state governments in 
the United States enact climate change policies, which are heavily driven by renewable energy 
policy. He claims that states have framed their different policy reactions in one of three ways: as 
a response to an environmental threat, as a response to an economic development opportunity, or 
as a response to an economic threat. “Policy entrepreneurs” contribute directly to issue framing 
by cultivating new policy ideas. They tend to be located in state government agencies, including 
those devoted to environmental protection or energy, and have often developed reputations as 
policy experts. They frequently draw upon their previous experience to frame policy proposals as 
economic opportunities (Rabe, 2004a, p. 31). While broader economic and political institutions 
structure energy and environmental policies, individual action plays a role in mobilizing policy 
activities to support new initiatives (Agassi, 1975).  
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2.6. Contributions to the Literature 
The standard model for electricity reform frames regulatory bodies as strictly economic 
institutions. In practice, political pressures and social concerns do not go away after electricity 
restructuring (Dubash, 2005). Since regulatory agencies operate at the intersection of both 
political and private sector influences, striking the right balance is both critical and politically 
challenging. Regulators have authority and discretion in carrying out government policy, and 
consequently have opportunities to shape their mandate and institutional culture in ways that 
support renewable technologies. Building on insights from energy transitions research, 
regulations form part of the wider institutions and cultural practices that can perpetuate the status 
quo (Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006), but which can serve as crucial sources of system 
transformation. The regulatory process can also realign actors into new coalitions that disrupt 
existing policy practices (Smith & Kern, 2007). Renewable energy auctions and distributed 
generation regulations provide excellent cases with which to examine how the “politics of 
regulatory policy” influences renewable energy development. 
By first setting the backdrop for wind and solar policies, this dissertation demonstrates 
that new energy technologies do not enter into empty terrain. Instead, they must compete with 
pre-existing technologies: “history matters” in that new technologies have to adapt to previous 
investment and policy decisions, often made decades in the past. Therefore, pre-existing 
infrastructure, both physical and institutional, can create important and lasting constraints (del 
Río & Unruh, 2007). Chapter 4 accounts for the co-evolution of hydroelectric infrastructure and 
current arrangements in the Brazilian electricity sector. It underlines how the frequently path-
dependent nature of technological and institutional frameworks condition the adoption of wind 
and solar technologies.  
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Turning to the case of wind energy, there is surprisingly little research on how the 
regulatory context affects the implementation of energy auctions. In restructured power sectors, 
regulatory agencies frequently serve as the auctioning authority and interact directly with project 
developers. While the literature on auction design cites the importance of independent regulators 
in setting market rules and enforcing contracts, there are few studies on how regulatory 
institutions influence auction implementation (Bellantuono, 2016). This might be because the 
literature assumes that an auction design can adapt to the specifics of each power system. It is 
presumed that an auction can internalize context-specific factors, such as a government’s policy 
objectives, the degree and nature of competition in the electricity market, the variety of 
technologies available, and the existing regulatory and institutional frameworks in which 
investors operate (Maurer & Barroso, 2011, p. xvi). Observed increases in implementation rates 
are generally attributed to successful amendments to an auction design.  
This research does not discount previous analyses that have found that auction design 
changes can improve implementation outcomes. What is missing from this literature, however, is 
recognition that the success of renewable energy auctions also depends on their ex-post 
implementation. The effectiveness of auctions to deliver projects ultimately depends on ensuring 
compliance from market participants. Compliance and enforcement of rules are not a given, nor 
can they be captured within an auction design, but result from the regulatory process. Regulators 
also work with stakeholders in ways that support the credibility of regulatory solutions. This 
dissertation shows how regulatory approaches to compliance and collaboration are important 
policy processes that lie outside of auction designs for wind energy. 
The development of a net-metering program for small-scale energy systems further 
illustrates how regulations can enable technological change. The energy transitions literature 
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refers to regulations as generally protecting the status quo and being responsible for 
technological lock-in (Unruh, 2000). Institutions are considered important insofar as private 
actors and firms can overcome regulatory and institutional barriers to open space for new 
technologies. The second part of Chapter 5 provides insights into the relationship between 
energy transitions and regulatory agencies. It describes how energy regulators have prioritized 
the adoption of distributed generation technologies in Brazil. In a system designed for large-scale 
hydroelectric power, regulators’ support for small-scale generation technologies powered 
predominately by solar photovoltaics fundamentally questions the underlying institutional 
arrangements in the electricity sector and serves as an important source of  technological change. 
Lastly, there is little attention to how states and regional governments in Brazil have 
influenced federal decisions about supply planning and energy diversification, or how they set 
policy agendas that contribute to the learning and development of renewable technologies. 
Moreover, regional differences in renewable energy investments are attributed to physical 
advantages, such as high winds speeds and solar irradiation. While natural resource potential is 
important, it must be understood in terms of the context in which renewable technologies are 
developed and deployed. Paraphrasing Meadowcroft (2009), their fates are bound up with 
different energy options. In elaborating on this view, chapter 6 aims to build on previous studies 
that demonstrate under what conditions states and regions have opportunities to guide the 
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A qualitative research design was used to examine how regulatory reforms, institutional 
changes, and state-level policies impact the development of renewable energy sources in Brazil 
over the period of 1992-2017. This research sought to discover (1) how electric power reforms 
and regulations have influenced the development of wind and solar energy to date and (2) to 
explain how the various planning and policy approaches taken by state governments affect 
renewable energy development. The fieldwork activities included semi-structured interviews and 
document collection. To overcome a “national bias” in the literature, which prioritizes the 
nation-state as a unit of analysis, the states of São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte 
were selected as comparative case studies to illustrate how renewable energy policies are 
implemented at a regional scale. The case study method is the most appropriate means to carry 
out this research because it can explain how and why things happen in certain policy contexts 
(Ragin & Becker, 1992). 
For the purpose of this study, “renewable energy” is restricted to the electricity 
production sector (also exchangeable with the terminology “supply” or “generation”). It pertains 
only to electricity generated from renewable resources, including hydropower, wind, solar, and 
biomass. This dissertation does not directly study non-electricity energy that forms part of the 
broader energy supply, such as fuel substitution by “cleaner” alternatives in the transport sector. 
The term “regulatory agency” refers to the government body formed or mandated under the 
terms of a legislative act to ensure compliance with the provisions of the act, and in carrying out 
its purpose. “Regulation” is thus understood to mean the policies and actions undertaken by this 
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appointed agency or body to co-manage the electricity sector, not to government intervention in 
a general sense. 
3.1. Plan of Inquiry  
The broad framework of critical realism informed the epistemological position of this 
research project. Combining explanation and interpretation, critical realism emerged in the 1970s 
and 1980s as a philosophical position to develop a properly post-positivist social science (Archer 
et al., 1998; Sayer, 1992). Critical realists hold that is possible for social science to refine and 
improve its knowledge about the real world over time, and to make claims about reality which 
are relatively justified, while still being historical, contingent, and changing (Archer et al., 1998). 
This study made realist assumptions to the extent that participants were approached as containing 
institutional knowledge of policies or programs in the electricity sector, where their “accounts 
[were] treated as providing insight into their psychological and organizational lives outside of the 
interview situation” (King, 2004, p.12). Such assumptions were employed to systematically 
compare different stakeholders’ observations with other sources such as government documents 
and newspaper articles. In the constructivist vein of critical realism, however, this study 
approached causation critically. Systematic data collection and analysis was meant to establish a 
robust account of structures and processes to highlight the complexity of actors and 
organizations which contribute to changes in energy policy, in order to arrive at inferences 
regarding causal processes. 
In accordance with critical realism and other post-positivist stances, this study drew on 
“grounded theory” as a basis for guiding data collection and analysis. The principles of grounded 
theory are designed to develop a well-integrated set of concepts that provide a theoretical 
explanation of social phenomena under study, where it is the researcher’s responsibility to catch 
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the interplay of actors responding to changing conditions and the consequences of their actions 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Creswell, 2014). Grounded theory does not outright reject the canons of 
“good science,” such as significance, generalizability, reproducibility, precision, and verification, 
but rather aims to make standards and procedures of any research method explicit.5 Following 
procedures in grounded theory, the selection of study participants was designed to provide a 
balanced perspective of actors and to identify as much variation as possible in what methods 
were being employed to facilitate or prevent the use of new alternative sources of energy at the 
national and sub-national levels.  
I received approval to conduct anonymous interviews from the Institutional Review 
Board on May 5, 2014 (see Appendix C). To ensure candor and the anonymity, I excluded all 
names. Interviewees are referred to in terms of general positions within their organizations. 
3.2. Interviewing Policy Elites 
In conducting qualitative research, the role of the researcher as the primary instrument for 
gathering data necessitates the identification of personal values, assumptions, and biases. The 
investigator’s contribution to the research setting can be useful and positive rather than 
detrimental (Locke et al., 1987). While I am fluent in Portuguese and have lived in Brazil for 
more than two years cumulatively, I am foreign and American, and thus I was perceived 
differently than Brazilians from the point of view of interviewees as well as the “gatekeepers” 
who deny or provide access to them. This placed me in a privileged position at times. I was often 
granted access to high-level policy-makers whereas Brazilian researchers investigating similar 
                                                          
5 More precisely, according to Corbin and Strauss (1990): “Every mode of discovery develops its own standards – 
and canons and procedures for achieving them. What is important is that all of these are made explicit” (p. 5). 
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topics have reported not being granted such interviews.6 One participant who is an executive at a 
solar installation company explicitly mentioned that he accepted my interview invitation because 
of my nationality and the prestige associated with my university in the United States.  
In general, I found that potential participants from the private sector were less accessible than 
those from the public sector. Specifically, I encountered more reluctant administrative secretaries 
and press liaisons who were unwilling to concede an interview on behalf of their associates. The 
two reasons given were that their employees were only allowed to focus on the work of their 
organizations, and that their agendas did not permit an interview unrelated to their work tasks. I 
also found it very difficult to gain access to professionals who worked directly in the oil and gas 
industry. In the end, I was only able to interview one employee from Petrobras. Upon arriving to 
the interview site, I was told that I was not allowed to record the interview and instead had to 
take copious notes during and following the interview. 
While my status as a non-Brazilian student researcher sometimes presented challenges 
when negotiating the interview relationship, it also worked in my favor. During the interviews, I 
often felt that participants spent considerable time summarizing and providing narratives of 
policies and institutional histories with which I had already gained familiarity. At times this was 
helpful, especially in the preliminary stages of data collection when I needed more information 
on certain policies or events. Further, it was also hard to know what was relevant to answer my 
research questions in the early interviews, and at that time it was better to have more rather than 
less information from my interviewees. Moreover, asking an interview participant to explain a 
policy or program in “her own words” served as a way to gauge institutional priorities, loyalties, 
and biases. The way that a representative from a utilities company explained net-metering and 
                                                          
6 For example, in his qualitative case study of Rio Grande do Norte’s wind sector, Neto (2013) states that neither the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy nor Aneel granted him an interview. Neto mentions, however, that he had requested a 
phone interview, which could have made policy-makers more reluctant to speak with him. 
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renewable energy regulations differed greatly from solar energy advocates’ explanations of the 
same programs which, in part, reflected the various interests at stake in the regulatory process.  
Difficulties arose, however, when participants continued to develop a topic at length 
without providing new material. While the interviews were semi-structured, my general 
objective as an interviewer was to have the interviewee provide me with her perspective on the 
topics outlined in the interview guidelines, in an attempt to balance both depth and breadth in 
responses. In situations when I judged that the participant had provided sufficient information, I 
decided that it would have been against social and professional etiquette to interrupt participants 
and possibly disturb the rapport that we had (Weiss, 1994), however tenuous. My main approach 
was to redirect rather than discourage the respondent during a pause. Similarly, when 
interviewees would conclude a response by asking me if they had provided enough information 
on a particular subject, I would use these openings to redirect the conversation to an 
underdeveloped or new topic. Also, once I showed a policymaker or official that I knew the 
basics of a policy, they would move on to something new or reveal a personal opinion.  
At the same time, my point of reference as an outsider was an advantage because it 
allowed me to ask questions that someone with insider status would be assumed to already know, 
or perhaps would not perceive as significant. For instance, as I progressed with my interviews, I 
began to notice a pattern. Several participants prefaced their responses by describing Brazil’s 
hydropower legacy, expounding on the low carbon emissions and the degree of energy 
independence provisioned by their hydropower base compared to other countries that continue to 
be subject to the geo-political vulnerabilities related to fossil fuels. As an outsider, I was neither 
professionally nor “emotionally” tied to the symbolic value of the country’s hydroelectric 
development as a case of national success, nor did I take for granted the commonly accepted 
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view that hydropower should be expanded within the electricity supply. Contrary to many 
professionals in the industry, I sought to challenge this conventional wisdom and elaborate on 
the notion that a strong dependence on one form of electricity alone could present policy 
problems. Namely, I stressed that a dominant energy technology could block the inclusion of 
other renewable and socially beneficial energy sources, and that this could further prove to be an 
interesting example of how energy transitions are hindered by well-established socio-technical 
arrangements that are often unquestioned.7  
Lastly, my personal experiences shaped my perception of issues and activities in the 
Brazilian energy sector. I was a visiting research scholar and Fulbright Fellow in the 
interdisciplinary Graduate Program in Energy Planning at the State University of Campinas 
during my field work. This program is one of three traditional departments in Brazil which are 
responsible for research and professional training in the electricity sector.8 Over the course of my 
research, I attended several roundtables and seminars at Unicamp and other public and private 
institutions that dealt with the electricity sector. Being a member of this graduate community 
enhanced my understanding of the Brazilian electricity sector and provided an informal platform 
where I could exchange ideas with key stakeholders and people who had professional experience 
in the energy industry.  
                                                          
7 For example, Vieira and Dalgaard (2013) argue that the strong pro-hydropower rhetoric is also used strategically 
by the Brazilian government as political leverage to promote Brazil’s position in domestic and international 
discussions on climate change and energy policy. 
  
8 These three programs are: the Energy Planning Program (PPE) at the Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ); 
the Graduate Program in Energy (PPGE) at the University of São Paulo (USP); and the Graduate Program in Energy 
Planning (PSE) at the State University of Campinas (Unicamp) where I was based.  
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3.3. Comparative Case Study Research  
Since this project relies on one country for its analysis, it is important to clarify the 
methodological advantages of using a single country with multiple subnational case studies. A 
study that takes only national level policies and politics into consideration can miss the important 
dynamics that occur at both the regional and state level in relation to national level decision-
making. A subnational study provides a more accurate examination of how regulations play out 
on the ground, avoiding what Rokkan (1970) refers to as “whole-nation bias,” and it provides 
better insight into the variation that takes place within states and countries. As Snyder (2001) 
points out, a subnational study provides an effective way to increase the number of observations 
when compared to single case studies. 
Further, this dissertation’s comparative case study design addressed how we can 
understand the differences in renewable implementation rates in different geographical contexts. 
For studies of renewable energy development, local and regional differences are frequently 
attributed to physical advantages, such as high wind speeds and solar irradiation. The 
“conventional claim” is that natural resource abundance can be readily converted into usable 
electricity that confers long-lasting forms of regional advantage. While renewable natural 
resources are confined within a particular physical territory, they are also socially and politically 
constructed by various networks of actors at different scales (De Laurentis, Pearson, & Eames, 
2016). “Physical” potential is not a clear indication that capacity will be realized - that depends 
on the motivation to invest in an energy technology, as well as its social acceptance. 
Consequently, investigating the “socio-political” potential in subnational contexts provides a 




In line with Flyvberg (2006, p. 221), small-N case studies can be valuable tools in 
providing practical, context-dependent knowledge, to generalize on the basis of a few cases. 
They are capable of summarizing and developing general propositions and theories, among other 
aims. The use of a small number of cases, however, should not to be confused with a 
“particularizing” analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 15). The identification of similarities and differences in 
the three state-level case studies allowed me to define dimensions not mentioned or emphasized 
in the literature that focuses on national-level regulations. These purposive case studies thus 
provide insights on how policymakers, energy planners, and regional institutions manage the 
direct and indirect benefits of renewable energy development, which can be generalized to new 
cases.  
By using three states as comparative case studies, the research questions of this study 
addressed how renewable energy development is conditioned by local contexts. In Brazil, policy 
design occurs mostly at the federal level, but policy implementation is often conducted by the 
states. Brazil’s federalist system of government creates opportunities for states to influence 
public policies compared to countries with unitary, centralized systems of governance. The 
working hypothesis of this study was that differences in implementation rates in wind and solar 
energy for electricity generation indicate the existence of different state-level policy approaches. 
São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte were selected to analyze the factors that 
explained these different approaches, as a type of “two-tail” design (Yin, 2009, p. 59). Rio 
Grande do Norte and Pernambuco have made concerted efforts to increase their use of wind and 
solar energy, whereas São Paulo demonstrates a “failed” outcome to implement these two energy 
sources. The purpose was to overcome selection bias and include a case setting where wind and 
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solar energy have not advanced substantially, despite the physical availability of wind and solar 
resources. 
 Therefore, the subnational component of this research design aimed to gain an elaborate 
understanding of how local institutions, polices, and practices affect the outcomes in wind and 
solar implementation. Rio Grande do Norte is a national example of wind energy development, 
representing approximately 32% of nationally installed capacity in wind energy (see Table 1). 
The state was a first-mover in the early 2000s in creating policies and regulations to introduce 
wind energy as an alternative form of centralized generation of electricity. Meanwhile, in terms 
of solar energy, the state of Pernambuco has been referred to by energy professionals as a 
pioneer in policy formation: it was the first state to design and hold a solar energy auction, a 
policy instrument used almost exclusively by national governments to contract energy. 
Pernambuco also has a considerable amount of installed capacity of wind energy relative to other 
states. Furthermore, since 2014, national newspapers have reported on state goals to attract wind 
and solar manufacturing industries (Calixto, 2014). In contrast, São Paulo has no considerable 
Table 1 
Overview of the State Case Studies 
 São Paulo Pernambuco Rio Grande do Norte 
Overview    
Population 44,749,699 9,410,336 3,474,998 
GDP (BRL billion) 1,349 trillion 104 36 
    
Electricity generation in 
2015 (%)  
  
Wind 0.00% 5.87% 70.82% 
Solar 0.00% 0.23% 0.04% 
Biomass 31.64% 8.85% 1.77% 
Hydro 65.09% 17.58% 0.00% 
Fossil Fuels 3.27% 67.47% 27.37% 
            
Note. Adapted from IBGE (2016), IBGE (2017), EPE BEN (2016), Aneel (2017). 
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policy developments in wind or solar energy generation, relying on hydroelectric power and 
sugarcane biomass to produce electricity within the state.  
Furthermore, in addition to their observed policy activities, these states were chosen on 
the basis that they are located in different parts of the country and cover a diverse geographic and 
socioeconomic distribution. São Paulo is the financial and industrial nucleus of the highly 
developed Southeastern region of Brazil, while Rio Grande do Norte and Pernambuco form part 
of the less economically developed Northeastern region.  Further, the case selection rationale 
thus aimed to understand how varying economic circumstances condition regional approaches to 
renewable energy development. Based on the policy literature, it was further hypothesized that 
prior investments at the regional level could have a lasting effect on energy priorities. In this 
regard, São Paulo was also chosen to illustrate the concept of localized path dependency and 
prior resource commitments, whereby certain technologies become and remain successful over 
time because of initial advantages (Breukers, 2006). In this regard, the state’s prior choices to 
develop small hydropower and biomass plants have precluded other alternatives such as utilities-
scale solar and wind plants.  
This sample of three states suffers from at least two limitations. First, the small sample 
does not allow an investigation of all combinations of factors that contribute to renewable energy 
development. This limitation is intrinsic to the type of “small N” research. However, as 
previously mentioned, this approach has an advantage over large statistical studies because it 
allows the exploration of factors that are difficult to measure systematically and which operate in 
complex ways in each case. In addition, this study suffers from a selection bias. Even though São 
Paulo is an unsuccessful example of wind and solar energy, all three states are important 
economic centers within their respective regions. This study omits examples of states that have 
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attracted wind and solar energy investments, but which have lacked the economic and political 
resources that have arguably contributed to this study’s case findings, such as Piaui and Alagoas. 
One way to address this gap is for future research to consider less economically developed areas 
where renewable energy development has occurred.  
3.4. Population and Recruitment  
Following procedures in grounded theory, a purposeful sampling strategy of potential 
respondents was employed based on traits theorized to be important to the research topic. This 
sampling method is similar to strategic non-representative sampling, which aims at variation in 
the respondents' experiences rather than at representativeness and statistical generalization 
(Trost, 1986). The population of this study was constructed around energy professionals: broadly 
speaking, policy-makers, managers, project developers, consultants, and academics that work 
with some aspect of renewable energy within the electricity sector. The purpose of the interviews 
was to develop a firsthand understanding of regulatory strategies to promote wind and solar in 
the energy supply, and to develop an understanding of the institutional contexts that affects 
energy decision-making at the federal and state levels. Policymakers and regulators have played 
a decisive role in creating renewable energy policies and regulations, and were consequently an 
important elite group to interview for this research. 
Study participants were further divided conceptually into two target groups. In the first 
group were representatives from regulatory agencies, government ministries, industry 
associations, and private utilities companies who possessed relevant professional knowledge and 
expertise regarding policies that have affected the implementation of wind and solar power at the 
national level (Kvale, 2009). In a second group, participants were interviewed based on their 
experience with supporting or devising policies to develop renewable energy at the state or 
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regional level. These included representatives from state-level energy, science, and technology 
agencies and institutes, regional economic development agencies, and environmental secretariats. 
The focus of interview guidelines for state-level actors was on non-federal policies and programs 
enacted by state governments. However, at the end of each interview, I also asked a general 
question about the role of the energy regulator, Aneel, in energy policymaking if the interviewee 
had not already addressed the topic. This allowed me to gather more perspectives on regulators 
and how regulations affect policy. Table 1 outlines the different types of public and private 

















Organizations that Participated in this Research 
 
Organization of interviewee   Number interviewed 
Central Government Level  
Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) 5 
Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) 1 
Energy Research Enterprise (EPE) 1 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 2 
  Regional Level   
State Energy Secretariat 15 
State Trade and Industry Secretariat 6 
Regional development banks 3 
  
Private sector and non-profit  
Energy investment companies 2 
Energy consultancies  2 
Non-profit organizations (NGOs) 2 






Professional interview introductions were made via personalized emails. This allowed me 
to establish a rapport and make my methods and motives transparent prior to the interview 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2011). For most policy-makers and energy professionals, it was explained that 
the subject’s contact information was obtained from their organization’s website, and that the 
interview would be confidential and voluntary (see Appendix C for a sample recruitment email).  
If a participant was referred by another interviewee, it was explained that their contact 
information was provided by a colleague or acquaintance who knows the subject. 
Verbal consent was obtained in this study. Before formally beginning the interview, I 
verbally expressed who I was (name, university and graduate program, dissertation adviser) and 
the reasons for my study. I stated that, in agreeing to the interview, they were not obligated to 
answer any questions that would make them feel uncomfortable, and that they had the right to 
stop the interview at any time. No interviewee refused to respond to a question or decided that 
she needed to stop and withdraw from the interview.   
3.5. Data Collection and Analysis  
Interviews were conducted with 43 participants from January 2016 to November 2017 in 
Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grando do Sul, and Brasilia, 
the national capital. Interviews ranged in length from 35 minutes to one hour and 40 minutes. 
Traveling to these different regions in Brazil and visiting areas with high levels of wind and solar 
penetration further provided me with a sense of the pattern of development behind these 
technologies.  
The interview guidelines were structured around three main subject areas: (1) an 
overview of the interviewee’s organization, including general activities and objectives in the 
energy field; (2) the point of view of the interviewee regarding certain public policies and 
58 
 
regulatory changes; and (3) the interviewee and/or her organization’s activities in terms of 
reacting to, blocking, or supporting wind and solar energy projects. (See Appendix C for sample 
interview protocols.) They were recorded digitally. During the introduction, participants were 
informed of the interview length (up to 90 minutes, unless an alternative length was established 
by the interviewee), of their right to confidentiality, and of my request to record the interview. 
All interviews were conducted in Portuguese, with the exception of two interviewees who had 
studied and/or worked outside of Brazil and preferred that the interview be conducted in English. 
The content of the interviews was adjusted to the specific expertise and characteristics of 
the interviewee. I reflexively developed individualized interview guides. For the preparation of 
each interview, I reviewed organizational homepages and newspaper articles. I began with a set 
of underlying questions, wrote how I expected the specific professional to respond, analyzed 
what assumptions I had made about that professional, and noted my preconceptions about the 
interview. Throughout the interview, I actively engaged with the respondent to discern her 
meaning, giving her a chance to rephrase and clarify. Interviews were generally characterized as 
“direct questions”: while the interviews at times took on a conversational tone, the subject 
always centered on their personal and institutional knowledge regarding the research topic. I also 
took handwritten notes during the interview to register points raised by the interviewee that I 
considered important and intended to revisit during transcription. Pre-interview notes, 
handwritten notes, and interview transcripts were reviewed together during data analysis.  
All informants were interviewed in their private offices or closed conference rooms. One 
energy consultant was interviewed in a busy café near his office, at his suggestion, and another 
policy-maker was interviewed over the phone. Such spaces and mediums of communication 
were agreed upon as secure by both the researcher and the participant, where it was reasonably 
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expected that no observations or outside recordings could take place. In the case of six (6) state 
and national-level policy-makers, interviews were conducted in the presence of one or more 
colleagues. This was in accordance with ethics policies followed by some Brazilian government 
agencies, in which a civil servant must be accompanied by at least one colleague during a private 
interview. Before starting my field work, I was unaware of these ethics procedures during 
interview situations in Brazil. I thus had to adjust my interview demeanor to be prepared for 
situations where I would be in the presence of more than one person without being advised 
beforehand. I also described my own thoughts on how their colleagues might have influenced 
their responses in my field notes.  
The data analysis began as soon as data were collected. This analysis was then used to 
direct the next set of interviews and other observations, enabling the research process to 
systematically capture all potentially relevant aspects of the topic as soon as they were perceived 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p.6).  I transcribed interviews while noting potential codes and 
questions (e.g., attitudes towards certain government regulations and administrative obstacles to 
supporting wind and solar energy) to identify recurring sub-themes and themes to investigate 
differences and similarities in responses. Requiring the concept or code’s relevance through 
continued scrutiny and new data is also one way to guard against researcher bias and the 
meaning that the researcher brings to the research (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p.7). The number of 
interviews was informed by a saturation point. I stopped interviewing when very little new 
information was being produced which sparked new insights. 
In the individual case studies of wind and solar energy, I applied a method called process 
analysis (or “history event analysis”) to create deeper insight into the creation and evolution of 
innovation systems for the respective technologies (Abbot, 1995). For this research project, 
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process analysis was used to analyze the development, diffusion, and implementation of wind 
and solar in Brazil. The aim was to provide insights into policy processes by focusing on the 
resulting patterns of activities carried out by actors involved in the regulatory process.  
3.6. Reliability and Quality 
The purpose of this research was to explain a phenomenon: how wind and solar energy 
have gained prominence in a system that has been historically dominated by an incumbent 
technology, in this case large-scale hydroelectric power. This study’s findings are not meant to 
be generalizable to a specific population per se, but to broader theoretical concepts about 
technological change and renewable energy development. This study makes explicit the broader 
structural conditions which hinder or support wind and solar, while drawing out the energy 
regulator as a key actor in enabling the successful inclusion of these two energy sources. The 
specific actions and strategies taken by the energy regulator were then generalized to 
longstanding theories on how regulatory agencies should administer utilities policy. In a similar 
way, the state case studies offer a comparative perspective on the broader strategies that regions 
employ to fulfill local economic development and environmental goals. While these findings are 
meant to be generalizable to concepts and debates established in the literature, particularities 
exist within the data and may therefore not be applicable to new situations.  
I used two main strategies to strengthen the accuracy and validity of the study’s findings.  
I first triangulated findings by including several individuals from different organizations and 
businesses as sources of data (Mathison, 1998), and by attending and systematically taking notes 
at public conferences and events on ongoing developments in the electricity sector. I also 
employed “peer debriefing” to enhance the accuracy of the account (Creswell, 2014, p. 202). I 
sought out colleagues in my host department at the University of Campinas to respond to my 
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questions as an ongoing way to assess validity throughout the study. Many of my colleagues had 
worked for electricity distribution companies in either a professional or Research & 
Development capacity in the past. During debriefings, I did not identify the names or positions of 
particular individuals who I had interviewed but rather asked for feedback on general issues 
raised during the interviews. I used these techniques to examine my developing explanations and 
thinking about the research process. This allowed me to construct more plausible explanations 
that accounted for the institutional context behind renewable energy development.  
Lastly, the findings resulting from this study are also reproducible in the limited sense 
that they are verifiable (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p.15). No quasi-experimental research design 
which deals with social phenomena is reproducible in the sense that new conditions can be found 
which exactly match those of the original study. The broadness of the propositions, however, 
ensures that they can be tested in other conditions. 
3.7. Changes to the Original Study Design 
In the original design, it was stated that the study would consider two regulatory policies: 
the expansion of universal access to electricity, and the promotion of renewable energy in 
electricity generation. By taking this study to the sub-sectoral level, the intent was to compare 
how regulators achieve different policy-oriented goals in the energy sector. To conduct this 
research, interviewees would have included low-income electricity consumers to understand how 
they use and afford electricity. As a result of this original study design, three informants were 
interviewed form July-August 2014: one community leader of an informal community, also 
known as a “favela,” one university professor, and one manager for an electricity distribution 
company. All of the interviews took place in São Paulo. Based on the researcher’s interests, the 
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study’s aim centered on understanding how changes in the electricity sector have influenced the 
use of renewable energy sources. These interviews were not directly used in the final analysis.  
In addition, the state of Rio Grande do Sul was originally considered as a potential case 
instead of Pernambuco. Rio Grande do Sul was thought to be a strong candidate for a case study 
because it is the second largest producer of wind energy in Brazil. It was also thought that its 
location in Southern Brazil would have provided insights into the significance of geographic and 
economic context for developing energy policies. 
By December 2016, however, I decided that it was in the best interest of this study to 
substitute Rio Grande do Sul for Pernambuco for two reasons. First, I conducted preliminary 
interviews with government officials in Rio Grande do Sul; one interviewee was with an 
economist at a regional development bank, and the other interview was conducted with a group 
of representatives from the state secretary of energy. In short, the interview at the state energy 
secretariat did not go well. The manager in charge of renewable energy programs was 
uncooperative during the interview. I thus judged that it would be very difficult to obtain 
additional information or conduct follow-up interviews about these programs in Rio Grande do 
Sul. I did decide to use these interviews in the final analysis because they pointed to general 
challenges that state governments face in managing renewable energy investments. Rio Grande 
do Sul was also excluded because of its low implementation of solar energy. Pernambuco was 
brought in to provide a stronger perspective of state-level solar policies. 
3.8.  Reporting the Findings 
The final written product is a narrative text. The results are presented in a descriptive, 
narrative style shaped by policy and theoretical debates. The final project is a construction of the 
participants’ reports on events and changes in the energy sector in relation to codes and themes 
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that emerged during the data analysis. The use of short and long embedded passages were used 

























The Brazilian Electricity Sector  
 
“Brazil will never stop being a hydro-based country.” 
-  Representative from the Ministry of Mines and Energy (2017) 9 
 
This chapter places the origins of the Brazilian power system into historical context. It begins 
by discussing how the industry structure and regulatory framework co-evolved with the 
centralized planning of the country’s hydrological resources. The claim of this chapter is that in 
spite of market-oriented reforms and restructuring in the 1990s, which could have introduced 
new sources of power generation, the hydroelectric system continued to be closely intertwined 
with the planning and regulatory system. As a result, the rules and institutional supports that 
historically favored hydropower have locked-out the diffusion of other technologies, even when 
they have demonstrated improvements in the established system (Unruh, 2000). A national 
energy crisis in 2001 marked the beginning of broader support for non-hydro renewable energy 
technologies. This chapter concludes by suggesting that regulatory agencies, a central feature of 





                                                          
9 Translated quotation that appears above: O Brasil nunca deixará de ser um país hídrico. 
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4.1.      Introduction  
Brazil is physically vast and the fifth largest country in the world, covering a a total area 
of 3,287,956 square miles (8,515,767.049 km2) (World Bank, 2017). Its approximately 208 
million inhabitants are concentrated primarily in large cities along the Atlantic coastline (IBGE, 
2017b). The Brazilian federal system shares power between the twenty-six states and the central 
government. At the federal level, power is divided between the Executive, led by the President of 
the Republic who names political appointees to key administrative positions, and the Congress. 
The administrative capital is Brasilia, while São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro drive growth in the 
service and industrial sectors of the economy.  
The country’s large hydroelectric capacity stems from three major river systems, 
including the Amazon basin (Vieira & Dalgaard, 2013, p. 615). Since the 1980s, hydropower has 
provided more than 80% of Brazil’s electricity. Large-scale generation facilities tend to be 
located in remote regions in the North and South of the country (hydroelectric projects), or in the 
less populated and less developed Northeast (wind farms). A consequence of this spatial 
dispersion is that extensive networks of long-distance transmission lines have been developed to 
transport energy to demand centers (see Figure 2).  
Table 1 shows the growth of energy resources in Brazil in 2012 and 2017. Hydroelectric 
plants represented approximately 65% of installed capacity in 2017.  While hydropower occupies 
the majority of the total electricity supply, fossil fuel-based thermoelectric plants were first 
constructed to compensate for the lack of hydroelectricity during periods of low rainfall, and 
represent the country’s second largest energy source. In terms of non-hydro renewable energy, 
wind power is the fastest growing source where Brazil is ranked 9th globally. Biomass from 
sugarcane, forest residues, and waste from the pulp and paper industry generate approximately 
66 
 
9% of electricity. Policymakers have only recently admitted utilities-scale solar into supply 




Installed power capacity in Brazil 
 
 2012  2017   
 Installed 
Capacity (GW) %  
Installed 
Capacity (GW) %  ∆ 2017/2012 
        Hydrob 84.29 69.67  98.03 65.64  16.30 
Nuclear 2.01 1.66  1.99 1.33  -0.10 
Biomass 9.92 7.64  13.26 8.88  33.47 
Wind 1.89 1.56  10.94 7.33  478.84 
Solar 0.02 0.017  0.17 0.11  750 
Fossil Fuels 21.44 17.72  24.96 16.71  16.42 
        
Total 120.98 100  149.35 100  - 
        Note. Adapted from Aneel’s Generation Information Bank (BIG) (Accessed September 1, 2017) 
a Distributed generation is not included. 
b This figure includes large hydro, small hydro, and central hydroelectric generators. 
 
4.2. From Private Sector Foundations to Growing Nationalization 
 The earliest power utilities in Brazil were private companies that owned and operated 
exclusive concessions in major cities and for large industries. While Portuguese colonialization 
began in the Northeast in the beginning of the 16th century, after World War II, the Southeast 
region ascended as the pole for national industrialization. Electrification was centered on 
growing industrial centers in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, parts of Minas Gerais, and the southern 
part of Bahia (SP SEM, Interview, Dec. 8 2016). Beginning in 1897, Light, a Canadian utilities 
group, built much of the early electricity infrastructure in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The U.S. 
firm AMFORP also obtained the rights to build and manage electricity in several other large 
towns. Without an established federal process for awarding public concessions for power 
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services, each municipality created its own rules on which private utilities companies based their 
operations (de Oliveira, 2007).  
 The Brazilian electricity sector was largely decentralized and uncoordinated until the 
1929 New York Stock Exchange crash. Coffee exports, the single tradable Brazilian product in 
those years, dropped dramatically, pushing the domestic economy into a recession (Furtado, 
1964). To stabilize the economy and guide national development, the federal government began 
to eclipse some of the powers of the twenty-six states. Since electricity is a key input for 
industrialization and economic growth, the decision to grow the industrial base with import-
substitution policies involved expanding the electric power system. Consequently, the role of 
foreign companies in the energy sector became a political issue. Liberals had argued that foreign 
investors would bring technology and capital, both scarce in the country. On the other hand, 
nationalists viewed the energy supply as a strategic factor of production and could not be left to 
foreign control (de Oliveira, 2007). These initial political and macroeconomic debates 
foreshadowed the increasing intervention of the Brazilian state in electricity supply and 
distribution. In the end, the nationalists came out ahead. In 1934, the federal government adopted 
the Water Code. This cornerstone legislation granted the Brazilian state the property rights for 
rivers and the authority to regulate power services, laying the foundations for the state-led 
development of hydroelectric power (Abers & Keck, 2013).  
4.3. The Expansion of Hydroelectric Power Generation 
From the 1940s and through the 1960s, the federal government sought greater control 
over electric utilities. Hydroelectric potential was being gradually exhausted in the Southeast, 
and new plants had to be constructed farther away from large cities and urban areas to meet the 
rising demand for electricity (SP SEM, Interview, Dec. 8 2016). Starting in 1945, the Brazilian 
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government created Eletrosul, Furnas, Chesf, and Eletronorte.  These federal power companies 
built and operated large hydroelectric plants in the Southern, Southeastern/Midwestern, 
Northeastern, and Northern regions of the country, respectively. The government eventually put 
these entities under the control of a singular holding company, Eletrobras, making the central 
government the primary owner and manager of the transmission system and also of much of the 
hydroelectricity generated in the country (Bajay, 2006, p.866). State governments formed 
distribution and retail supply companies, and some were also involved in generating and 
distributing electricity.10 To develop the incipient oil market, Petrobras was created as a legal 
monopoly in 1954. Like many countries at the time, monopoly under government control was 
seen as the best means to extend electrification.  
Throughout the military period (1964-1985), planning and decision-making within the 
Brazilian electricity sector became more centralized.11  The government encouraged the 
development of the country’s natural resources and river basins to stimulate economic growth. 
As the economy grew, so did the demand for electricity (Vieira & Dalgaard, 2013, p. 611). The 
National Department of Water and Electric Energy (DNAEE) was founded in 1965 with the 
purpose of managing freshwater resources. From the 1970s onward, hydropower grew to 
represent over 80 percent of Brazil’s electricity production. Eletrobras used its control over state 
funds for building power plants and pursued vast projects, such as the Itaipu hydroelectric dam 
on Brazil’s shared border with Paraguay (de Oliveira, 2007, p. 31). There was no independent 
regulator or systems operator separate from the political bureaucracy, and the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy and DNAEE were in charge of policymaking and de facto regulation.  
                                                          
10 These energy companies owned by state governments include Cesp in the State of São Paulo, Cemig in the State 
of Minas Gerais, Copel in the State of Parana and CEEE in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, 
11 On April 1, 1964, the Brazilian military overthrew then president João Goulart. See Skidmore (1990).  
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The OPEC oil crisis from 1973-1979 represented a critical juncture in Brazilian energy 
planning. The twin oil price shocks set off an upheaval in the global economy which hit many 
petroleum-importing countries. At the time, Brazil was importing 80% of its petroleum. The rise 
in the price for oil disrupted supplies and threatened the country’s economic development plans. 
Consequently, energy sovereignty rose higher on the policy agenda, and the military government 
saw energy independence as a matter of national concern. Since the technological and 
institutional framework was already well-developed around hydropower, the ability to build out 
the supply capacity with hydroelectric plants, rather than with imported crude oil, reinforced the 
notion among policymakers that Brazil was a “hydropower country” (de Oliveira, 2007, p.37).12 
Another salient government initiative was the launching of the National Alcohol Program 
(Proálcool) to replace gasoline consumed in the transport sector with sugarcane ethanol. Like 
hydropower, ethanol was not initially conceived as a source of renewable energy, but as a means 
of reducing Brazil’s dependency on imported petroleum (Vieira & Dalgaard, 2013, p. 618).   
The National Interconnected System (SIN) was further designed with the objective of 
maximizing the number of hydroelectric plants in electricity production. Managed by The 
Electric System National Operator (ONS), the SIN is an extensive transmission infrastructure 
which serves all Brazilian states and transports over 98% of the electricity produced and 
consumed in the four regional subsystems: the South, Southeast/Center-West, Northeast, and 
North grids. Given their industrial and economic importance, the South and Southeast became 
the first regions connected by the SIN in the mid-1970s. Under its original conception, fossil 
fuel-based thermoelectric plants were used in cases where hydroelectric plants were unable to 
supply sufficient energy to the electricity grid. The SIN was thus intended to unify the country’s 
hydroelectric generation and transmit it to demand centers (see Figure 2 below).   
                                                          




Diagram of the Brazilian National Transmission System (SIN) 
 
 






4.4. Privatization and Regulation in the Brazilian Power Sector 
The public ownership framework of federally- and state-owned companies responsible 
for electricity generation and supply in Brazil lasted until the mid-1980s. The low price for 
electricity and a growing energy supply had largely achieved what they were intended to do – 
fuel Brazil’s rapid economic development. The Brazilian economy grew at a rate of around 10% 
per annum between 1968 and 1973. However, the “miracle years” of state-led development 
eventually triggered the unraveling of the electricity sector model. The military government had 
tried to ensure economic growth while downplaying the financial viability of public sector 
companies. The artificially low tariffs for electricity were often vain efforts to control high 
inflation rates and achieve other political and economic objectives. The practice of fixing 
electricity tariffs below costs had led state-owned utilities companies to accumulate high 
amounts of debt, which were then exacerbated by the shocks of the oil crises and ensuing 
economic instability (Tanka, 2008, p. 154-156). Politically appointed managers of state-owned 
companies had also done little to protect environmental quality as they built ever-larger 
hydroelectric projects (de Oliveira, 2007, p.45). 
By the end of the 1980s, the decline of an institutional model based on strong public 
sector involvement led to a search for alternatives. In 1995, a political ideology of privatization 
spurred the momentum to reform the power sector. Based on principles of market deregulation 
pioneered by Chile and Great Britain, then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
administration initiated a restructuring process that aimed to stimulate competition and attract 
private investors to generate and supply electricity. The Brazilian government would drastically 
reduce its role by privatizing the distribution sector and some hydroelectric generators.13 As a 
                                                          
13 Victor and Heller (2007) note that reform strategies have differed in whether to lead reforms with the generation 
or distribution side of the power sector.  
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result of broad-based privatization and restructuring, 70 percent of distribution assets and 30 
percent of generation capacity were initially privatized. Distribution companies were privatized 
as 30-year concessions. Generation companies were auctioned as 35-year concessions and were 
required to sell their power in competitive wholesale markets. The large generation and 
transmission companies — Furnas, Chesf, Eletronorte, Cemig and Copel — continued to be 
state-owned. This partial privatization of utilities was caused by strong political opposition to 
privatization both within and outside of government (Bajay, 2006, p.867).  
The National Privatization Program in the 1990s introduced independent regulatory 
agencies in Brazil as modern forms of market regulation.14 Previously, the Ministry of Mines of 
Energy, DNAEE, and Eletrobras had been traditionally responsible for most aspects of energy 
planning. One of the first steps of Brazil’s reform program was the establishment of Aneel in 
1996, a quasi-independent regulatory body charged with overseeing the electricity sector. 
Reformers conceived Aneel as being at the center of policy implementation, although the agency 
faced considerable review of its functions and resources in the electricity sector (Lock, 2005). In 
turn, the Ministry of Mines and Energy was to reduce its role in the construction of hydroelectric 
projects, but remain in charge of coordinating long-term supply planning.  
The prevailing institutional context in Brazil influenced the design and vision for the new 
energy regulator, Aneel. At the federal level, the reform of the electricity sector centered on how 
to renovate existing institutions to meet the challenges of privatization. Over the 1980s, DNAEE, 
the federal agency responsible for water, hydroelectric dams, and monitoring the power sector, 
became increasingly seen as bureaucratically costly and underperforming (Nunes, 2007, p.63). 
DNAEE encompassed a staff of 600-700 civil servants and, while it counted on a capable 
                                                          
14 In a parallel fashion, the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL) and the Petroleum, Natural Gas and 
Biofuels National Agency (ANP) were created to regulate their respective infrastructure sectors. It should be noted 
that the ANP physically adjoins Aneel’s offices in Brasilia.   
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technical team, most employees had not been subjected to technical selection criteria during 
recruitment. Moreover, having been subordinated as an administrative arm of the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy, it lacked independence. By 1995, an organizational alternative which could 
safeguard investor confidence and provide transparent decision-making was already being 
discussed within the department (Nunes, et al., 2007, pg. 63; Ribeiro et al., 2006, p.12). Aneel 
would be vested with the fundamental role to depoliticize the electricity sector and set the stage 
for market-oriented energy policies. The image of the new energy regulator was framed in 
contradistinction to DNAEE: it would be independent from the interventionist tendencies of the 
administrative bureaucracy (de Oliveira, 2007, p. 32).  
In addition to founding Aneel, a set of central institutions were created to direct the future 
course of Brazil’s power sector (see Figure 3). Among these were the National System Operator 
(ONS) in 1998, the central dispatcher which balances supply and demand for electricity within 
the interconnected transmission system. The CCEE (Electric Energy Trading Chamber) replaced 
the MAE (Wholesale Market of Electric Energy) and coordinates the wholesale market and 
regulated contracting environment. In 2004, President Lula’s government created the Energy 
Research Enterprise (EPE). Linked to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the EPE is a semi-
autonomous planning and research agency which carries out long-term expansion planning for 









Diagram of the Brazilian Electricity Sector 
 
Note. Authors’ adaptation of the CCEE’s institutional chart (CCEE, 2018). 
 
As part of the new planning model for energy expansion and regulation, two trading 
environments were created in the wholesale market: the regulated contracting environment 
(ACR) and the free contracting environment (ACL). In the ACR, distribution companies 
purchase energy at public auctions by submitting demand projections with five-year horizons to 
the EPE. Based on these projections, the EPE sets the total amount of electricity to be contracted 
in the auctions. The EPE gathers baseline data and guides firms through the bidding and 
licensing processes (Hochstetler & Tranjan, 2016). In the ACL, large consumers are free to 
choose their suppliers outside the centralized auctions. Energy sales are negotiated through 
bilateral contracts with generators and traders, and are subject to federal oversight from the 
CCEE. The public-private ownership system allows public and private sector companies to 
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compete freely in the market for supplying electricity and provides the opportunity to compare 
total price efficiency in the two sectors. If the private sector bids too high for a supply contract, 
the public sector will undercut them, and vice-versa (Tankha, 2008, p. 160).  
As of 2017, private companies that are non-utilities own 60 percent of generation in 
Brazil. Much of the non-utility generation is under long-term contract to utilities. Approximately 
40 percent of transmission and 71 percent of distribution is privatized (Portinari, 2017)).  
4.5. Public Support for Non-hydro Renewable Energy Alternatives 
The electricity reforms that Brazil adopted in the late 1990s marked an opportunity to 
diversify the energy supply away from hydro. In theory, the market-oriented approach was 
technology-neutral: any energy source could be considered a fair candidate. At the same time, 
several arguments were being made for cleaner and more diversified electricity sectors that drew 
on recent advances in renewable energy technologies. Following the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, international 
and domestic stakeholders advocated for more environmentally friendly sources such as wind, 
solar, and biomass. In addition, environmental actors in Brazil had gradually brought to light the 
social impacts of large hydroelectric projects. The environmental movement was also highly 
critical of electricity utilities’ quest for expansion and their disregard for environmental 
concerns. With the return to civilian government and democratization, the voices of opponents to 
large hydro began to matter in national policy debates over energy (Vieira & Dalgaard, 2013, p. 
615). The fact that Brazil had already tapped 75 percent of its hydroelectric potential was cited as 
an additional reason to branch into alternative energy. 
While sustainability concerns gained importance in energy policies, hydropower was 
given continued priority in Brazil’s energy expansion plans. The mounting pressures to diversify 
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the energy supply did not provide a sufficient counterbalance to the pre-existing hydropower 
framework. The hydroelectric system’s organizational principles and characteristics led to a 
situation of “lock-in” in which centralized hydropower has remained the dominant from of 
energy production, while creating a strong resistance against introducing alternative energy 
technologies (Geels & Kemp, 2007). For a number of reasons, “hydro lock-in” has created 
constraints for achieving emerging policy goals such as energy security.  
First is the fact that the price of hydro-based electricity is the lowest among all sources of 
energy. The central dispatcher, the ONS, selects which generators can supply electricity to the 
grid based on their declared variable costs. In terms of the technological and financial 
characteristics of hydropower, enormous capital investments are required during initial dam 
construction, but the operating costs are typically very low in comparison to other major 
electricity sources. The functional life of a hydroelectric plant is longer than its amortization 
period, the length of time that it takes to pay back a loan for the initial capital and construction 
costs. Since the majority of hydroelectric plants had their capital costs amortized before the 
liberalization of the electricity market, they do not have their past financial and environmental 
costs figured into their variable costs. These old hydropower plants only have to recoup 
operational costs and, therefore, have more flexibility in setting prices in the free market, where 
consumers negotiate power supplies directly with generators and traders. These power plants 
thus compete asymmetrically, making it difficult for new technologies to enter the generation 
market (Cavaleiro & Silva, 2005; da Silva et al., 2013, p.691).15 Their significant share of the 
electricity supply can be likened to a “first-mover advantage”: as preliminary entrants, these 
                                                          
15 As described later on, the auction system was designed to differentiate between “old” and “new” power facilities. 
One of the reasons was to take into consideration the characteristics of old hydroelectric plants which have already 
been installed and “paid for,” and which could consequently out-compete new investments in energy.  
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early hydroelectric plants gained a significant competitive advantage and continue to control a 
large share of generation in the electricity sector. 
In addition to hydro’s low prices to supply electricity, the incipient regulatory structure 
inherited institutional endowments from the previous system. In practice, the underlying rules 
and market structures that determine which power plants are selected to supply electricity are far 
from being technologically neutral. The centralized dispatch rules give priority to hydropower 
when prioritizing which power plants the systems operator will deploy to service the electricity 
grid. Hydroelectric plants are considered must-run baseload plants that are always “turned on” to 
maintain the electricity grid’s voltage, frequency, and reliability.16 These plants are allowed to 
supply electricity nearly continuously and will be dispatched ahead of any other primary source 
except nuclear, which is also classified as inflexible. The implication is that the central supply 
dispatcher gives lower priority to other sources, such as wind and solar. 
Lastly, the political culture to promote and sustain hydropower was integrated into the 
new regulatory order. The initial winners that emerged from institutional reforms were the well-
organized interests of hydroelectric operators. The political slang term, eletrocratas, is used 
colloquially to refer to career bureaucrats who were trained in the engineering and political 
culture cultivated during the golden age of large hydropower and hydro-based megaprojects. 
These professional elites have been largely brought into the new regulatory regime (de Oliveira, 
2007, p.73; Unicamp, Interview, June 15, 2016).17 For them, continuing to build up the 
hydroelectric sector was part of common practice and integral to their belief system. For 
                                                          
16 Electric power generators connected to the electricity transmission and distribution grid function not individually 
but as part of a “team” of generators, turning synchronically with the frequency of the grid. Some power stations are 
“frequency regulators.” They maintain the grid’s overall frequency so that other power stations can continue to 
generate power. 
 
17 This research looks at elitism indirectly by focusing on policies and regulations that energy elites have defended 
within the electricity system. For a more focused elitist perspective that explains how individuals and groups amass 
power and influence within large, energy-based technological systems, see Hirsh (1999).  
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example, during restructuring, Aneel passed a resolution to incentivize small hydro power plants, 
giving special operational discounts to plants with installed capacities of fewer than 30 
megawatts (Aneel, 1998). Other types of renewable energy facilities, such as wind farms, have 
had to adapt to standards that were  intended to guarantee the expansion of hydropower. These 
informal institutions, based on vested interests and ideological commitments regarding what are 
politically and culturally appropriate forms of electricity generation, have also contributed to 
system inertia.  
The necessary political will to make more systemic changes to the electrical supply 
system was precipitated by an energy crisis in 2001. Until 2001, the country relied on 
hydroelectric power for 88-percent of its generating capacity, and there were no significant 
incentives for non-hydro renewable energy technologies. Beginning in July of that year, a severe 
drought had reduced the water levels of hydroelectric reservoirs and resulted in major disruptions 
and power rationing. The Southeast and Northeast reservoirs were at only one third of their full 
capacities, an amount that was insufficient to meet the demand until the start of the next rainy 
season. The government first lodged the origins of the crisis in climatic factors and unpredictable 
rainfall. An important factor, however, was that generation investments had been added at a 
slower rate than consumption between 1990 and 2000 (Tolmasquim, 2000). The immediate 
reaction of the government was a demand-side solution: energy supplies were rationed for eight 
months and energy efficiency measures were gradually phased in to reduce the demand for 
electricity. In response to the prospect of another energy crisis, the Brazilian Government 
accelerated the construction of thermoelectric power reserves to stabilize supply levels.18  
                                                          
18 Since the 1980s, the Brazilian government had positioned fossil fuels, primarily natural gas, as a way to 
complement the hydropower system and boost supply security. The government created the Priority Thermo-
electricity Program (PPT) to stimulate investments in thermoelectric plants, but plants were not built fast enough to 
keep up with expansions plans under a more liberalized framework. In this view, attempts to diversify the supply 
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The crisis had a lasting effect on the broader policy environment that strongly relied on 
the performance and stability of hydrological resources. The reoccurring power supply shortages 
provided an external pressure to expand and diversify the electricity matrix. Furthermore, by 
early the 2000s, the wind power booms in California, Denmark, and Germany had dispelled the 
notion that wind was an unviable power option (Heymann, 1999). The anti-nuclear movement 
had also influenced the public’s general opposition to nuclear energy. These changed technical 
and cultural conditions presented electric power reformers with new options for how to craft a 
new supply model for the power sector. While hydropower formed the backbone of the energy 
system, the solution to future energy problems no longer relied exclusively on hydroelectric 
power. 
In addition to energy conservation measures, policy-makers responded to the energy 
crisis by creating a number of government supports to foster markets for renewable energy 
sources. In 2002, the Program of Incentives for Alternative Energy in Electricity (Proinfa) 
introduced feed-in tariffs for wind, biomass, and small hydro but did not include solar. In 2004, 
the government established energy auctions as the main policy mechanism to attract new 
generation capacity. While many auctions have been restricted to hydro, technology-specific 
auctions have been conducted for wind, solar, and biomass (Hochstetler & Kostka, 2015; Batlle, 
et al., 2010). After a preliminary round to ensure competition, a second “pay-as-bid” round 
awards the lowest bids with a power purchase agreement (PPA) (Elizondo et al., 2014). The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           





Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) provides credit for approved energy projects at 
subsidized rates.19 
Another way to encourage renewable sources of energy has been the establishment and 
subsequent revision of a national net-metering framework. In 2012, with the global cost 
reductions for solar technologies and equipment, the Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency 
(Aneel) created net-metering regulations to reduce regulatory barriers for small-scale distributed 
generation systems. Although a variety of renewable energy sources are eligible under net-
metering regulations (Jannuzzi & Melo, 2013; Mattar et al., 2015), they were essentially 
designed to stimulate solar power generation. At 194 MW, solar photovoltaic (PV) systems 
represent 72.5% of installed capacity in distributed generation connections (Aneel, 2018a). 
In addition to explicit government supports, the new electricity market structure provided 
the basis to expand the power system with non-hydro renewables. After the victory of the 
Workers’ Party in 2002, power reformers introduced a new class of participants in the electric 
utilities sector: the Independent Power Producer (IPP). An IPP, or non-utility generator (NUG), 
is an entity which owns facilities to generate electric power for sale to utilities and electricity 
consumers. It is not a public utility involved in electricity distribution. Previously, federally and 
state-owned power companies were primarily interested in building big power plants that were 
infeasible for most renewable technologies at the time, except for hydroelectricity. There were 
also a few vertically integrated power companies owned by the state governments in Brazil's 
industrialized southeast and southern regions (Tankha, 2008), which produced and sold 
electricity to end consumers almost exclusively from their hydroelectric plants. Following 
sectoral restructuring, the opportunity for independent power producers to enter the generation 
                                                          
19 The BNDES no longer provides subsidized loans for fossil fuel-based thermoelectric plants following Brazil’s 
participation in the Paris Climate Agreement.  
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market interested many medium-size companies that considered producing energy from sources 
other than hydro. The prospect of government incentives to encourage the development of 
biomass and wind has also been an attractive incentive for new investors.  
Another drought in 2012 provided a renewed stimulus for non-hydro renewable energy 
sources. From mid-2012 to late 2015, the average water levels in river basins had been below 
historical values. In response, the federal government deployed electricity from fossil fuel-based 
thermoelectric plants, powered primarily by coal and natural gas, to guarantee the country’s 
electricity supply and allow a recovery in reservoir levels. In the medium-run, this caused the 
price of electricity to rise, leading to an unprecedented increase in energy tariffs in 2015. To 
mitigate the financial impacts on distribution companies’ revenues, the federal government 
decided to use the Energy Development Fund (CDE), a public benefit fund created to promote 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, to compensate distributors for the additional costs 
incurred. High electricity prices are politically unpopular, and the government used its control 
over the energy sector to keep prices low and avoid the pass-through of these costs to final 
consumers (CPFL Energia, 2012). In compensating for the system’s inherent hydrological risks, 
the over-use of thermoelectric plants causes high electricity prices and emissions. 
Despite a growing consensus to develop the country’s non-hydro renewable resources, 
the government has been intent on expanding hydroelectric power. Under the Worker’s Party 
government, the EPE released an expansion plan in 2007, which it later revised in 2010. It 
anticipated an annual increase in energy production, amounting to 40,000 MW by 2020, mostly 
from building new hydroelectric power plants in Northern river basins. Considering the 
sensitivity of the Amazon region, dam construction continues to exemplify the clash between 
development and conservation policies (Vieira & Dalgaard, 2013). Moreover, the main rivers 
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targeted for hydroelectric expansion overlap with territories of several traditional communities. 
The reliance on large-scale hydroelectric power plants in the Amazon has triggered major 
debates about the actual sustainability of hydropower, the unequal distribution of benefits, and 
the socio-environmental costs (de Castro, 2014). Although the government has recognized the 
costs and environmental impacts associated with hydroelectric plants, it is still set on increasing 
hydroelectric power. 
The exploration of offshore oil and gas fields also presents important challenges to 
diversifying the power supply with more renewable alternatives. In November 2007, the 
Brazilian government announced the discovery of its “pre-salt” oil reserves containing oil and 
natural gas.20 The reserves follow a rough rectangle formation with dimensions of approximately 
300 km by 800 km, extending from the south of state of Espírito Santo to the north of Santa 
Catarina. The thick layer of salt in the subsoil indicates a large volume of petroleum. According 
to petroleum technicians, the Brazilian pre-salt fields could contain around 90 billion barrels of 
reserves, which could result in a 7.2% increase in world oil reserves (Metri, 2009). Given the 
difficulty in accessing these reserves, analysts predict that oil and gas resources will comprise 
close to half of all investments in the energy sector over the next 10 years. Critics speculate that 
this new source of fossil fuels may negatively affect Brazil’s long-term commitment to 
renewable energy development. A disproportionate investment in the exploration of fossil fuels 
is clearly at odds with a commitment to a “clean” energy matrix (Vieira & Dalgaard, 2013, 
p.614). 
                                                          
20 The term “pre-salt” refers to the underwater geological layer formed by the separation of the current American 
and African continents, a process that started about 150 million years ago. Over millions of years, large amounts of 
organic matter were deposited to form the present pre-salt region. See Petrobras (2017).  
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4.6. Contemporary Power Sector Reforms 
The Brazilian electricity sector is frequently referred to as a “hybrid” system because of 
the present mix of private and public sector participation. In 2002, the Workers’ Party, the left-
wing opposition, won on a platform that included drastic reorientation of the power industry. The 
elected President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (‘Lula’), replaced the strategy motivated by 
comprehensive privatization and deregulation with a hybrid model of centralized planning and 
market competition. After ensuring security of supply, keeping prices low was the primary 
objective (Tankha, 2008). While the government under the Worker’s Party supported 
hydropower as part of its developmentalist agenda, major public support programs were created 
to introduce non-hydro alternatives into supply planning. 
At the time of writing in 2018, the Brazilian government has invited a second wave of 
reforms for the electricity sector. Under the guidance of President Michel Temer, the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) party has developed a liberal economic platform, widely 
seen as a rejection of a decade of the Workers’ Party and left-wing policies (Boadle & Soto, 
2016). The government plans to use proceeds from the privatization program to reduce its fiscal 
deficit. The proposal is to expand the free market aspect of the sector by eliminating subsidies, 
encouraging privatization, and allowing consumers to choose their own energy suppliers. A 
cornerstone of the privatization plan is to auction off the electricity distribution subsidiaries of 
Eletrobras, the largest power utility in Brazil and formerly the state-controlled driver behind 
energy planning. The potential impacts of the reforms are still largely speculative. Like earlier 
reforms, however, critics argue that the state will lose its control over the electricity sector, and 




One key aim of this chapter was to show how the electricity system’s institutional 
structure has co-evolved with the development of hydroelectric technology. The political and 
technical characteristics of the existing hydropower system shape the deployment of new 
technologies and serve as a defense for the status quo. While electric power reforms were 
technology-neutral, the characteristics and standards associated with hydroelectric power were 
written into the new regulatory regime. Powerful incumbent actors have also mobilized the 
hydroelectric infrastructure to retain their control over the industry and uphold their vision of 
what are appropriate forms of electricity for the country’s power supply. For these reasons, the 
dominant energy regime has exhibited strong path dependence and lock-in (Essletzbichler, 2012, 
p.794). The impacts of external shocks have exposed the system’s vulnerability to climatic risks 
and over-reliance on hydropower. Changes to these landscape factors have provided broader 
political opportunities to question and reshape the domestic energy system (Geels, 2002).  
Furthermore, privatization and the creation of an independent regulatory agency marked a 
key change in the way in which Brazil managed its electricity grid. The primary purpose of 
Aneel was to regulate the new electricity market, insulate the reformulated sector from political 
intervention, and introduce professionals with technical expertise to administrate electricity 
issues. Under certain conditions, however, regulatory agencies can create opportunity structures 
that foster their status as news spaces for deliberation and policymaking (Dubash & Morgan 
2012, p.270). This can happen in quite unanticipated ways by reform designers’ intent on 
providing safeguards to investors and ensuring efficiency. The following chapter demonstrates 
how Aneel has prompted change in the electricity system, challenging both the tendency of large, 




Regulatory Approaches to Wind and Solar Energy 
 
This chapter explores the role that the federal energy regulator, Aneel, has played in 
enabling the development of non-hydro renewable technologies. Building on the previous 
chapter’s socio-technical analysis of the Brazilian electricity system, I argue that the choice to 
develop alternative sources of energy has largely depended on how a given technology is 
compatible with the dominant features of the hydropower system. Within this context, Aneel has 
emerged as a crucial institutional supporter of wind and solar in electricity generation. The aim is 
to provide insights into how regulatory institutions advance renewables sources of energy in 
ways that are consistent with their mandates.  
I begin by outlining Aneel’s institutional structure, how the regulatory agency has 
responsibilities that deviate from conventional models for electricity reform, and the agency’s 
role in developing renewable sources of energy in Brazil. I then describe the processes through 
which Aneel has contributed to the development of wind and solar energy. In the case of wind 
energy, which is widely seen as complementary to the existing hydroelectric system, energy 
regulators have strategically used their jurisdiction to mediate specific cases and contract 
disputes as an opportunity to improve the implementation of renewable energy auctions. For 
distributed solar energy, which is seen as less compatible with the electricity system, Aneel has 
created a new regulatory space for distributed generation technologies. I argue that Aneel’s 
ongoing struggle for legitimacy and autonomy in the electricity sector motivated its decision-
making when implementing broader energy policies and objectives.  
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5.1. The Brazilian Energy Regulatory Agency: Purpose and Institutional Structure 
 The Brazilian Energy Regulatory Agency, Aneel, was created in December 1996 as part 
of the privatization reforms of the 1990s. Formally enacted under Law No. 9427, Aneel replaced 
the National Department of Water and Electric Energy (DNAEE) and initiated Brazil’s 
administrative engagement with public regulatory bodies removed from the traditional 
ministerial structures. The agency was designed around the concept of economic rather than 
social regulation, a distinguishing feature which pervaded the thinking around regulatory reforms 
at the time (Peci & Sobral, 2011). The stated mission of Aneel is to, “provide favorable 
conditions for the electricity market to develop in a balanced environment, amongst other agents, 
for the benefit of society." In practice, Aneel regulates and monitors investments in the power 
sector, supervising the production, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity in accordance 
with the policies and guidelines of the federal government (Law No. 9427, Art. 2) (see Table 3). 
 Aneel is formally under the umbrella of the MME but is financially and administratively 
independent from the government through charges levied on electricity generators and 
distribution companies. It is organized into approximately 20 divisions which administer 
different regulatory activities such as supervising generation contracts, intermediating between 
investors, and monitoring distribution concessions. To ensure accountability and oversight, 
Aneel is required to present its accounts to the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) which are also 
made publically available on its website. A board of five directors is elected by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate for four-year terms (de Oliveira, 2007, p. 51). Aneel has relatively 
highly educated staff with approximately 40% of the agency’s directors and upper management 
having a masters or doctorate (Azumendi, 2016), typically in energy planning, economics, or 
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engineering.21 This reflects that early reasoning that directors and staff with better training will 
privilege their professional careers in the face of political pressures, and have adequate 
knowledge to deal with technical issues.  
Although Aneels’ mandate is broad, it is not unlimited. Courts can reverse decisions if 
they find that regulators have exceeded their statutory authority, misinterpreted the law, or 
conducted an unfair process. In general, however, courts will defer to the expertise of the 
regulators when regulatory decision-making is contested (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017). 
 
                                                          
21 This study was based on a sample of 25 directors at Aneel. In comparison to other federal regulatory agencies, 
Aneel was ranked as the agency with the third highest level of academic achievement; the agency with the highest 
rank was the National Petroleum Agency (ANP). See Azumendi (2016).  
Figure 4 
 
Summary of Aneel’s Regulatory Functions 
 
  Regulation  
Technical  Revises the electricity tariff 
 Conducts Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA) to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of regulatory decisions.  
 Creates new regulatory norms to accompany technological, economic, and 
environmental change.  
Monitoring  Ensures regulatory compliance from private and public agents in the 
electricity sector, e.g. distribution concessionaires, power generators, and 
transmission operators.  
Mediation  Attempts to employ conflict resolution to avoid the levying of penalties 
  
  Energy Auctions  Implements energy auctions designed by the Ministry of Mines and Energy 
 Provides permits for new investments in electricity generation 
 Renews contracts for old power facilities and generation assets 
  
  R&D and Energy 
Efficiency 
 Promotes energy efficiency and rational energy use 
 Hosts public R&D calls to encourage the development of projects that  
address the long-term challenges in the energy sector 
 
Note.  Author’s elaboration based on Aneel’s website on technical information (Aneel, 2017).  
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Public consultation is another facet that aims to make the regulatory process more 
transparent and accountable to government and civil society. Aneel interacts regularly with the 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies during public hearings and technical meetings to summarize its 
activities and provide clarifications. The agency also consults with the public and gathers input 
prior to the establishment or amendment to any sector regulation. The main channels for public 
engagement are the Consumer Advisory Council and Public Hearings Advisory Council. 
Stakeholders can express concerns regarding tariffs and quality of electricity supply in these 
forums, and are represented by the five main consumer classes for energy: residential, rural, 
government, commercial, and industrial. In turn, public hearings are intended to give greater 
visibility to the agency’s actions (Aneel, 2016; Peci & Sobral, 2011, p. 216). The five directors 
sit through hearings and listen to the evidence presented by attendees, asking questions and 
ruling on motions. Aneel is then obligated to analyze all contributions and integrate them into its 
decision-making process. 
Aneel and the Ministry of Mines and Energy share the day-to-day governance of the 
electricity sector. Consequently, one common source of deliberation is determining jurisdiction. 
Since its creation, Aneel has become more involved in the siting, construction, licensing, and 
operation of generation facilities, especially in acquiring responsibilities for actions that had been 
pursued by the MME. Aneel recognizes, however, that these duties do not preclude having to 
collaborate with the Ministry of Mines and Energy, which has a strong role in centralized supply 
planning. Representatives from Aneel and the MME mentioned that they often exchange 
information, attempt to resolve problems together when there is overlapping jurisdiction, and 
provide suggestions on how to approach sectoral problems (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017; 
89 
 
Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017). While regulators and ministers may at times disagree, they 
claim to want to work in harmony to achieve good outcomes for the energy sector.  
As part of its regulatory mandate, Aneel has a duty to comply with the social and 
environmental guidance from government ministers and existing legislation. Under the National 
Energy Policy Council (CNPE) (Law No. 9478, Art. 1), the duties required of the agency include 
…II - to promote development, expand the labor market and enhance energy resources; 
III - protect consumer interests with regard to price, quality and availability of products; 
IV - protect the environment and promote energy conservation…VII - identify the most 
appropriate solutions for the electric power supply in different regions of the country; 
VIII - use alternative energy sources through the economic use of available inputs and 
applicable technologies. 
 
The breadth of this legislation provides a basis for the energy regulator to take social 
considerations into account. For instance, following a major energy crisis in 2001, Aneel 
required households to conserve electricity and reduce their consumption by 20 percent. The 
agency then created a public benefit fund and obligated electricity concessionaires to invest in 
research and development and energy efficiency programs, referred to as the Program for 
Research and Development (P&D) and Program for Energy Efficiency (PEE), respectively. In 
the case of energy efficiency, one of the obligations is to invest at least 0.5 percent of its net 
operations income on activities to reduce electricity consumption. Aneel sets the standards for 
the range of activities covered by PEE and P&D projects and has the discretion to accept or 
reject proposals according to pre-determined benchmarks. These programs are further justified 
on the basis that Aneel has the authority to search for innovations that meet the long-term 
technological challenges within the electricity sector (Aneel, 2017). The energy regulator thus 
has responsibilities that exceed the traditional regulatory tasks of rate-setting and overseeing the 
contracts of power concessions. 
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Furthermore, since restructuring, Brazilian regulatory agencies have been responsible for 
acquiring and organizing relevant information related to their sectors of operation. For instance, 
Peci and Sobral (2011, p.216) found that the Aneel board representatives claimed that the agency 
has more data and information than the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Aneel’s ownership of 
sector-relevant information was also confirmed during the authors’ interviews with members of 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME, Interview, March 20, 2017). Oftentimes, Aneel 
provides the MME with information and data. In turn, the MME takes into consideration Aneel’s 
suggestions for crafting decrees and legal changes (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 2017). This 
control over sectoral information and Aneel’s proximity to consumers and stakeholders has 
increased its importance in electricity governance. 
Aneel also explicitly contributes to the achievement of other objectives that support the 
public interest. The independent regulator is in charge of managing the private sector, but also 
directs regulated utilities to perform public ends.  The belief that the state had failed to manage 
the electricity sector made regulators partly responsible for fulfilling the social role of utilities. In 
this context, Brazil has experienced a new growth of public service regulations in relation to the 
privatized utilities (Prosser, 2000). A salient case in point is the universalization of electricity 
access. Since 2002, Aneel has been in charge of administrating universal service obligations. The 
agency requires that electricity companies serve their entire concession areas on the same 
conditions, which includes the electrification of low-income households and informal areas 
(Jannuzzi & Goldemberg, 2014). Regulators acknowledge that their role extends beyond 
traditional economic regulation and fixing market failure, and that their decisions can have a 
wider impact on the environment and society (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 2017).  
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While Aneel is involved in policymaking, the agency prefers to highlight its impartiality 
in public decision-making and emphasizes its role as a neutral arbiter. Representatives have 
repeatedly distinguished their regulatory duties from the federal government, mainly from the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy, emphasizing the regulator’s long-term mandate in contrast to the 
four-year mandates of federal administrations. Regarding electricity generation, Aneel denies 
accusations that it makes decisions which explicitly seek to diversify the energy supply or uses 
environmental criteria in its capacity as regulator (D. Rabelo, presentation, Oct. 28, 2014). In the 
interest of establishing their legitimacy within the energy sector, regulators tend to draw attention 
to their circumscribed legal role of managing contracts and reducing barriers so that projects 
come online within projected timeframes. Representatives interviewed at Aneel affirmed in 
various ways that they do not engage in public policymaking, but rather implement policies in 
light of their legal obligations and the MME’s overarching authority to set basic policy  (Aneel, 
Interview, Sept. 14, 2017; Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017).  
5.1.1. The Regulatory Setting for Renewable Energy Policies 
Aneel was founded at a critical juncture when the fundamental tenets of the original 
hydropower model still guided energy planning. At the same time, public support for non-hydro 
alternative spurred the government to invest in renewable energy. The Workers’ Party 
government, while still convinced of the need to increase hydroelectric power, had encouraged 
public and private companies to generate electricity from non-hydro alternatives sources. These 
new public demands and alternative conceptions of power supply gained attention and began to 
influence expert discussions and decisions.  
Within this changing institutional context, Aneel’s distinct qualities and powers give it 
the authority to shape renewable energy policies. In contrast to the broader government 
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bureaucracy, the professional culture of the regulatory agency has fewer ties to hydropower and 
fossil fuels. Although many of the agency’s first employees had come from DNAEE, Aneel was 
an institutional newcomer which lacked many of the founding assumptions of the electricity 
sector. The original electrocrats had graduated from predominately engineering schools during 
the golden age of hydroelectricity and had professional experiences limited to hydropower 
planning, the oil and gas industry, or the distribution sector.22 These policymakers and engineers 
essentially had a stake in the existing system. By contrast, the new generation of energy 
regulators received their educations when alternative energy technologies had already matured 
considerably. Technological advances in wind, solar, and bioenergy had widened the possibilities 
of supplying electricity with other sources of energy, and were being taught as case studies at 
Brazilian universities. In sum, regulators lacked many of the ideological commitments of their 
predecessors. 
Furthermore, Aneel’s quest for authority and legitimacy influences the character of 
regulatory governance for electricity. Regulators are agents of the state, but not necessarily of the 
government of the moment (Brown, 2003, p. 9). By delegating authority to regulatory agencies, 
electricity reforms made regulators responsible for the credibility and reliably of their sectors in 
the face of political pressures. Renewable energy policies in particular are discussed in reference 
to policy stability as an essential design element to spur investment (Stokes, 2013). While the 
Brazilian government seeks to achieve a variety of goals, Aneel was created to use rules, 
regulation, and oversight in order to manage the electricity sector. These pillars of regulatory 
governance stress that contracts and technical decisions made by the regulatory agency should be 
sustained, independent of short-term government interests. In practice, the goals of regulation 
                                                          
22Abers and Keck (2006, p.606) note that the expansion of hydroelectric utilities had stimulated the growth of first-
rate university programs dedicated to training technical professional with expertise in hydroelectric engineering and 
related scientific fields. 
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can conflict with government preferences and other organizations, such as the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy. Government representatives might attempt to influence the electricity sector in ways 
that might compromise the basic tenets of regulation in order to achieve political goals.  
The agency’s defense of its credibility and regulatory authority is relevant to renewable 
energy policies. In this case, using auctions for energy supply planning can manifest as a conflict 
of interest between Aneel and incumbent government administrations. For large-scale power 
generation, the expectation that regular auctions will be held provides a guarantee to both 
equipment manufacturers and investors. While the MME decides on the conditions for each 
auction, the regulator agency fulfills the task of providing investors insight into what they may 
reasonably expect about long-term wind and solar auction policies, which may be difficult to 
guarantee. For instance, during energy crises, promoting alternative forms of energy gains 
support across government but loses momentum when a crisis is mitigated. The result is that 
government officials may be less amenable to support non-hydro renewable energy sources 
during periods of low economic growth, and may even pressure regulators to modify or cancel 
contracts for renewable energy investments when hydroelectric plants are running near full 
capacity. In short, government decisions based on political priorities can tread on Aneel’s 
territory and undermine the overall quality of the regulatory framework for renewable energy 
investments.  
At the same time, since markets and circumstances evolve over time, stability cannot 
mean a complete ban on regulatory changes. While the regulatory agency may decide to affirm 
its authority and provide a stable environment for renewable energy investments, policymakers 
and regulators will never be able to foresee all issues that arise during policy implementation. 
Consequently, there is an element of renewable energy policies that may need to be made 
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adaptively when there is no pre-existing policy or procedure, or where policies require fuller 
definition. Regulators thus use their professional expertise and judgment to make incremental 
changes in the regulatory process. For instance, regulators often interact with energy companies, 
utilities, and investors to decide how they fulfill their contractual obligations in light of changing 
market conditions. This allows regulators to use their technical knowledge to resolve policy 
issues as they are encountered.   
Regulators fill in the details of wind and solar policies within this political and 
administrative setting. They navigate the tension between stable policy and adaptive policy, 
providing a stable environment for renewable energy in the face of government pressures and use 
their regulatory discretion to influence and learn from policy decisions during implementation. 
Aneel also works to ensure its authority and legitimate exercise of power in co-managing the 
sector with actors that have other priorities.  
5.1.2. Implementing Energy Auctions 
Auctions are at the core of Brazil’s public policy framework to increase the share of 
renewables in the electricity supply. Beginning in 2004, the Brazilian government created 
separate auctions for procuring electricity from new electricity generators and existing 
generators. While many auctions have been restricted to hydro, technology-specific auctions 
have been conducted for wind, solar, and biomass (Batlle, et al., 2010). The Ministry of Mines 
and Energy, in coordination with the EPE and Aneel, decides which energy sources it will admit. 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy and the EPE then calculate a price ceiling for each technology 
to ensure that participating in the auction is attractive to investors. Aneel is then responsible for 
the auction procedures. In the case of auctions for new energy and alternative energy, electricity 
distribution companies determine the demand they face for electricity over the next five years. 
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The exact amount of targeted energy capacity is kept secret prior to the auction in order to avoid 
collusion between project developers. After a preliminary round, which attempts to guarantee 
competition, a second stage is a single “pay-as-bid” round between all bidders that successfully 
passed the first stage (Elizondo, Barroso, & Cunha, 2014). The lowest bids are awarded with a 
power purchase agreement (PPA).23 
Project developers who wish to participate in auctions have to fulfil several technical and 
financial requirements. To secure initial approval for their project proposal, wind energy projects 
need a valid preliminary environmental license, a grid connection feasibility report, a declaration 
that local content requirements are met, confirmation of land-use rights, and demonstration of 
financial viability (Aneel, 2015a; MME, 2016). A preliminary confirmation of a project’s 
viability of being connected to the main transmission grid is issued by the Brazilian Independent 
Transmission System Operator (ONS), or the respective distribution system operator. Lastly, 
project developers have to provide proof of financial guarantees. To participate in the auction, 
they have to deposit a bid bond in the amount of 1% of the estimated project cost. Should they 
win the auction, they have to deposit the completion bond of 5% of the estimated project cost 
(Aneel, 2014b). 
Brazil’s practical experiences with auctions have been mixed. When a project bid is awarded, 
the project developer is obliged to build the energy facility within two to five years, depending 
on the auction type. Some awarded projects do not reach commercial operation by the agreed 
deadline or are abandoned at some point after the auction. On average, the Electric Energy 
Trading Chamber (CCEE) estimates that project delays occur at a rate of around 27.3%, and non-
completion at a rate of 10% (Viana, 2017). This represents a major risk, since renewable energy 
                                                          
23 The first auction stage is referred to as a descending clock auction. This stage ends when the successful bids are 
equal or lower than the capacity to be auctioned multiplied by an “unknown” factor to guarantee competition in the 
second stage, which awards final projects.  
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project delays and cancellations may lead to reduced energy security, higher wholesale market 
prices, and higher CO2 emissions when thermoelectric plants are run to compensate for a lack of 
electricity supply. Moreover, auctions are also meant to stimulate the domestic production of 
renewable technologies. The local industrial base for wind energy depends on a pipeline of 
guaranteed projects in order to plan how many turbines and related components and equipment 
that they need to produce; unfinished projects have an adverse impact on its operations. In sum, 
while auction results may initially look favorable and lower the price for electricity, they may be 
insufficient to propel the policy through a difficult and politicized implementation period 
(Stokes, 2013, p. 491). 
Since auction designs with strict requirements do not necessarily translate into on-time or 
completed projects, Aneel is often responsible for achieving the implementation of energy 
projects. Aneel has three possible options to deal with the delay or cancellation of a project: the 
agency can oblige the project developer to forfeit the energy that was not delivered, it can issue a 
financial penalty or fine for not fulfilling the terms of a contract, or it can ban non-compliant 
developers from participating in future auctions. It is up to Aneel to decide the consequences for 
each individual case. For example, Aneel may grant an extension to an implementation deadline 
if it does not attribute delays to a developer’s project management. Rather than applying a 
straightforward set of rules, Aneel exercises discretion in adjudicating whether or not a project 
developer is responsible for a non-performing or unsound project. The initial auction design 
stipulates the participation rules, but the way that Aneel enforces projects during implementation 
shapes auction outcomes.  
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5.2. Wind Energy 
In Brazil, wind is the fastest-growing source of energy for electricity generation. By 
2016, wind represented 39.3 percent of total supply growth, followed by hydropower (35.1 
percent) and thermal energy (25.6 percent).  According to the World Energy Council, Brazil is 
ranked 8th globally in terms of installed wind capacity as of 2016. It also also has the world’s 
third lowest costs for wind power generation, behind India and China (World Energy Council, 
2016). Figure 5 presents the costs of new energy capacity by source in Brazil. Wind energy has 
the second-lowest levelized cost, behind hydropower.  
Large-scale wind generation is predominantly onshore and geographically concentrated 
in the Northern and Southern regions of the country. Wind parks are connected to the national 
electricity grid through the National Interconnected System (SIN). Although less common, wind 
energy can be utilized as a small-scale, off-grid systems, also referred to as “stand-alone 
systems,” where wind turbines provide electricity to locations that are not connected to the 
electricity distribution system. These off-grid wind systems are typically located in remote rural 
or maritime regions where it is infeasible to construct transmission lines. 
The evolution of government policy to support wind energy begins with the larger goal of 
ensuring supply security. Following the launch of the Proeólica and Proinfa programs to stabilize 
supply levels in 2002, Brazil’s wind energy production started to quickly expand. While 
ANEEL’s precise role and functions were still under review, the agency became involved in 
researching and collecting information on alternative sources of energy that could make the 
electricity supply more reliable. One of its tasks was to discover the physical potential of wind 
energy. In partnership with CEPEL and Eletrobras, a wind atlas was published in 2001, which 
showed that the potential capacity was around 143 GW. In particular, the wind atlas highlighted 
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the Northeastern region for its wind potential. Through the Proeólica Program, which predated 
Proinfa, the regulatory agency also received several requests to license wind power generation 
projects, which totaled approximately 3.3 GW of power. Projects that were authorized before 
December 2002 were given special economic incentives because of the supply crisis underway. 
Aneel also began to partner with university research centers on how to develop technologies to 
increase the supply of wind energy (Alves, 2010). 
 
Figure 5 
Auction Prices by Technology (USD/MWh) 
 
Note. Adapted from the CCEE (2017). Prices in Reais were updated by inflation rate from the auction day until 
April 2017. Then the prices were converted into USD with Exchange Rate R$ 3.28 / USD. This price differs from 
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The transition to an auction-based approach to energy planning, however, has been the 
main tool for contracting new investments in wind energy. After the Proinfa feed-in tariffs ended 
in 2008, the first exclusive reserve auction for wind power took place in December 2009. A total 
of 13,000 MW in wind power projects were contracted. This amount was higher than the 
expected break-even point for the industry, which would make wind power a profitable 
investment. The contracted wind energy further surpassed the estimated amount of additional 
power capacity needed to sustain the domestic production chain, which corresponds to about 2 
GW per year.  
Typically, winning auction bids for wind energy have secured loans from the Brazilian 
Development Bank. The BNDES’s subsidized rates for wind generation are about 4 percent 
below market rates (Hochstetler & Kostka, 2015, p.82; Melo, 2013), allowing prospective 
bidders to develop more competitive project proposals. To be eligible to apply for public 
financing from the BNDES, wind energy investors must follow local content requirements. This 
means that they have to source a certain share of their inputs locally as a way to develop the 
domestic manufacturing base for wind turbines and related equipment. After 2005, BNDES 
allowed a more flexible timeline for implementation of its 60 percent domestic content 
requirement, making agreements with individual firms that committed to moving production to 
Brazil. While project developers and wind turbine manufacturers highlight the challenges in 
meeting local content requirements, financial incentives in the form of subsidized credit have 
drawn international wind energy firms to Brazil and spurred firms to set up domestic production. 
In terms of grid-scale renewable generation, the Brazilian government and private sector 
argue that wind is compatible with large-scale hydro-based electricity system. Wind energy, they 
claim, complements the technical characteristics of the hydropower base and contributes to 
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supply reliability. For instance, a large percentage of wind generation potential tends to peak in 
the dry season. During these periods when the water levels of dams decrease and hydroelectric 
plants operate at low capacity, wind farms supplement the electricity supply. On the other hand, 
a problem of wind power is its production intermittency. The power output of a wind power 
plant fluctuates with changing wind speeds. These periods of low wind capacity are partially 
offset by the storage capacity of large hydro reservoirs in the Northeast, providing an operational 
flexibility that facilitates their technical and economic integration into the electricity network 
(Cunha, et al., 2012).  
Industry stakeholders also promote wind energy as a suitable form of alternative energy. 
Among these energy experts are the founders of Brazil’s wind power advocacy group: the 
Brazilian Wind Energy Association (Abeeolica). In the early 2000s, during the energy crisis, 
Abeeolica became heavily involved in promoting wind power. The trade group initially was 
composed of a small staff that represented the first wind farmers. Over time, Abeeólica grew to 
represent the entire production change, which includes wind farm managers and suppliers of 
wind turbines and equipment. According to industry peers, Abeeólica has high legitimacy in 
representing the Brazilian wind sector and is seen as adept at articulating a singular voice for the 
wind industry (Greenpeace, Interview, June 6, 2016). Representatives regularly attend trade 
shows and academic conferences, in addition to being present during Aneel’s public hearings 
that concern wind industry matters. 
To advance wind energy, Abeeólica and other industry supporters also promote wind’s 
compatibility with hydropower. They emphasize that wind power is socially beneficial because it 
can be deployed in agricultural areas, whereby the practice of leasing the properties of poor 
landholders to wind project developers could present an additional source of income generation, 
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further grounding the positive externalities of wind power. Wind towers can also be built 
relatively quickly, in comparison to hydroelectric dams, which fits into the perception that wind 
energy can accompany rapid economic development.  For critics of large hydro, such as 
Greenpeace Brazil, wind represents an environmentally benign way of reducing dependence on 
hydropower without altering the traditional system (Greenpeace, Interview, July 5, 2016). 
Building on this logic of complementarity, the technical characteristics of wind power are seen 
as reinforcement to the existing regime in addition to bolstering energy security. 
In sum, wind power meshes well with the goals, values, and planning of the existing 
hydroelectric system. In perhaps a contradictory way, the technical drawbacks of wind power are 
used to uphold hydroelectricity as the most ideal source of power for the electricity sector. 
Despite its supply advantages, wind power has quite different technical characteristics: it is 
intermittent and the current electricity system lacks the storage capacity for these types of 
technologies. Wind cannot be easily controlled. These characteristics are then used to assert that 
hydropower should still maintain a higher value in the energy system. In effect, the electricity 
industry sees the value of wind power as an “add-on” to the existing system; while wind 
advocates argue that the system should be analyzed as a whole, they construct their arguments in 
terms of the complementarity between the two sources.  
The following sections illustrate how the regulatory process shapes the overall 
development of the wind energy sector. While policymakers and industry stakeholders justify the 
suitability of wind energy based on how it fits into the existing hydroelectric system, it is only 
through the implementation of winning auction projects that the diffusion of wind energy is a 
highly uncertain process. The cases of project delays caused by the absence of transmission lines 
and the government’s sudden cancellation of energy auctions were chosen because they represent 
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how regulators engage with stakeholders and project developers to make policy adaptively. 
Moreover, while auction results present low prices for wind energy initially, and support the 
image of a fast-growing, competitive sector, regulators shoulder the administrative costs of low-
quality bids and underperforming projects. I argue that Aneel’s strategies for enforcement and 
building regulatory credibility improve the performance of wind auctions. The case of wind 
energy underlines the importance of the underlying politics of the regulatory context when using 
auctions to contract additional capacity in renewable energy. 
5.2.1. Untangling Transmission Lines (2010-present) 
Beginning in 2009, the Brazilian auction model significantly increased the number of 
wind energy projects in the country. The results obtained in the 2009, 2010, and 2011 auctions 
surpassed most expectations in terms of eliciting investor interest and confirmed that wind power 
would be competitive with other renewable energy sources. The auction design introduced in the 
first reserve auction in 2009 was maintained for several years, with only minor adaptations: as 
long as the participation of wind energy in the electricity supply was small, public authorities did 
not view wind power as a source for concern in the overall planning of the electricity system. 
Regular auctions were organized over the following years, with only minor adjustments to the 
ceiling price and the types of candidate technologies that were allowed to compete with wind 
power in each auction (Elizondo Azuela et al., 2014). 
Towards the end of 2012, as wind projects contracted during the first three auctions 
neared completion, the wind industry began to run into problems associated with the construction 
of transmission lines. When developers build energy projects, they must plan to connect those 
projects to the transmission grid. Prior to the intensified development of wind resources, Brazil 
had the practice of constructing transmission lines within two years. As power lines were 
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extended to the northern and southern extremities of the country where wind speeds were the 
strongest, far from demand centers in the urbanized southeastern region, transmission lines began 
to take roughly four years to finish. Aneel at first estimated that new transmission lines would 
take approximately 14 months to be completed. Compounding these issues was the 
environmental licensing process which took between 48 and 60 months to complete (Abeeólica, 
Interview, Jan. 28, 2016; RS SME, Interview, September 23, 2016). Wind farms would be ready 
for operation, only to have no power lines or substations in place to connect them to the grid. As 
a result, absent transmission lines and substations delayed almost 70% of the wind capacity 
contracted in the first three Brazilian wind auctions by more than a year (Elizondo Azuela et al., 
2014, p.13).  
These issues alerted policymakers to a broader policy challenge: the realization of the 
country’s wind energy potential largely depended on the development of transmission 
infrastructure which could move electricity from its point of generation to the point of consumer 
demand. The existing electricity grid had been constructed to suit centralized, hydroelectric 
generators, and windy sites do not necessarily correspond with the locations of existing grid 
infrastructure. In particular, the nation’s windiest states in the Northeast often lacked 
transmission lines to connect wind farms with cities in the South of the country. These include 
the states of Rio Grande do Norte, Bahia, and Ceará, and the southern state of Rio Grande do 
Sul.  Investors that secured winning bids in the wind energy-specific auction in 2009 
concentrated most of their projects in the Northeast, the region with the highest wind speeds, 
expecting that adequate transmission planning would follow. The ability to export this enormous 
amount of wind-generated electricity across state and regional lines, however, is limited by the 
structure of the national transmission system.  
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The technical answer to this problem was the development of a more integrated model for 
transmission planning. A defining trait of the early design of wind energy auctions was that 
policy designers had integrated transmission planning into the auction process, centrally 
designating a network expansion plan involving a multilayered system of shared collector 
substations conditional on auction results. Based on this plan, the Ministry of Mines of Energy 
and Aneel would separately auction concessions to build the necessary transmission lines and 
substations, while the investor would not be liable for any delays in the interconnection of their 
projects. The idea behind this scheme was that, because the auctions enabled the full disclosure 
of projects in advance, it would be possible to achieve greater coordination and economic 
efficiency by centrally coordinating the planning of new power facilities and transmission lines 
(Elizondo Azuela et al., 2014, p. 8). In effect, because policy designers and developers had full 
information about project locations, they assumed that transmission would be built out to attend 
to this new generation. They had further assumed that transmission requirements for wind energy 
were equivalent to other energy projects that had been constructed previously. 
To untangle the problem of creating the necessary transmission lines for wind facilities, 
an immediate solution was first needed to assist project developers who had had finished 
projects. Since many wind projects could not be delivered on time, Aneel set out to determine the 
extent to which delays were beyond a given project developer’s control and which were affected 
by absent transmission lines. Without regulatory adjustments, project developers would be held 
responsible for being unable to deliver their energy (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017). 
Aneel frequently mediates requests for a deadline extension to postpone obligations for 
energy projects, avoiding resorting to stricter enforcement mechanisms, such as penalties. In 
addition to delays caused by environmental licensing, Aneel considers transmission grid 
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extension a valid reason to grant a deadline extension (Bayer, 2018). The agency created 
Resolution 583, which set a new deadline for the awarded capacity on the basis of a delay in 
transmission grid extension. These new set of conditions would allow project developers to show 
that they had already built operational projects and fulfilled their contractual obligations, and that 
the only missing element was the transmission lines to link their energy production to the grid.  
In addition to project delays caused by lagging transmission issues, other companies had 
not finished building wind farms because they had placed bids for projects that they were unable 
to deliver. As previously mentioned, investors often bid below an auction’s price cap in order to 
secure an auction contract. This can lead to long-term price reductions for unconventional 
renewable sources of energy, but may not accurately reflect an investor’s true costs to construct a 
power plant. To gain more time to construct their projects, some investors claimed that delays in 
the transmission grid connection had compromised their operations. Instead of granting across-
the-board extensions for project developers who cited the transmission issue as a reason to 
postpone their deadlines, Aneel inspected each project on a case-by-case basis to fully adjudicate 
responsibility for project delays. According to an interviewee from Aneel (Interview, Sept. 14, 
2017), consistency in holding developers responsible to their contractual obligations is meant to 
prevent short-sighted project proposals:  
In general, Aneel tries to give a very strong regulatory signal to say the exact following: 
only participate in an auction if you are sure that you know what you’re doing. I don’t 
want to contract some cheap project that’s not going to be there, so if you’re going to 
participate then you better have the conditions to do it…Aneel does not revise any of its 
contracts. So, if the exchange rate went up, that’s your problem. You don’t need to 
declare bankruptcy, so just cancel a contract, pay the penalty, and leave. Aneel does not 
transfer auction risks to consumers; this posture is already made very clear. 
 
Aneel’s main regulatory objective was to achieve compliance while facilitating a resolution to 
the transmission problem. The regulatory agency claims to first work with wind companies when 
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attending to requests to grant extensions, but will ultimately dispute projects that are unable to 
follow through with their obligations. Aneel was adamant about not granting extensions to 
developers who could not prove that their plant operations were compromised by transmission 
issues. It also refused to give into industry requests to waive penalties for further delays in 
building transmission lines. At the same time, Aneel granted financial incentives to companies 
for constructing transmission facilities on time and within the existing rules and regulatory 
framework.24 While a more generous approach to granting deadline extensions could possibly 
improve the immediate rate of implementation of wind projects, the agency reasoned that a more 
tolerant posture could encourage companies to relax the management of their ventures.   
As Kovacic (2014) notes, much like a commercial enterprise, a regulatory agency 
develops a brand that signals quality to various observers. A strong reputation for enforcing 
regulations increases the agency’s chances of achieving its regulatory priorities in the long-run. 
By inspecting projects that have violated a contractual agreement on a case-by-case basis, Aneel 
attempts to develop a reputation that signals credibility among industry participants. The agency 
exercises some flexibility in determining what factors are out of investors’ control, but with the 
overall objective of achieving compliance. In this way, Aneel maintained its right to enforce 
contracts and punish companies to communicate that only investors that can commit to 
delivering projects within the scope of their contracts should participate in energy auctions. The 
agency conveyed that it has a low tolerance for companies that bid projects that are unable to 
enter into commercial operation within their original deadlines.  
Aneel’s efforts to brand itself as a credible regulator further enhances its power within the 
electricity sector. The agency’s jurisdiction often overlaps the activities and responsibilities of 
                                                          
24 The auction of transmission lines were prolonged until September 2016 because the sale of Celg-D, owned by 
Eletrobras, lacked interest from investors. Eletrobras had decided not to renew its contracts. 
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other public authorities. For instance, interviewees from Aneel contrast their more rigid posture 
with the Ministry of Mines and Energy, which they suggest takes a more “friendly” approach in 
responding to the complaints of industry participants (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017; Aneel, 
Interview, Sept. 14, 2017). In this sense, the Ministry of Mines and Energy can compromise the 
regulatory signal to investors by changing the rules of the game, or providing a more lenient 
treatment of underperforming projects. By spelling out that project developers will uphold their 
obligations or lose their privilege to participate in auctions, Aneel’s stronger “brand” as a 
credible regulator gives it a greater chance of being an influential actor and making decisions 
that affect the form and quality of competition. In effect, the regulatory signal to prospective 
auction participants is that there is no toleration of underperformance from low-quality bids, 
despite policymakers’ divergent preferences for energy policy. 
In addition to disputing individual contracts, a second step to improve the implementation 
of winning bids was the creation of a new auction design. Aneel and the MME decided that 
future participation in energy auctions would require proving conclusively that projects had 
access to transmission lines (CERNE, 2016). The government also discontinued the centralized 
planning of the transmission expansion, which coordinated the construction of new power 
facilities with the expansion of the transmission grid. This approach had put the construction of 
new transmission lines into a very tight schedule with little margin for error (Elizondo Azuela et 
al., 2014, p. 10).  
By December 2015, the MME and Aneel had proposed to couple the auctions of wind 
farms with the construction of transmission lines, though it was unclear how investors would 
view this and how it would be implemented. The MME turned to the Brazilian Wind Energy 
Association (Abeeólica). Owing to its close relationship with wind investors, Abeeólica would 
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now be, in part, responsible for trying to secure nationwide transmission and thereby increase the 
prospects for wind investors to export energy. The trade association was asked to study a model 
for wind power producing companies to invest in transmission lines. According to Dr. Elbia 
Gannoum, the president of Abeeólica, the association created a working group to do so. 
In the eyes of Aneel, Abeeólica is a legitimate participant in the process of successfully 
bringing wind projects to the market. An important figure in the Brazilian wind industry, Elbia 
Gannoum had developed her professional career at the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the 
Commercialization Chamber (CCEE). While the wind trade association is staffed by other 
former industry insiders, which could signal an opportunity for regulatory capture, the privileged 
voice of Abeeólica in the regulatory process is seen as counter-balanced by the regulator’s public 
consultation process. According to Aneel (Interview, Sept. 19, 2017): 
We, here at Aneel, the entire process at Aneel is very transparent from the point of view 
of decision-making. Therefore, decisions are taken by superintendents after a public 
participation process, that is, a norm that affects any stakeholder - whether consumer or 
generator - it has to be in public hearing for a period, agents can contribute and this is a 
role of Abeeólica, in the sense of public participation and they put their contributions, 
obviously with the objective to foster wind generation. We, the regulator, you should 
know, live in an eternal conflict, because wind generators want the wind energy market to 
grow, and we do too, but hydraulic generators also have similar demands, as well as 
thermal generators - and the overall demand can only be one. You are not able to satisfy 
everyone. But that's normal, it's part of a healthy process.  
 
 
Rather than relations between regulator and the regulated being analogous to a contract, Aneel’s 
problem-based approach significantly departs from the hands-off and quasi-juridical style often 
emphasized in the literature on regulatory design (Dubash & Rao, 2008). Where deliberation and 
taking account of outside industry is necessary, the agency receives evidence through public 
audiences in addition to direct participation of stakeholders in the regulatory agency itself. The 
adoption of public consultation procedures ensures that as many different viewpoints as possible 
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are made available to the regulator, earning its legitimacy through wide participation in decision-
making (Prosser, 1999, p.200). Abeeólica is seen as having ample technical knowledge of the 
wind sector and maintaining important lines of communication with wind energy generators. 
Aneel argues that Abeeólica’s negotiation power in overcoming the challenge of expanding the 
transmission system is held accountable by the agency’s transparent public consultation process 
and the debate between stakeholders. 
Following changes to the auction design, the financial risk for transmission grid delays 
was transferred to the project developer. Critics have argued that this transfer can lead to higher 
auction prices (Ferroukhi et al., 2015), which may partly explain the price increase of 9% in 
wind auctions held in 2013.25 Regulators, on the other hand, argue that making such adaptations 
during implementation have made transmission deadlines more “realistic” and attuned with the 
changing context for energy investments (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017). Previously, 
deadlines for wind projects were based on the time it took to complete the environmental 
licensing process. The fact that the time to construct long-distance transmission lines was not 
adequately factored into auction designs presented wind energy as much cheaper than it actually 
was. These information asymmetries were revealed after the first wind auctions had taken place. 
In deciding individual cases for project delays, regulators discovered that tying the construction 
of transmission lines to new investments in wind generation was infeasible. In so doing, they 
prompted a process that required rethinking approaches to transmission and supply planning.  
Aneel’s deepening involvement in managing the governance of the wind energy market 
has prompted regulators to better incorporate wind into the electricity system. Given the 
significant growth of the industry, high penetrations of wind power create variability and become 
                                                          
25 Bayer (2018) notes that the higher local content requirements and further regulatory changes could also be 
responsible for this price increase. 
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a challenge for how the electricity market operates. If wind speeds drop, other generators must 
be available to meet the demand and alter their output to compensate for fluctuations. This 
“intermittency” generates a cost for other generators that have to compensate for wind’s 
variability of supply. The priority to deal with various aspects of wind’s intermittency issues is 
expected to be a major focus of Aneel’s 2018 regulatory agenda. One interviewee from Aneel 
asserted that early intervention in the intermittency engendered by wind energy ensures that 
renewable energy continues to be an important part of energy expansion (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 
19, 2017). 
Aneel has also decided to direct its R&D activities to resolve intermittency issues. For 
example, the use of wind energy is limited by the lack of storage technologies. In 2016, Aneel 
created a special call for R&D projects to integrate energy storage systems into wind and solar 
facilities. The idea is to integrate intermittent and unpredictable renewable energy into the grid 
while also creating a technological base and infrastructure for Brazil’s own production of storage 
systems. The R&D project call would also allow Aneel to engage in the early identification of 
what storage technologies could be more easily commercialized (Aneel, 2017). 
In summary, for wind energy, an auction process that accounts for the extension of the 
transmission system is of great importance. In comparison to hydropower, the technical 
characteristics of wind elicit a different type of transmission planning, since the best wind 
regions are located far from load centers. This changed context for transmission planning, 
however, was not factored into the design of auction contracts, but discovered through Aneel’s 
monitoring of individual wind projects. The delays caused by transmission lines illustrate the 
strategy that regulators have adopted to ensure compliance while collaborating with key 
stakeholders to resolve regulatory problems. Aneel’s reputation for enforcement and willingness 
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to intervene in response to the industry's performance has been essential for securing its 
regulatory objectives (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). The agency incorporates stakeholders’ 
interests and its own organizational goals to make sure that additional power capacity is built. 
Furthermore, Aneel’s mediation of wind contracts has motivated the agency to prioritize R&D 
resources to anticipate issues related to intermittency. 
5.2.2. Cancelling Wind Energy (2016-present) 
Until 2016, Brazil had been experiencing rapid economic development. The country’s 
energy supply was growing at a rate of approximately 4.5% a year to keep up with consumer 
demand. Generation firms had rushed to bid for licenses to supply the power needed to fuel 
growth, as a commodities-fueled boom drove annual economic growth above 7 percent in 2010. 
Auction winners used their long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) as collateral to attain 
relatively cheap credit from the Brazilian Development Bank and other project lenders. A 
collapse in commodities prices in 2015, however, tipped Brazil into a recession that shrunk 
economic output by more than 7-percent, crippling demand for electricity. A slightly above-
average rainfall in 2016 had also temporarily filled hydroelectric reservoirs, supporting the 
government’s belief that there would be more contracted power than needed to satisfy demand. 
The economic crisis and decline in electricity demand had severe impacts for distribution 
companies. Electricity distributors are under obligation to procure, in advance, 100% of the 
energy required to attend to consumer demand in their concession areas. Commonly referred to 
as “resource adequacy,” regulators recognize the difficulty in accurately predicting consumer 
demand. Aneel thus stipulates that distribution companies have a modest leeway to secure energy 
contracts from suppliers: they are allowed to maintain a maximum surplus of electricity of 5% 
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above consumer demand, or they can run a deficit of 2%, or less. Given the consecutive years of 
high economic growth, distribution companies had contracted energy for the 2016 fiscal year 
based on assumptions that the economy and electricity demand would continue to expand. As the 
crisis escalated, it became apparent that distribution companies would be left with an excess of 
contracted electricity. Some distribution companies had contracted 15% above consumer demand 
in their concession areas. Regulators estimate that the average was 10% (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 
14, 2017; Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017).  
The government cited these worsening economic conditions in order to intervene in the 
scheduling of technology-specific auctions for solar and wind energy.  A few days before the 
planned date in December 2016, the MME cancelled the only reserve energy auction for wind 
and solar, citing a reduction in energy demand for the following year (EPE, “Queda de 
demanda,” 2016). As a result, no new wind or solar projects could be contracted. This decision 
was a cause of concern for renewable energy investors and wind and solar equipment 
manufactures. While the government does not make promises about when it will hold auctions to 
contract new energy capacity, the scheduling of regulars auctions allows suppliers to plan for the 
long-term. The local manufacturing industry for renewables had been expecting an average of 
2GW of new wind capacity and 1GW of new solar capacity to be contracted each year. 
Canceling the auction had undermined these expectations. In response, the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy affirmed that the decision would not affect the country’s long-term renewable-energy 
policies, which aims to double non-hydro renewables by 2030. The government also guaranteed 
that it would schedule regular tenders for renewables in 2017 (Spatuzza, 2016).  
Aneel initially disagreed with the government’s decision to cancel the auction. The National 
Council on Energy Policy, an assessor of the President of the Republic which serves to articulate 
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the executive branch’s decisions regarding energy policy, had made a unilateral decision behind 
closed doors. The regulatory agency has no representation on the council and was only notified 
two days before the government’s decision (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 2017). Since the auction 
process is led by the regulator, under the guidelines of the MME, the decision was initially seen 
as an instance of undue political interference, and an infringement on Aneel’s autonomy. 
Moreover, the government and the MME’s public statements had led investors to believe that 
Brazil would grow more and would consequently need more energy. The MME’s official 
expansion plans, the Decennial Energy Plans, had also reported that additional auction rounds 
would be required to keep up with growth (MME, 2015; MME, 2016). Despite the government’s 
reassurances that another auction for wind and non-hydro renewables would be considered for 
2017, canceling the auction fomented doubts among investors about regulatory stability. The 
MME’s unexpected shift of opinion threatened the long-term commitment that equipment 
manufacturers and renewable energy investors desired.  
To solve the country’s oversupply problem, the Ministry of Mines and Energy proposed “de-
contracting” the excess energy, also known as a reverse auction. Under this type of auction, the 
cancellation of unfinished energy projects would take place as a competitive tender. Project 
developers that were awarded supply contracts in previous reserve auctions would bid for their 
projects to be cancelled. The project owners that offered the lowest discounts on the penalties 
that they would otherwise have to pay would have priority in cancelling their projects. By paying 
a smaller fine to return their contracts, winning bidders would preserve their investment capacity 
and be able to participate in future auction. They would also avoid a more confrontational 
dispute process with Aneel for not fulfilling their contractual obligations. With the prospect of a 
return to economic growth in 2017, the government hoped that a coordinated reversal of supply 
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contracts would allow fresh investments to return to the sector as a way of “putting order in the 
house.” In effect, the removal of poorly-managed power projects would liberate space in the 
supply market for new projects. 
With the decision to hold the reverse auction in August 2017, regulators were worried about 
the message that an across-the-board cancellation of contracts could send to energy investors. 
While the MME had based its decisions on the country’s poor economic conditions, it was 
initially viewed by industry participants as a retroactive change in the rules that could set a bad 
precedent. The proposal to amicably cancel under-performing contracts provided a means of 
escape for financially distressed firms that were unable to build the power projects awarded to 
them, particularly in the wind sector. In theory, it would make sense for the government to 
unload un-built projects from its balance sheet; however, by providing special conditions for 
underperformers, the government indicated its unwillingness to adequately discipline firms that 
failed in their contractual responsibilities. At the same time, it provided fewer incentives for 
firms that had “followed the rules” and delivered their projects within projected time frames, but 
were not rewarded for their good performance and might be less willing to cooperate in the 
future.  Aneel’s efforts to provide credible regulatory signals could consequently suffer from the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy’s weaker stature towards investors.  
In such an environment, often marked by uncertainties at the ministerial level, Aneel has had 
to sustain technical decisions that govern renewable energy. Representatives of Aneel have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the government’s disruptive influence on the regulatory 
process in both discrete and open ways. According to a representative of Aneel: “In reality, 
distribution companies want to get rid of their contracts. So, we have a good partnership with the 
government and the MME, but the agency does not give up on its competences, and will 
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continue to follow and regulate the process” (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017). While 
representatives from Aneel were concerned about the overreach of government in their duty to 
regulate contracts, the agency is required to comply with decisions made at a higher level of 
authority. However, the fact that Aneel is at times subordinated to the decisions of the MME and 
the incumbent political administration does not mean it withdraws from attaining its regulatory 
objectives. On the contrary, Aneel’s struggle for legitimacy and autonomy in the electricity 
sector motivates its strategy in maintaining the credibility of the wider institutional framework 
for renewable energy.  
While Aneel initially viewed the decision to cancel contracts as a threat to the regulatory 
process, the political origins of the oversupply issue influenced its view that intervention was not 
only legitimate, but could reinforce its authority in ensuring compliance from market 
participants. In principle, the agency generally believes that changes in broader economic 
conditions should be shouldered by firms, and are not the regulator’s problem (Aneel, Interview, 
Sept. 14, 2017). In this case, however, Aneel took into consideration that the situation had been 
aggravated by government interference. In January 2013, President Dilma Rousseff’s 
administration had politically intervened to order a drastic reduction in electricity prices, which 
had simultaneously encouraged the increase in energy demand. As part of the government’s 
package to guarantee cheap electricity, distribution companies had been required to participate in 
“emergency auctions” and contract energy from existing power plants that normally sold 
electricity in the free market where consumers negotiate power supplies directly with electricity 
generators and traders. The incumbent administration had decided on these plans with little 
involvement from the Ministry of Mines and Energy and Aneel (Borges, 2014). 
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The regulatory agency’s directors, while avoiding open criticisms of the administration, 
expressed concern about the unprecedented practice of requiring distribution companies to 
contract large amounts of their energy from the free market. They were also displeased with 
having to rush the public consultation process to discuss the new decree with stakeholders. One 
of Aneel’s core regulatory procedures is to hold public consultations regarding any major 
changes in the electricity sector to elicit the views and responses. It also provides a means for the 
agency to state its priorities, respond to issues raised by actors in the sector, and develop a 
common set of expectations. In sum, the government’s intervention to provide cheap electricity 
infringed on Aneel’s territory in supervising supply and demand in the regulated market.26 The 
decision also forced Aneel to proceed in a manner that compromised its own procedural 
obligations.  
In responding to the crisis early on, one of Aneel’s first steps was to allow distribution 
companies to cancel contracts that they had acquired during the emergency auctions in 2014.  
One the one hand, Aneel’s official justification was that this energy, produced primarily from 
hydro and thermoelectric plants, could be easily returned to the free market. Since these projects 
were already in operation, this approach would not put at risk projects that had not yet amortized 
their debt, where the banking sector would likely respond by increasing interest rates. In 
addition, hydroelectric reservoirs continued to have low water levels and were not operating at 
their full potential. The resulting high price for electricity facilitated the agency’s ability to resell 
unwanted contracts, where generators sell their electricity in the free market and make large 
profits. Using this opportunity to their advantage, Aneel reversed an initiative that had 
compromised generation and distribution markets. In effect, Aneel was undoing one of several 
                                                          
26 Agency employees have been critical of the Workers’ Party administration, accusing the government of having 
compromised progress in the electricity sector by infringing on Aneel’s autonomy and authority. See Rittner (2014).  
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political decisions imposed by the previous administration that had obstructed its regulatory 
authority.  
Furthermore, until that point, there had been no formal procedures developed to deal with 
a mass cancellation of incomplete projects. In the beginning, Aneel provided modifications and 
special rules for developers to postpone their project deadlines. The agency also inspected 
individual projects to see whether delays fell under the responsibility of the project developer. 
By implementing these small adjustments, the agency was able to head off problems at first 
(Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 2017). As the agency continued to monitor the process, it noticed 
that it needed to broaden its efforts. Electricity distributors were holding too many supply 
contracts from non-performing, “problematic” projects. While these contracts remained on their 
books, they could not legally contract new energy from power plants that were entering into 
operation. Aneel created a special resolution to cancel projects that were under construction, but 
awaiting environmental licensing permits. This modification allowed distribution companies to 
trade energy contracts amongst themselves in an amicable fashion without imposing penalties for 
noncompliance. Since there are 63 distribution companies in Brazil, however, cancelling bilateral 
contracts between distributors and generators resulted in high transaction costs for the agency. 
On average, distribution companies contract energy from approximately 40 power plants, which 
meant that Aneel had to revise 40 bilateral contracts for each distribution company (Aneel, 
2016). 
The voluntary cancellation of supply contracts falls within the jurisdiction of Aneel and 
the MME. As such, Aneel and the MME partnered to create a credible framework for the reverse 
auction. Aneel’s procedures to modify and, in more serious cases, cancel awarded projects were 
intended to complement the Ministry of Mines and Energy’s friendlier auction to de-contract 
118 
 
projects. If a project developer elected to participate in the MME’s procedures, the fine was less 
than the penalty that would have to be paid to Aneel. The developer only had to relinquish a 
small part of its deposit which had been used to secure a spot to bid in the original reserve 
auction. Such a process was intended to give companies the option to avoid lengthy litigation. 
Aneel’s procedures for dealing with cases of noncompliance, on the other hand, are generally 
less forgiving. Under the regulatory agency’s rules for non-compliance, the fine to cancel a 
contract is higher because the developer would be deemed as having been unable to fulfill its 
contractual obligations. The project developer would also be barred from participating in future 
auctions for two years.   
Conflicts and tensions inevitably arise between the MME and Aneel as they co-manage 
the sector. Each public authority attempts to pursue its interests and goals within the framework 
of the regulatory process. Yet, regulation is also intended to encourage orderly management of 
the sector, and both the ministry and the energy regulator have an interest in preserving the 
quality of participation in the electricity sector. By collaborating on the design of the reverse 
auction, the MME and Aneel negotiated their priorities while drawing on their competences to 
devise a joint solution (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 19, 2017): 
 
We quickly identified that Aneel did not have all the tools to solve the problem in this 
specific case…In this specific case of over-contracting energy, as well as reserve auctions 
and energy auctions, there are competences on both sides; Aneel cannot change the law 
or a decree, and some things we wanted to do needed it. We suggested some revisions for 
the ministry to incorporate, and at the same time they would inform us of some of the 
needs they identified, and we dealt with it. Now, the ministry cannot tell Aneel what it 
has to do, it can suggest, and Aneel does what it wants, in the same way we can provide 
suggestions for them and they just do what they want. There was a lot of talk, a lot of 
interaction, the overall collaboration was good, but not everything they asked us to do we 





Both Aneel and the MME stood to benefit from coordinating the reverse auction process. The 
MME wanted to reduce the supply glut, while Aneel wanted to communicate its low tolerance 
for poor project management and short-sighted investments. To achieve both goals, the MME 
would first hold the reverse auction which would “bring order” and allow under-performing 
projects to voluntarily remove themselves from the balance sheet. In a second movement, once 
the de-contracting auction had taken place, Aneel would come in and cancel the remaining 
projects through its more rigid procedures for dealing with cases of noncompliance. 
Collaboration and reciprocity exist between two public authorities, at the same time that the 
regulatory process is marked by inner tensions and disagreements. 
As a result, from Aneel’s standpoint, the de-contracting process reinforced its regulatory 
authority. The overall credibility of the cancellation process depended on Aneel’s more rigid 
approach towards enforcement. The final say on what projects would be cancelled, and on what 
terms, resided with the regulatory agency, since it had the authority to de-contract everyone that 
could be judged as non-compliant. Projects that had not voluntarily declared insolvency under 
the MME’s reverse auction, or that had participated but had asked to pay low penalties for the 
right to cancellation, would be subject to entering the dispute process with Aneel. One regulator 
from Aneel claimed that this is where “the real conflict begins” (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 
2017), assuring that this was not a desirable position for project developers.  
Meanwhile, the MME was able to reduce the number of supply contracts and realize 
other political objectives. Although not widely disclosed by government representatives, the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy was politically obliged to create its own de-contracting process. 
The Brazilian government is presently the controlling shareholder of Eletrobras, Latin America’s 
biggest electricity generator. Furnas, a subsidiary of Eletrobras, was unable to fulfill its 
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obligations to construct several wind energy projects. If the de-contracting process had been 
solely carried out by Aneel, without involvement from the MME, both Elebtrobras and its 
subsidiary would be prohibited from participating in future auctions for two years.27 Denying 
Eletrobras the right to participate in energy auctions would be politically controversial and would 
severely limit the state-owned company’s performance in the energy sector. The de-contracting 
process was thus designed to allow the MME to shield Eletrobras from Aneel’s noncompliance 
procedures. 
 Moreover, the de-contracting process enabled Aneel to achieve one of its key regulatory 
priorities: the efficient use of public resources. The Brazilian Constitution, supported by several 
congressional amendments, collectively establishes the procedures for concessions and 
permissions for the private sector to engage in the provision of public services. This model 
provides a legal basis for competition in the electricity sector. For power generation, energy 
projects cannot be developed anywhere, but are designated for specific zones where they can be 
implemented based on access to natural resource potential (e.g., wind speed, solar irradiation) 
and distance to transmission lines and substations. In this view, areas that are set aside for power 
generation are considered scarce public resources. The identification of predefined locations for 
energy development also attempts to avoid problems related to integrating new power facilities 
into the transmission system. Constitutional amendments which guide activity in the electricity 
sector thus establish that private sector participation is not confined to efficient management, but 
in fulfilling the public interest of the state. 28  
                                                          
27 The Ministry of Mines and Energy was also worried that future solar auctions would not be competitive. Since 
only two different project developers were able to successfully build their projects, they could charge unreasonably 
high prices in the next auction that included solar. 
 
28 Art. 175 of the Brazilian Constitution: It is incumbency of the public power, according to the law, directly or 
through concession or permission, always through public tender, the provision of public services. 
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According to representatives from Aneel, one of the goals of auctions is to insist on high 
quality standards in the allocation of scarce public resources (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 2017): 
ANEEL's interest in repealing these contracts is not only to say to the distributors, ‘Look,  
this contract of yours was a fraud, don’t trust in it anymore, go ahead and contract  
another one.’ Also, it's to ensure that we take full advantage of the public use of the  
resources that we auction. What we want is for someone to use it, any private company,  
but if you cannot do it, I'll take it away from you. 
 
 
In the eyes of the energy regulator, the cancellation of contracts was legitimate because future 
supply contracts would be given to more committed investors. The de-contraction process that 
Aneel had developed with the MME was an opportunity to pass on licenses to other firms that 
could build more viable projects. Thus, by freeing up public resources for potentially better 
projects, the agency employed a strict interpretation of the public interest to improve the quality 
of competition for renewable energy projects. 
While Aneel continued to cancel contracts, representatives of wind and solar equipment 
manufacturers lobbied for the government to hold another round of auctions by the end of 2017. 
They claimed that they would be left with empty factories due to the absence of new auction 
projects. The growth of the renewable energy industry had also brought economic opportunities 
to poor cities in the South and Northeast, and local politicians from these regions advocated for 
holding new auctions. Aneel regularly meets with representatives from the wind and solar 
manufacturing sectors, but the agency balked at attending to industry demands in balancing its 
objectives for the sector (Aneel, Interview, Sept. 14, 2017):  
They [industry] talk a lot about instability, they say that they would like to have  
“regulatory stability.” Aneel argues that we do not like and do not believe in regulatory  
stability, in that sense. What we like is “regulatory security.” It’s not possible to provide  
complete stability because technology is changing, the sectoral model is changing. People  
need to know in what direction you’re heading, they need to be able to anticipate your  




Investors and renewable energy equipment manufacturers tend to depict regulatory stability as 
the key factor that sustains the wind and solar sectors. Aneel argues, however, that the goal of 
regulatory stability and the means to obtain it are sometimes represented in a misleading way by 
industry. Oftentimes, the positive aspects of wind energy are undermined by the high financial 
burden of the auction schemes adopted in past years, where high-growth scenarios have led to 
low implementation rates and abandoned projects. Energy regulators thus argue that regulatory 
quality and stability cannot be equated with a framework that guarantees an accelerated pace of 
investments (Bellantuono, 2016). Since Aneel has to balance a variety of demands, the agency 
reserves the right to maintain a regulatory process that is adaptive to changing conditions. 
Regulators express their commitment to renewable energy investments by making regulatory 
changes in predictable ways, not by merely guaranteeing a high pace of investments.  
In summary, Aneel’s approach to maintaining regulatory credibility and compliance 
underpins governance in the wind industry. The energy regulator strategically used the 
government’s decision to cancel wind energy projects in order to reassert its authority and attract 
more potentially viable projects to the renewable energy market. Aneel was initially skeptical of 
the government’s decisions, but it became apparent that the reverse auction could be mutually-
beneficial for the regulatory agency and the MME. Aneel was able to reinforce its reputation for 
being a strong enforcer that does not tolerate low-quality projects, and the MME was able to 
satisfy its political objectives and clear the supply market. Aneel and the MME co-manage the 
sector with unease, but they share their authority in ways that often leads to collaborative and 
responsive solutions to regulatory problems. In the end, after a process marked by conflict, the 




Lastly, building on the case of transmission planning, the regulatory work of 
implementing auctions is a chance for the regulator to incorporate features from the political 
environment into its broader strategies. In recent years, contradictions in policy have arisen 
between the Brazilian government and the energy regulator, where Aneel has jostled to maintain 
ground over its jurisdiction. In an unforeseen way, Aneel used the reverse auction to upend a 
decision that had infringed on Aneel’s regulatory authority. The cancellation of wind energy 
contracts allowed Aneel to send a message that supporting the wind industry is not equivalent to 
unbridled growth, and that the regulator will exact responsibility from the private sector to 
improve participation and quality of competition in the future. Aneel used its strengths in 
discerning when to use compliance procedures to intervene in problematic cases, demonstrating 
its willingness to be tough when necessary. 
5.3. Solar Energy and Distributed Generation 
Brazil’s estimated solar resource potential ranks among the highest in the world, and is 
consistently high across the country. According to the Brazilian Atlas of Solar Energy, which 
provides information about solar energy resources in the country, daily irradiation levels range 
on average from 4,500 Wh/m2 to 6,300 Wh/m2 (INPE, 2006). To provide a comparative 
perspective, solar irradiation in the sunniest region of Germany is 40% smaller than in the least 
sunny region of Brazil (IDEAL, 2017). Yet, Germany is a world leader in installed capacity for 
PV solar at 48.4 GW. In addition, Brazil has one of the largest reserves of quartz in the world, 
which can serve as a competitive advantage for the production of silicon-based solar cells and 
modules. These factors make the country a prime location to develop solar energy and foster a 
local industry for solar cell production and other equipment. Despite these favorable conditions, 
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and a global reduction in prices for solar technologies, the implementation of solar energy has 
been slow in comparison to other alternative sources.  
Conventional explanations for Brazil’s historically scant use of solar energy have focused 
on solar power's costs and undesirable technical characteristics. As in the case of wind energy, 
the characteristics of the existing system shape how the “efficacy” of a new technology is judged 
(Bunting, 2008, p.174). The electricity industry and policy-makers have typically argued that 
solar power is too expensive compared with conventional sources and that it has undesirable 
technical characteristics, particularly intermittency, which severely limit its value. Furthermore, 
the lack of a domestic solar manufacturing sector has been a major barrier to development. Since 
Brazil has a small manufacturing base for solar technologies, the majority of components for 
solar PV systems have to be imported. This makes the solar energy sector there vulnerable to 
fluctuations in exchange rates.  
While acknowledging the importance of these factors, the explanation for solar energy’s 
slow adoption is based on how it relates to the socio-technical characteristics of the electricity 
system. When the Brazilian government decided to diversify the electricity supply with non-
hydro alternatives in 2001, energy planners were presented with several possibilities of “new” 
renewables candidates. Under these circumstances, solar energy did not enter into an even 
playing field with other alternative technologies because of its lack of “technological 
interrelatedness” with the hydropower system. Solar energy’s intermittency, unlike wind power, 
does not correspond to the hydrological fluctuations of Brazilian dams. In contrast, wind power 
was already technologically mature and seen as compatible with the existing arrangements in the 
electricity sector. Consequently, a stronger support policy for wind energy was initially 
“sponsored” by energy planners (Bunting, 2008, p.174). The early entry of wind led to a strong 
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technological coalition which has advocated improving its competitiveness. Solar photovoltaic 
energy entered at a much later stage and relies on a less experienced coalition of supporters.  
Furthermore, policymakers have expressed their preferences for wind energy through 
public support programs. The first stage of Proinfa feed-in tariffs did not include solar power, 
which continues to lag well behind wind power in energy auctions. Moreover, other public 
policies for stimulating renewable energy sources did not significantly contribute to building up 
the domestic solar market. In the 1990s, the Ministry of Mines and Energy had launched the 
Energy Development Program for States and Municipalities (PRODEEM) and Luz Para Todos 
(‘Light for All’), federal programs which aimed to bring electricity to primarily rural or isolated 
communities with small-scale, stand-alone PV systems (Goldemberg et al., 2004, p. 88). 
However, these programs were implemented on a provisional basis and aimed at off-grid power 
generation. There was no intention to scale up these programs and increase the country’s share of 
grid-connected photovoltaic systems in the energy supply. 
Government officials have reinforced this more cautious approach by openly signaling 
their negative expectations for the sector. Policymakers have expressed reservations and 
uncertainties about the potential of solar energy through official documents, public presentations, 
and government forecasts. While wind energy has garnered 8 years of experience in competing 
in energy auctions, the first reserve auction which included solar power was held in October 
2014 (Hochstetler & Kostka, 2015, p.83). Before the auction, the EPE had arrived at cost 
estimates which were twice as high as the actual market price. Policy-makers who held favorable 
visions of solar energy saw this as progress; however, their voices were crowded out by those 
who emphasized its lack of cost competitiveness. The overall message is that solar energy is not 
a key technology in terms of centralized renewable energy generation. 
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The fact that the electricity sector is managed by several public authorities and agencies 
makes it difficult to achieve coherence in communicating priorities about solar energy. One 
example is how the ministerial and planning branches of government have contributed to an 
indecisive outlook for solar. The plans and policy positions adopted by the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy and EPE provide important information regarding long-term energy priorities. The 
medium- and long-term scenario planning of the MME and EPE for 2016 have been optimistic 
and include an objective of 8.7 GW of PV installations in the 10-year Energy Plan (PDE). This is 
double what was stipulated in the 2015 version of the plan (EPE, 2016). Meanwhile, while the 
Minister of the MME may publicly express a positive orientation toward renewables, other 
ministry constituents can hold opposing views. This happens to be the case with the current 
MME President and Executive Secretary, where the latter has expressed unwillingness to 
maintain subsidies for alternative renewables (Greenpeace, Interview, July 5, 2016). Together, 
with the unpredictable scheduling of solar auctions, this does not signal a positive vision on the 
part of the government to attract investments in large-scale solar energy.  
The lack of political sponsorship and public stimulus has largely hindered its adoption. 
Feed-in tariffs and energy auctions have allowed wind energy to gain a competitive advantage 
and benefit from increasing returns. The present challenge for solar energy is that it faces direct 
competition against all technologies during energy auctions, where hydro and wind power are the 
most cost-competitive. Policymakers have been reluctant to lower the costs for solar and, in the 
process, have foregone opportunities to learn about solar energy and understand how it can be 
inserted into the energy matrix. Solar energy is thus subject to a paradoxical situation: Brazilian 
policymakers emphasize the shortcomings of solar energy, while they are simultaneously 
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unwilling to provide it with the types of supports that have driven down the cost and improved 
the performance of wind.   
A solution to encourage solar energy development has been the establishment and 
subsequent revision of a national net-metering framework for distributed generation systems. 
From the perspective of Brazilian consumers, the growing interest behind distributed generation 
revolves around several issues. First, distributed generation offers access to electricity to 
previously isolated communities and potential improvements in energy efficiency. Secondly, 
smart grid and distributed generation technologies embody an alternative vision of how 
consumers can reconfigure their traditional relationship with utilities companies. Unlike wind 
energy, the decentralized nature of the technology counterbalances the longstanding model of 
highly centralized power generation and large investments in transmission and distribution. 
Therefore, public support for distributed solar energy is based on the prospect of increased 
choices in energy services and independence from traditional utilities. Advocates emphasize the 
ideological act of unplugging from large utilities companies which encourages individuals and 
households to take responsibility for their own energy decisions (Greenpeace, July 5, 2016).  
Although a variety of renewable energy sources are eligible under net-metering 
regulations which guide distributed generation, they were essentially designed to stimulate solar 
power generation. Solar photovoltaic (PV) systems represent more than 70% of distributed 
generation connections in Brazil (Aneel, 2018). Therefore, the overall focus of this section is on 
small-scale solar PV systems. 
5.3.1. The Formative Period of Distributed Generation (2008-2012) 
Until 2008, the Brazilian electricity market had been dominated by centralized generators 
and rules and regulations co-evolved with this technology. The electricity system’s supply-side 
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focus led to a dominant perception about what constitutes a power station: that they should be 
controllable, centralized, increasingly larger over time (Bunting, 2008, p. 172), and preferably 
powered by hydroelectricity. However, small-scale solar generation systems are decentralized 
and owned by electricity consumers. 
The initial motivation to create a more supportive intuitional environment for distributed 
generation systems came from within Aneel and began as an internal discussion. A small group 
began to debate the possibilities of distributed generation for the electricity sector. 
Representatives from Aneel described the process as “bottom-up,” initiated by about four or five 
agency employees who were eager to study the issue (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017).  
The opportunity to transform Aneel’s regulatory interest in distributed generation into a 
real-world application of the technology arose on pig farms located in the Southern state of 
Paraná. The first major experiment with small-scale generators for grid-connected electricity 
production was a biogas project in the state’s Western region. While Paraná has a high 
concentration of urban industrial activities, especially near the metropolitan region of Curitiba, 
the rest of the state is characterized by a strong agri-business sector. In particular, Paraná ranks 
third in Brazil in terms of swine production. In addition, many agricultural businesses in Western 
Paraná are located near the waterways that feed into the reservoir of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam, 
the pride of Brazilian hydrological engineering and the largest generator of hydroelectricity in 
the world. 
Given their proximity to the Itaipu reservoir, the business operations of Paranense pig 
farms became a major environmental liability. Brazilian scientists from Embrapa (The Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation) and managers at Itaipu were increasingly aware that the 
waste generated from the local animal livestock was contaminating the dam’s water resources. 
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To mitigate the impact on water quality, Itaipu Binacional, the operating company of the Itaipu 
hydroelectric plant, formed a partnership with Copel Distribuição, the local distribution 
company, as well as agricultural cooperatives, to devise a solution. Their proposal was to install 
biodigesters on the adjacent properties dedicated to swine production as a way to lessen the 
environmental impact of livestock refuse on the reservoir, and to study the economic and 
technical feasibility of bioenergy. The idea was to use the methane gas produced by the 
decomposition of organic matter to generate on-site electricity. Farmers and agricultural 
cooperatives saw this as an opportunity to reduce the high costs of electricity necessary to 
maintain their business operations. Any surplus electricity not used during swine production 
would be injected into the grid and sold to Copel (Copel, 2009).  
The task of integrating small-scale biogas units into the broader electric power system 
presented many challenges for Aneel and project developers. A “mismatch” existed in the 
operational rules for electricity generation (Negro, Hekkert, & Smits, 2007):  the regulations 
governing the installation of grid-connected generators had not yet accounted for the 
characteristics of small-scale units. The operating standards which were designed for large-scale 
central power generation required extensive information and monitoring so that electricity could 
be transported, sold, and distributed to final end consumers. For a number of reasons, the 
adoption of distributed generation technologies depended on corresponding changes to the 
regulatory framework. 
First, to receive authorization to supply electricity to the grid, all grid-connected 
generators are required to install a meter to monitor the amount of electricity produced and 
establish a corresponding price. The central systems operator, the ONS, then uses this 
information to dispatch electricity and satisfy demand across the transmission network. Under 
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existing rules, Copel would have to install electricity meters to monitor the energy produced 
from the first 41 small-scale biodigestors. These meters would also have to be connected in real-
time to computers located in the nearest headquarters of the systems operator, the ONS. Metering 
systems for conventional generators have complex functions and are expensive. In comparison, 
distributed generation systems owned by electricity consumers generate much less electricity and 
can operate on an independent, stand-alone basis if desired. The total installed capacity of the 
Copel micro-generators was 80 kW, implying that they could produce approximately up to 
0.027% of the electricity of an average 30 MW grid-scale power plant. The comparably small 
output of the biodigester units thus did not merit the technical costs and regulations imposed on 
large-scale generators.  
Second, the current laws and regulations had been developed to mitigate the operational 
risks and volatility associated with large, centralized hydroelectric plants. In contrast to the 
concept of  installed capacity, which is the maximum output of electricity that a generator can 
produce, the "physical” or “assured” energy for a power plant is a way of guaranteeing, 
throughout the life of a power plant, that the final output will reach the levels stipulated under a 
purchase agreement for electricity (Aneel, 2005). The overall purpose of this second 
measurement for output is to internalize worst-case scenario conditions, when unfavorable 
periods of below-average rainfall result in the low productivity of hydroelectric generators.29 
This system was intended to improve the economic competitiveness of the hydropower system 
by providing a long-term guarantee for investors despite prolonged periods of unfavorable 
weather conditions. Unlike the conventional generation market, it does not make sense for small-
scale generators to provide these kinds of supply guarantees.  For small-scale, consumer-owned 
                                                          
29 Aneel calculates the assured energy in accordance with a statistical model based on average rainfalls, water flows 
of rivers and water levels in each plant’s reservoir over a multi-year time frame. Aneel then guarantees this assured 
energy by issuing a certificate during the licensing process for each power plant, which it reviews every 5 years. 
131 
 
systems, the distribution company automatically purchases electricity that is injected into the 
grid based on a pre-established compensation system. This eschews the types of negotiations that 
normally occur when utilities buy and sell energy. Moreover, small-scale systems do not present 
the electricity system with supply risks based on hydrological fluctuations.  
This initial phase of project development revealed that the regulatory environment was 
ill-adapted to small-scale energy systems. Consequently, the successful implementation of the 
biogestion project depended on the creation of regulations which took into account the 
institutional and technical needs of the new technology. Aneel began to discuss what regulators 
could do to facilitate it. It recognized that, with some adjustments, the project could largely 
operate within the existing regulatory framework. At the time, it viewed its role as limited to 
providing the necessary regulatory clarifications and easing standards for small-scale systems so 
that the project could move forward (Representative of Aneel, March 20, 2017). Regulators 
chose to reinterpret existing laws and regulations as a means to create a separate regulatory space 
for distributed generation. Electricity reforms had legally established the concept of the “auto-
producer” in 1996, which authorizes private entities to generate electricity wholly or partly for 
their own use and consumption (Brazil, 1996).30 The framework for distributed generation was 
thus fashioned out of the concept of an auto-producer. Redeploying this existing concept allowed 
regulators to avoid directly challenging the existing institutional structure.  
To accomplish these aims, Aneel simplified the metering scheme and authorized Copel to 
purchase only the energy effectively injected into network, rather than having to derive a 
“physical guarantee” for each system. Energy producers were also authorized to use the 
distribution system at a 100% discount, and were not required to pay the typical usage fee of 
                                                          
30 Brazilian Constitutional Decree No. 2003, September 10, 1996.  
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transmission and distribution lines to the distribution company. Following these modest 
regulatory modifications, Aneel granted authorization for the biodigester projects in July 2008. 
Aneel’s next step was to generalize these regulatory changes to other small-scale 
installations. The information and experience gathered from the Copel pilot project served as an 
initial basis for a framework for distributed generation. In scaling-up the biodigestion 
experiment, Aneel mandated that these small systems of “reduced capacity” did not have to 
undergo a more comprehensive and lengthy licensing process required of large-scale 
generators.31 Energy regulators grounded their decision in the observation that these systems 
were of such small scale that they mainly posed questions for how to regulate the injection of 
excess electricity into the grid. Distributed generation was still a niche technology. If distributed 
generation was eventually used on a wider scale, this would require that regulators design a new 
rate structure, a lengthy and time-consuming process. They would also have to consider how 
these new technologies would affect the relationship between utilities companies and consumers. 
As biodigestors in Southern Brazil began operation, the development of regulations for 
small-scale systems was consolidated as a key agenda item. Every two years, Aneel makes 
available on the Internet its “Indicative Regulatory Agenda.” The Regulatory Agenda is 
essentially a list of Aneel’s priorities and emerging topics that require more extensive regulations 
or procedural improvement. It is one way that the agency tries to make more transparent the 
ongoing changes to regulations to industry stakeholders and consumers. The Indicative 
Regulatory Agenda for 2010 included, among other items, the following language: “To diminish 
obstacles that prohibit the access of small electric generators to the distribution system” (Aneel, 
2010). The experience that regulators had gained with the implementation of the Copel 
                                                          
31 Aneel Resolution 390, of 2009, established that generating stations with power equal to or less than 5,000 kW do 
not have to be licensed by Aneel since they can be treated as generators with reduced capacity. This resolution 
builds on provisions of Article 26 of Law 9,427 of December 26, 1996. 
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biodgestors made distributed generation a priority item. It had generated internal learning about 
the institutional and technical needs of the technology, which regulators judged to be relevant in 
prioritizing their ongoing regulatory activities.  
The growing niche for distributed generation prompted Aneel to fine-tune the technology 
to a wider user base. The success of the Copel project had led other organizations to make 
requests to install small generation units. For instance, the IDEAL Institute, a prominent energy 
consultancy and think tank in Latin America, wanted to install solar photovoltaic systems on the 
football stadiums that would host the 2014 World Cup games in Brazil (Aneel, 2010). The PV 
solar systems would then sell their surplus energy back to the grid as a model for sustainable 
development and energy efficiency. Such visible projects would use distributed generation 
systems in ways that would have much broader ramifications for society and the electricity 
system. Moreover, while many net-metering systems were under 2 MW, Aneel was interested in 
bringing small-scale systems with higher levels of power generation into the electricity market. 
In the Brazilian supply system, electricity producers with capacity above 5 MW are allowed to 
commercially sell their electricity to the grid. There were no regulations that enabled the 
installation of generators that fit into the range of 2 to 5 MW. To attend to these demands, Aneel 
would have to respond with more supportive criteria to consolidate the regulatory framework. 
To begin a formal regulatory review, the agency’s directors needed to collect information 
and conduct a formal Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) about the barriers and alternative policy 
solutions that existed to enable the broader diffusion and uptake of distributed generation 
systems. Aneel first decided to hold a public consultation process from September 2010 and 
April 2011. Stakeholders within the electricity sector sent their concerns about distributed 
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generation systems and net-metering. Aneel received an estimated 900 technical contributions.32  
According to an interview with a representative of Aneel, these preliminary steps further 
represented a contemplation of the agency’s authority and its role in supporting this relatively 
new technology (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017): 
 
We created a technical note with a bunch of questions, we wrote 33 questions to collect 
from society: Are you interested? No? What are some barriers that you think exist? And 
so we went on from there to investigate more broadly - technical barriers, economic 
barriers, regulatory barriers, legal barriers…we raised a number of issues. With the 
responses we received, we filtered through them to see what fell within the authority of 
Aneel, and what laws and decrees needed to be changed. If it’s not our place to change 
something, could we propose the change? And from there we identified barriers that we 
could diminish. So the initial objective was to reduce barriers, it wasn’t necessarily to 
incentivize: whoever wants to do it can do it and we’ll create the conditions. 
 
This first review allowed Aneel to continue to learn from extensive user and stakeholder input 
about the performance, effects, economic viability, and social desirability of distributed 
generation technologies. It then applied this knowledge to create new regulations that were 
needed to further the development and rate of application of the technology. 
Notably, this early stage centered on framing distributed generation as a regulatory 
solution, rather than as a policy issue. The impetus to advance distributed generation could 
theoretically come from three main actors within the electricity sector: Aneel, the Ministy of 
Mines and Energy, or the Brazilian National Congress. The Congress can approve laws which 
affect the electricity sector without having to consult the MME or Aneel. Given the low priority 
of distributed generation in the broader political agenda, it was unlikely that Congress would 
take up the issue on its own. Alternatively, the MME co-manages the electricity sector with 
Aneel and could emerge as a potential advocate for distributed generation. Historically, energy 
authorities at the MME have seen their role in the sector as promoting energy expansion, 
                                                          
32 Public Consultation No. 15, and Public Audience No. 42, respectively.  
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primarily by encouraging the construction of large hydro and thermoelectric plants. The MME’s 
experience with smaller systems was limited to installing stand-alone generators in remote 
communities, and had shown little interest in distributed generation. Thus, a gap in policy action 
created an opportunity for Aneel to claim control over distributed generation as an emerging 
regulatory area.  
Aneel further opted for a net-metering scheme to compensate system owners for the 
electricity they added to the grid. An alternative solution debated at the time was to implement a 
feed-in tariff (FIT) approach. FITs have been a common approach to subsidize the costs of 
renewable energy and distributed generation systems, especially in Europe. Any government 
subsidy, however, would require a corresponding law, and proposing a new law lies within the 
domain of the Ministry of Mines and Energy. Such an approach might result in sharing control 
for the development of distributed generation with the MME. Moreover, the energy tariff has 
been historically high in Brazil, and any cost-increase argument to accommodate the subsidy 
would be politically infeasible. The creation or revision of a constitutional decree would also be 
a costly and time-consuming option involving authorities external to the agency. A 
comprehensive net-metering framework with special benefits for interconnection was chosen as 
an alternative to a subsidy. The development of a net-metering system would allow the 
regulatory agency to shape distributed generation through the regulatory process.  
In laying the groundwork for net-metering, the regulatory agency anticipated that the 
incumbent utilities would attempt to resist or block the introduction of distributed generation 
systems. In general, utilities companies often have little incentive to grant access to the network. 
Distributed generation is perceived as a threat to utilities’ profits by reducing consumer demand. 
At the same time, utilities companies are responsible for maintaining and monitoring the grid 
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infrastructure and can establish their own connection requirements. For instance, although the 
generator would be owned and managed by a utilities customer or third-party operator, the utility 
would ultimately be responsible for the overall grid connection, as well as the routine operation 
of the meter and related equipment. The distribution concessionaire would also be required to 
periodically collect data from distributed generation customers and provide this data to Aneel. 
The regulatory agency feared that utilities companies would try to discourage the use of 
distributed generation systems by setting more prohibitive technical requirements for metering 
systems.  
After extensive review, the policy milestone for distributed generation was established as 
a net-metering framework in April 2012 through Normative Resolution nº 482/2012 (Aneel, 
2012).33 The new rules allowed small-scale, renewable generators up to 1 MW capacity to be 
interconnected to low and medium-voltage grids. They could then sell a surplus of the electricity 
back to the national grid in return for credits to offset their electricity bills. Credits earned by the 
micro- or mini-generators would expire after 36 months from the invoice date. Qualified sources 
included solar, wind, biomass, certain types of cogeneration and small hydro sources. Aneel also 
created a set of requirements for metering systems to limit grid operators’ ability to block small-
scale systems owners from connecting to the grid. In this case, the net balance of generated and 
consumed power would be evaluated by a bi-directional energy meter. This resolution fixed an 
8-month adaptation period, so that the regulation would start to take effect in December 2012. 
The adaptation period provided distribution system operators the opportunity to revise their 
service standards and connection requirements in compliance with the general rules defined in 
                                                          
33 Resolution 517 was an amendment to Resolution 482 and took affect in December 2012. However, the hallmark 
regulation for distributed generation continued to be referred to as Normative Resolution No. 482, or simply “482” 
in the vernacular.   
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Brazilian Distribution Grid Code (PRODIST) (Mattar et al., 2015), which defines technical 
standards and processes for power distribution. 
The passage of Resolution 482 established the minimal regulations to start a distributed 
generation market. The agency accomplished the immediate regulatory goal of simplifying the 
interconnection process to improve the integration of small-scale renewable energy generators 
into the grid. A partnership between regulators, industry, and swine farmers to experiment with 
biodigestion was the starting point to acquire the learning and experience necessary to construct 
a general regulatory framework for small-scale renewable energy generation. Furthermore, the 
regulatory agency had asserted that the development of distributed generation was a regulatory 
issue. By adopting a net-metering scheme that did not require the involvement of other public 
authorities within the electricity sector, Aneel claimed a discretionary space in which it could 
define the character and pace of distributed generation. Focusing on the consumer-side of the 
technology, the agency also made it clear that distribution companies would have to adjust their 
operations to accommodate these new technologies.  
5.3.2. Expanding the Market for Distributed Generation (2012-2016) 
In the beginning, the number of distributed generation installations grew more slowly 
than regulators had predicted (see Figure 7). The final touches to the country’s net-metering 
framework had taken place against a backdrop of high electricity prices. By the end of 2012, 
Brazil was experiencing yet another severe drought that had reduced water levels at hydroelectric 
dams, requiring the country to import liquefied natural gas to fuel costly gas-fired generators that 
needed to run at full capacity. Short-term energy prices had roughly quadrupled between 
September 2012 and January 2013, providing a boost to the attractiveness of installing 
distributed generation systems. Unexpectedly, in late January 2013, the government mandated a 
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sudden and drastic reduction in energy tariffs. During a national radio and television broadcast, 
President Dilma Rousseff announced a cut in energy tariffs of 18% for residential consumers and 
32% for industry. The measure was made possible through an agreement with power 
transmission companies. They accepted the price reductions provided that the government paid 
retroactive compensation for improvements made to the electricity network before privatization 
reforms in 2000 (Monteiro & Moraes Moura, 2013).34 These cheaper electricity prices attenuated 
the incentive to install distributed generation systems. 
 
Figure 6 
The Growth of Distributed Generation Connections and Consumers Receiving  
Net-metering Credits (2012-2017) 
 
Note. Adapted from Aneel (2017a).  
 
                                                          
34 The compensation was calculated in R $ 62.2 billion in 2017 [58] and will be diluted in the consumer light bill 
until 2025. The opposition accused the presidential election official of claiming that it was a maneuver to reduce the 























































In spite of this unfavorable environment, Aneel continued to take a proactive approach to 
the nascent industry. The average time to recover expenses from investing in a photovoltaic 
system had risen, but Aneel remained optimistic. The attitude of the agency was to keep pushing 
for distributed generation, despite its reduced economic viability and the government’s intent to 
keep energy prices low: “Was it reasonable? Was it difficult? But, was it still possible? If so, 
let’s keep moving forward” (Aneel, Interview, May 20, 2017). Regulators were not discouraged 
by external forces that had made small-scale systems more costly, but rather resolved to iron out 
ongoing issues.  
The 2014-2015 Regulatory Agenda had scheduled the next public hearing to initiate the 
regulatory review of distributed generation regulations for mid-2015. In the lead-up to the 
review, Aneel monitored the roll-out of net-metering regulations to learn how to best 
accommodate the characteristics of distributed generation technologies. Aneel hosted a 
conference in Brasilia in April 2014, entitled “Micro and Minigeneration Seminar – The Impact 
of Normative Resolution nº 482/2012” (Aneel, 2015). Regulators were interested in gauging the 
wider barriers to the adoption of distributed generation systems. The agency also reviewed data 
collected by utilities companies. Most of the issues that surfaced were related to the connection 
requirements for joining up distributed generation systems to the electricity grid. On the one 
hand, the agency acknowledged that, in some cases, these barriers derived from the new 
experience that distribution companies were facing in dealing with this paradigm shift. On the 
other hand, even subtle forms of utilities’ noncompliance could dampen regulatory momentum 
for distributed generation. To address these problems, Aneel first analyzed whether distribution 
companies’ connection practices were in compliance with the standards defined in the PRODIST 
distribution and transmission code. Regulators also examined what they could do to remove 
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unnecessary connection requirements that were required of larger-scale power plants. This 
included exempting small-scale solar PV systems from environmental licensing procedures 
(Mattar, et al., 2015).35  
Apart from testing the viability and social acceptance of the new technology, the advent 
of net-metering set in motion the building of a constituency behind distributed solar energy 
generation. For the new technology to gain ground, technology-specific coalitions needed to be 
formed and to engage in wider political debates in order to gain influence (Jacobsson & Lauber, 
2006, p. 259). In 2013, the official trade association, ABSOLAR, was founded to coordinate and 
represent the interests of the budding solar industry (ABSOLAR, 2017b). The founders 
recognized that they needed to perform lobbying activities in order to grow the solar and 
distributed generation industry. According to a solar professional and fellow board member of 
ABSOLAR (Solar Consultant, Interview, Aug. 6, 2016): 
 
…We are really trying hard to penetrate Brasilia. What we have done, it’s ABSOLAR  
that was created to do this. It was created to do lobbying. At the end of the day, you  
cannot leave it all to this, and as painful as it sounds: if you don’t have someone getting  
paid to go to Brasilia and visit the guys, forget about it, it’s not going to happen… That's  
what, I think, was one of the few mistakes I made in ABSOLAR, was to criticize the need  
of generating cash flow for the Association. I was like, ‘Man, this is an association. No  
one is meant to be earning money here, you know.’ But no, we need to have a lot of  
money because we need to decide today, to jump in a plane tomorrow to go to China and  
meet our  president in a conference...You got to do it. 
 
Before joining ABSOLAR, the interviewee had ample experience in owning a company that 
installed residential and commercial solar panels. While having a vested interest in the industry’s 
growth, he initially viewed the concept of lobbying to promote solar energy with reservation. As 
he gained experience in the association, he realized that developing a relationship with regulators 
                                                          
35 Most distribution systems operate in a radial configuration - that is, the power flows only in one direction. The 
installation of distributed resources not only alters the general topology of the system, but the power flows in 
multiple directions. This has important implications for the protection of the system.  
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and providing an organized voice for solar and distributed energy was important to cultivating 
the institutional set-up of the industry (Solar Consultant, Interview, Aug. 6, 2016).  
Moreover, according to the interviewee, the founders of ABSOLAR recognized the need 
to invite industry professionals with diverse backgrounds to steer the association. In addition to 
core stakeholders from the distributed generation sector, the board of ABSOLAR has 
representatives from regulated electric utilities and mangers from more traditional companies 
that focus on centralized generation (ABSOLAR, 2017a). The reasoning was that, if the primary 
aim of their work was to grow the market, which depended on both newcomers and incumbents, 
the association’s representatives should come from different sub-sectors of the electric power 
industry. The well-being of the industry should not be risked because of benefits that might stem 
from being exclusive or favoring certain stakeholders over others (Solar Consultant, Interview, 
Aug. 6, 2016).  
Other actors whose objectives aligned with renewable energy and small-scale generation 
came forward to advocate for more favorable conditions for distributed generation. The IDEAL 
Institute is a non-profit organization which promotes the development of renewable energy in 
Latin America. Associated with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), an 
international development agency, the Institute has managed several initiatives to disseminate 
educational materials and promotional events that encourage solar energy in Brazil (IDEAL 
Institute, 2017). Greenpeace Brazil is another environmental organization that has emerged as a 
strong proponent of small-scale solar. Historically, the organization had been a vocal watchdog 
of hydroelectric dam construction in the Amazon, and has lobbied against the use of coal-fired 
thermoelectric plants. Distributed solar generation fit into the non-profit’s mission as being a far 
less harmful and more sustainable way to generate the country’s energy. Greenpeace Brazil’s 
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Climate and Energy division has also been active in producing research and policy whitepapers 
on how to increase the economic viability of solar installations, such as by eliminating state 
value-added taxes and providing discounts on municipal property taxes (Greenpeace, Interview, 
June 5, 2016). Greenpeace representatives regularly attend Aneel’s public hearings and technical 
meetings on net-metering regulations to contribute their perspective.  
The Greenpeace representative also underlined the importance of lobbying and forming a 
single voice to present to the public and decision-makers. For instance, organizations that 
support distributed generation have been internally divided on several issues. This disagreement 
stems from advocates who believe that the sector should focus on distributed generation more 
broadly, represented by a variety of energy sources, or by using distributed generation 
regulations as a means to promote solar energy (Greenpeace, Interview, July 5, 2016): 
The wind energy lobby is very strong, they have a strong presence in the national  
congress, and they are an association that has a lot of legitimacy. I think it’s more  
complicated, for example, for solar energy, because it’s a very new sector. We have today  
ABSOLAR, but, for example, there exists a questioning of this association’s  
legitimacy…I think it’s problematic that, in the context of lobbying, to be forming blocks  
of networks, because if you’re not able to secure a singular voice within the sector, you  
show that that sector is still fragile. And so, for public policy-making, this is very  
negative. So, I think having a strong lobby is good.  
 
Comparing distributed generation to the wind energy sector, which has an arguably more mature 
coalition of supporters, the Greenpeace representative stated that an underlying tension is 
whether regulations favor a particular source of energy. While distributed generation is 
dominated by PV solar installations, the biomass and biogas, small hydro, and wind lobbies also 
want their smaller generation systems to qualify under net-metering regulations in order to 
expand their access to markets. The inclusion of different technologies has enlarged the number 
of stakeholders that support distributed generation, but has also brought in different groups that 
143 
 
have diverging priorities. Greenpeace acknowledged that they have had an important role in 
serving as a moderator and negotiating these differences between different stakeholder groups. 
The progress of distributed generation have thus depended on consensus-building and 
emphasizing overlapping interests between members in order to make a strong case in the 
regulatory arena.  
Despite different beliefs and prerogatives among actors, these organizations and interest 
groups formed a broader advocacy coalition to advance the belief that solar photovoltaic energy 
and distributed generation were the answer to wider policy concerns. Distributed generation has 
been argued to be not only a more sustainable way for consumers to produce their own 
electricity, but is also an alternative to the longstanding model of large-scale energy projects. In 
addition to providing more independence from traditional distribution companies, which are 
generally regarded by the public as unresponsive and inefficient, small-scale systems and 
installation companies counterbalance the large construction companies that have embroiled the 
country in corruption scandals. Small-scale electricity generation fits into a vision in which 
Brazilian citizens have the ability to counteract corruption and maintain a critical distance from 
government (Camargo, 2017).36 This view has been echoed by both Greenpeace and supporters 
of small-scale solar energy (Greenpeace, Interview, June 5, 2016; Solar Consultant, Interview, 
Aug. 6, 2016). For example, like many supporters of small-scale generation systems, the 
ABSOLAR representative was against the ongoing construction of large-scale dam projects, 
which were often built in environmentally vulnerable areas by private construction companies. 
Consequently, his perception that corruption is influenced by private interest groups, which 
                                                          
36 In addition to newspaper articles that draw connections between corruption and large-scale energy projects, it is 
also common for solar energy installation companies to argue that one of the underlying benefits of distributed 
generation is its ability to reduce corruption. Providers of small-scale energy systems have strategically used anti-
corruption discourse to promote distributed generation’s advantages.  
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encompasses the electricity sector, negatively affected his outlook of lobbying in the policy-
making process. 
As the coalition behind solar energy grew, Aneel was nearing the date in which it would 
have to begin the formal revision of distributed generation regulations. Fortunately, by 2015, this 
timing coincided with a drop in global solar prices, as world installed capacity soared and 
Chinese solar panel producers entered the market. A more favorable exchange rate had also 
momentarily diminished the costs of importing solar energy technologies, PV modules, and 
related equipment. The doubts that still lingered about the realistic potential of distributed 
generation were also assuaged by the growing domestic experience with solar technologies and 
distributed generation. Solar panel installers had emerged to meet the growing consumer 
demand. It became apparent that solar energy systems could be made accessible to a wider base 
of consumers.   
From its interactions with industry groups and stakeholders, Aneel decided that more 
robust changes to regulations were needed to expand the distributed generation market. The 
agency had already created the basic conditions for net-metering to take root and current market 
conditions gave it an opportunity to decisively foment market growth. The internal debate within 
Aneel centered on the agency’s authority to consolidate its jurisdiction over this emerging policy 
area (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017): 
 
The structure of the agency is a little more dynamic, so we observed that we had a space  
in which to act…Realizing that there still wasn’t much action from either side of the  
aisle, as I said a while back, we studied the issue further and identified that there was a  
gap there, and so we asked ourselves, could we act on it? First we consulted our legal  
counsel to see if it was within our jurisdiction to do it, and the response was a positive  
“yes.” Aneel has the authority to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy  
sources, so let’s go down this road. 
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Regulators used their discretion to become more proactive in defining the agenda for distributed 
generation. To make this case credibly, they had to demonstrate a clear and defensible set of 
procedures on which to make their decisions as to how they could act. The broad regulatory 
remit of promoting energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies allowed Aneel to 
justify its decisions within the existing regulatory framework and, at the same time, affirm its 
evolving authority over the issue. The fact that no public authorities in the electricity sector took 
control over distributed generation facilitated Aneel’s ability to act responsively and enlarge its 
scope of responsibility for net-metering. 
In the regulatory arena, opposition to changes in existing regulations has centered on the 
ways in which net-metering impacts concessionaires. As previously mentioned, electric utilities 
have contended that their financial viability would be undermined by distributed generation, 
since it would imply selling less electricity to consumers. They have expressed reluctance to 
adapt to the new model in various ways.  Leading up to the 2015 revision of net-metering 
regulations, distribution companies had been largely reactive and non-compliant. For instance, 
distribution companies were known to cause delays in connecting systems to the grid. Although 
connection times have varied by distributor, Aneel estimated that the average connection time 
between 2013 and 2014 was 160 days, although cases had existed where delays were over 400 
days (Aneel, 2015). Distribution companies also argued that net-metering consumers used 
distribution networks without paying a fair price to connect their systems to the gird, also known 
as the Transmission and Distribution System Use Tariffs (referred to as “TUST” and “TUSD”, 
respectively). A significant part of the regulatory debate thus focused on how to increase 
compliance and to clarify the interconnection method for distribution operators and net-metering 
customers.   
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Before the passage of the new regulations, a final public hearing in December 2015 
allowed stakeholders to express their concerns and provide information to Aneel. Stakeholders 
who favored a more progressive interpretation for Resolution 687 argued that distributed 
generation was becoming popular among consumers and had broad benefits for the environment. 
They also invoked the concept of consumer rights, and were concerned about amplifying net-
metering benefits for various subgroups of consumers that might be excluded without additional 
regulatory provisions. In addition to residential consumers, Brazilian telecommunications 
companies, such as Oi and Claro, were interested in distributed generation to reduce their 
operational costs, of which electricity is the second largest item (ABRADEE, Interview, March 
20, 2017). On-site distributed generation provides less costly power that can serve as a backup 
and keep telecommunications systems online when grid power is unavailable. In effect, while 
different consumer classes represented their interests, the result was a positive turn-out of 
eligible electricity consumers which formed part of a larger market for distributed generation 
systems. Together, these different industry and consumer groups demonstrated a collective stake 
in expanding the market for distributed generation. 
In the other corner of the regulatory arena, incumbent utilities were organized through a 
trade and lobbying group called the Brazilian Association of Electricity Distributors 
(ABRADEE),37 which represents 99.8% of distribution companies.38 At the final public hearing 
to discuss the resolution, ABRADEE contested the revision of Resolution 482, arguing that 
Aneel was overreaching its constitutional mandate (ABRADEE, 2015). In opposing the policy 
                                                          
37 The Association was created alongside the establishment of the Distribution Committee (CODI) in August 1975, 
and was later reincorporated in 1995, at the commencement of electricity privatization (ABRADEE, 2017). It is thus 
one of the oldest industry groups in the Brazilian electricity sector. 
 
38 A few municipal utilities in Brazil are politically represented by a separate association, the Brazilian Association 
for Small Electricity Distributors (ABRADEMP).  
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change, utilities did not make their case based on a threat to their business model and earning 
profits for shareholders. Instead, ABRADEE argued that distribution companies were being 
called on to shoulder the costs to incentivize distributed generation, since distributed generation 
users did not have to pay to use the distribution network. Relatedly, the Association repeated 
their claim that distributed generation and rooftop solar were technologies adopted by the 
wealthy, since an average solar system at the time cost approximately 6,500 USD. Therefore, 
exemption from the transmission fee represented a “perverse subsidy” that was being paid for by 
distribution companies, and that had little benefit for low-income consumers (ABRADEE, 
Interview, March 20, 2017). This argument was also made separately by Light, the 
concessionaire of Rio de Janeiro and the second largest utility in Brazil. The distribution 
company cautioned that it would likely increase electricity rates for consumers who did not own 
distributed generation systems, a practice known as “cost-shifting.” 
The final revision of Resolution 482 was regarded by stakeholders who defended the 
changes as a forward-looking piece of regulation on the part of Aneel. Under the new rules, 
limits on the installed capacity of units increased from 1 MW to 5 MW. Utility companies were 
also obligated to connect generating units within 49 days. Aneel expedited the application 
process for interconnection to the grid by reducing the deadline for the concessionaire to issue its 
interconnection report (Figueiredo et al., 2012). Furthermore, to the chagrin of distribution 
companies, their proposal to charge a connection fee for owners of distributed generation 
systems was rejected. Aneel augmented tax benefits for solar power deployment, increasing the 
existing discounts in transmission and distribution system usage charges for owners of 
distributed generation systems to a 100% exemption. Overall, the revised interconnection rules 
were much more favorable for owners of distributed generation systems than for the regulated 
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utilities. These regulatory enhancements came into force in March 2016. Table 4 summarizes the 
changes to distributed generation regulations, which resulted in Normative Resolution 687. 
 
 
Besides largely siding with owners of distributed generation systems on the issues of 
installation, allowable capacity, and transmission pricing, the new rules further allowed solar 
energy systems to be used beyond traditional rooftop generation. Consumers could now generate 
electricity through different configurations, including virtual net-metering, aggregated net-
metering, and community sharing. Virtual net-metering allows energy to be generated at one of 
the system owner’s properties, but the credits generated can be used towards other electricity 
bills as long as the utility company is the same in both locations. In particular, for residential 
consumers, aggregated net-metering allows condominiums and apartment buildings to install a 
generating unit and distribute the credits among the units. This regulatory change takes into 
consideration Brazilian cities where higher portions of the housing stock in densely populated 
areas and urban centers such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are comprised of condominiums. 
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In theory, these changes would broaden the market by extending regulations to different building 
types and consumer profiles.  
In the case of revising net-metering regulations, the regulator had translated its broad 
legislative mandate into an operational agenda, which was then implemented through a set of 
procedural requirements. For example, ABRADEE criticized the approach of Aneel on the basis 
that distributed generation had been framed during the regulatory process as a public benefit. 
Since distribution companies were only one segment of stakeholders, they argued that Aneel 
should more equitably distribute the costs of its regulatory policy. In justifying its decisions in 
the face of utilities’ criticisms, Aneel asserted that a different regulatory design would infringe 
on the “non-discriminatory treatment to all users of the transmission and distribution systems” (J. 
Coelho, 2015). Moreover, Aneel referenced the same resolution to affirm its authority to support 
solar energy (Aneel, 1999). The agency had to defend how these new rules and regulations 
would benefit energy consumers in lieu of clear guidelines and regulatory precedent for inserting 
the new technology into the electricity system. The energy regulator has been both reactive and 
proactive: Aneel has crafted the regulations that govern distributed generation from the extensive 
process of consultation and responding to industry concerns, while exercising a more robust 
interpretation of its mandate.  
The regulatory agency created a defensible set of procedures that provided an enabling 
framework for distributed generation. In recounting a conversation with a director of Aneel 
following the passage of the new rules, an ABRADEE representative explained the agency’s 
insistence to use the interconnection rules as a “subsidy” to incentivize small-scale systems 




During a frank conversation with a director, he basically said, ‘We understand your 
point…but this is the time to accelerate.’ Because, they argued the following: ‘You see 
that from 2012 until the end of 2015, there were only a thousand consumer units.’ So, it’s 
necessary to use the regulations to see if something comes from it, to accelerate the 
process. 
 
The directors of Aneel hoped that the new rules would “open the tap,” and that early adopters 
would aid in developing a commercial market for distributed generation and reduce the costs of 
PV solar installations. Granting a subsidy to connect their system to the grid was, in part, a 
gesture to compensate systems owners who were paying a higher price to overcome the learning 
effects for the new technology. Aneel’s directors even overruled the superintendent in charge of 
regulations and distribution on the issue of imposing a connection fee. The next tariff revision 
would occur in 2019 and they wanted to signal to utilities that they would consider their 
proposals to adjust for the social costs of distributed generation at that time.  
 Following the approval of Resolution 687, the Ministry of Mines and Energy entered 
with its own program to provide incentives for distributed generation. The Program for the 
Development of Distributed Generation of Electric Energy (ProGD) was launched in December 
2015 with the official purpose to provide a legal basis for distributed generation.39 The program 
also aims to stimulate the use of distributed generation based on renewable energy sources with a 
particular emphasis on solar photovoltaics. The MME announced a large budget of up to $25.6 
billion USD in investments to support distributed generation systems until 2030 (MME, 2015). 
Under the program, the government plans to create and apply lines of credit for the installation of 
distributed renewable technologies. By early 2018, however, there had been no public 
announcements about what the ProGD program has actually achieved.  
                                                          
39 These include ministerial decrees No. 538/2015, No. 13/2016, and No. 175/2016.  
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Some observers criticize the program for being pro-business and not intended to benefit 
the average consumer that owns a distributed generation system, since the ProGD program 
includes large-scale generation systems of up to 30MW (Costa, 2015). An interviewee from 
Aneel suggested that that the ProGD program is an example of how the MME sometimes creates 
policies that were first instigated by regulators. Oftentimes, these policies are more about 
creating a legal precedent to accompany an emerging policy issue, rather than intruding on 
Aneel’s day-to-day activities. Referring to the ProGD program (Aneel, Interview Sept. 14, 
2017): 
There was some movement, some stuff happened, but the agency is much more agile and 
all of our regulations pass through public consultation, public meetings, we interact more 
with consumers, with businesses. So, we have a better feeling of what’s going on…We 
have more contact, so we know what’s working, what’s not working, and we act. 
 
 
According to the interviewee from Aneel, the ProGD program does not interfere with its 
management of distributed generation regulations. The ProGD program was viewed as being 
moderately helpful in that it was a move taken by the Ministry to reduce certain legal barriers to 
distributed generation, but it ultimately did not reduce Aneel’s discretion to shape net-metering 
regulations (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017).   
5.3.3. Regulating Technological Change (2016-present) 
Since the revision of the net-metering framework in 2015, Brazil has reached 
approximately 194 MW of distributed solar PV micro-generation and mini-generation 
deployment (see Table 5). The Ministry of Mines and Energy also released its long-awaited 10-
Year Energy Expansion Plan proposition which projected that the country could reach more than 
13GW of solar PV deployment by 2026 (Kenning, 2017). In accompanying these market 
changes, Aneel declared that it would review the net-metering policy again in 2019. The energy 
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regulator expects that, by this time, distributed generation systems will have reached 
approximately 500 MW of installed capacity. Table 5 shows that, as of March 2018, the 22,737 
distributed generation systems represent 267.45 MW of installed capacity. Figures 7 and 8 
present Aneel’s projections on the growth distributed generation. 
 
Table 5 
Installed Capacity and Total Number of Distributed Generation Systems by Source (kW) 
Technology Number of Systems  Installed Capacity (kW) % of Total Capacity  
    Solar PV 22,564 193,706.42 72.43% 
Small Hydro 38 39,190.70 14.65% 
Biomass and Biogas 81 20,642.94 7.72% 
Wind 53 10,285.60 3.85% 
Natural Gas 1 3,627.68 1.36% 
  
Total 22,737 267,453.34 100% 
    Note. Adapted from Aneel (2018a).  
 
While solar energy advocates would like to see the industry grow more quickly, Aneel 
approaches this steady development as an opportunity to reformulate its regulatory strategy 
(Aneel, Interview Sept. 14, 2017): 
Distribution companies think that we are going too fast, and equipment manufacturers  
think that we are going too slow. Aneel believes that we are going in the right direction,  
and we would be wrong if both parties were completely happy. We like to say here that  
they have to be equally dissatisfied, nobody can be completely satisfied, but you can’t  
have someone that is much more dissatisfied than the other. If they’re equally dissatisfied  
then we’re doing our job.  
 
From the regulator’s perspective, the main objective is to closely accompany developments in 
the market to devise procedures that fairly allocate the costs and benefits of technological 
change. If the rate of diffusion falls short of their projections, regulators claim, they intend to be 
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more proactive in providing favorable conditions. On the other hand, if distributed generation 
systems are adopted at a rate that exceeds their expectations, they will be less willing to maintain 
current subsidies. A third scenario also exists which, in the opinion of Aneel, is the most ideal. If 
the diffusion rate is well-aligned with regulators’ projections, and the cost of the technology has 
dropped from increased experience and learning, they will revise the electricity tariff and 
increase the surcharge to connect to the distribution grid, the most salient point of contention for 
distribution companies. This is the scenario that Aneel has officially presented to the industry so 
that they can plan their operations, but with the qualification that the regulator can alter its course 
of action if distributed generation developments play out differently in practice (Aneel, Interview 
Sept. 14, 2017). 
The lead-up to the next regulatory revision provides Aneel and other public authorities in 
the electricity sector with the time to analyze how distributed generation impacts the grid. The 
value in waiting to revise regulations lies in being able to consider other aspects of the existing 
regulatory regime. For instance, the issue of intermittency has become a central issue in the 
electricity sector. The grid operator, the ONS, has increasingly had to plan for the fluctuating 
supplies of electricity from large-scale wind and solar plants. While Aneel continues to study the 
effect of intermittency on the electricity system, it claims that the present number of distributed 
generation connections does not create many stability issues for voltage and frequency. Yet, the 
agency is already anticipating the challenge: “We’re all going to learn together...In the future 
we’re going to have to contribute to the response - regulation is dynamic, it accompanies the 
process, we don’t have any problems yet but we’re already planning on it” (Aneel, Interview 
Sept. 14, 2017). Aneel claims that, like much of its regulatory activities, it is responsive to 
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to examine how distributed generation can be made more compatible with the electricity system, 
which has become a concern for all public agencies as they keep up with technological change in 
the energy sector. 
Utilities incumbents have become alarmed by the growth of distributed generation and have 
mobilized to slow it down. Utilities are anxious about the next revision of net-metering, claiming 
that 2019 is too late to evaluate the policy. They believe it would be better to review the current 
tariff system now and that consumers pay charges separately for their energy consumption and 
their grid usage. More importantly, utilities are concerned about the growing coalition behind 
distributed generation and solar energy. According to a representative of ABRADEE (Interview, 
March 20, 2017): 
 
We are worried, that following [the changes] the lobby is going to get really strong, because  
the regulatory sessions and Aneel’s decisions are carried out in a public way and transmitted  
on the internet. If I’m not wrong, [distributed generation] was the discussion item with the  
largest number of oral contributions from stakeholders, and so we were there, the  
distributors, and I was there making this defense, exactly what I have told you…and  
afterwards you have 16 people, entities, speaking in favor of not charging the connection  
fee…So, you have to be very careful.” 
 
 
Aneel’s policy for involving stakeholders in regulatory deliberations strengthens interest groups 
and brings new organizations into existence. The regulatory process has thus had a vital role in 
constituting the associational order behind distributed generation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, 
p.14). In addition to solar manufacturers and suppliers, there has been a proliferation of 
renewable energy and distributed generation associations, such as the Brazilian Association of 
Distributed Generation (ABGD), founded in 2015, and the Brazilian Association for Solar 
Thermic Energy (ABRASOL), founded in 2016. With a growing lobby behind distributed 
generation, utilities are afraid that consumers and advocacy groups will increasingly defend 
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favorable connection rates as a “right” instead of as a short-term subsidy. The broad coalition of 
consumer groups, solar energy installers, environmental organizations, and trade associations 
also means that utilities companies are outnumbered in public hearings.  
While many regulated utilities attempt to actively block the take-off of distributed 
generation, other companies are becoming leading investors in the area. CPFL Energia, Brazil’s 
third largest utilities company, has entered the solar distributed generation segment under a 
unregulated subsidiary, Envo. CPFL has already begun working on distributed generation 
projects, including a microgeneration research project in São Paulo state, through which it can 
evaluate the local residential market. CPFL recognizes the distributed generation receives from 
various incentives, including tax exemptions, making it a profitable business. The fact that such 
large energy groups often own commercial subsidiaries that do not act in the regulated market 
gives them an opportunity to view distributed solar generation as an attractive investment (Aneel, 
Interview, Sept. 19, 2017). Rather than a united front of utilities that lobby against distributed 
generation, some utilities companies accept the idea that they need to incorporate renewable 
energy and small-scale generation technologies in order to stay competitive. 
Despite having to deal with incumbent utilities that are resistant to change, Aneel has largely 
approached their criticisms as an opportunity to learn how to improve regulatory design 
(Braithwaite, 2011). Like the solar and wind lobbies, ABRADEE interacts directly with Aneel in 
the regulatory arena to provide technical support and advocate for projects that affect electricity 
concessionaires (Interviewee, ABRADEE).  The relationship between Brazilian utilities and 
regulators is marked by conflict but can also be collaborative. One interviewee from Aneel 
compared the new distributed generation regulations to the app-based, car-hailing service Uber, 
in that they represent a change in paradigm (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017). Since distributed 
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generation have already set in motion a change in the traditional utilities model, as a regulator, 
you need to learn how the new system functions in order to know how different elements in the 
system can co-exist. 
For example, regulators agree that the current net-metering scheme does not adequately 
internalize all of the social costs and externalities of distributed generation, nor does it properly 
compensate utilities companies for maintaining the distribution and transmission network. 
ABRADEE has proposed several ways to restructure the compensation system for net-metering, 
such as using funds from the Energy Development Funds (CDE), the public benefit fund which 
is used to promote social considerations in the electricity industry (ABRADEE, Interview, March 
20, 2017). While CDE funds cannot legally subsidize the costs of distributed generation, 
regulators are open to adopting a revised incentive structure that incorporates utilities companies’ 
suggestions (Aneel, Interview, March 20, 2017; da Silva, 2017).  
In addition to altering the regulatory framework, the agency has acted in secondary ways to 
facilitate the expansion of distributed generation. These revisions in the framework were coupled 
with R&D programs that began in 2012 and benefited domestic solar energy. Aneel has utilized 
its discretion in overseeing the qualification standards for energy efficiency and R&D programs 
as an opportunity to steer domestic developments in solar energy. In conjunction with the 
revision of Resolution 482, since late 2015 Aneel has launched several public calls for projects 
focused on solar energy, such as photovoltaic systems, general research, and improvements in 
energy efficiency using solar energy (Aneel, 2015). This has created added supports to increase 
regulatory credibility, demonstrating a clear and concerted effort on the part of Aneel to promote 




The inner world of the regulatory process has implications for understanding the 
diffusion of wind and small-scale solar technologies. As the administrative patrons of renewable 
energy programs, regulators have some discretion to reinterpret what a policy means and how 
they choose to act (Yarrow, 1996). In other words, regulators can insert their own values in 
policy formation and shape the character of renewable technologies in terms they consider best. 
For wind energy, Aneel’s oversight of the transmission planning processes and the de-
contracting auction are two cases in which the regulatory agency ensured the long-term 
expansion of wind energy. In both situations, Aneel formed a collaborative partnership with the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy and key stakeholders to overcome regulatory challenges. 
However, since project developers frequently delay or abandon auction projects, enforcement 
has ensured the effectiveness of the auction process. While studies on improving auction 
implementation devote attention to design choices that can mitigate the non-delivery of projects, 
Aneel’s rigid approach to enforcing contractual obligations has improved the implementation of 
projects and, in turn, enhanced its own legitimacy within the electricity sector. 
Similarly, the absence of political interest in distributed generation has allowed regulators 
to steer the diffusion process. Since the transition to more small-scale generation technologies 
fundamentally questions the institutional arrangements and organizational stability of the 
electricity system, Aneel has used the iterative nature of the implementation process to gradually 
adapt regulations to this emerging technology. Electric utilities have strongly contested these 
changes, and Aneel has used the regulatory process to align its organizational interests with 
external groups and establish a supportive technological coalition. Similar to resolving regulatory 
problems with wind energy, the agency uses public consultation to collaborate with stakeholders 
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and gather information relevant to its decision-making. Public consultation also increases 
confidence in the regulatory process by allowing affected stakeholders to openly contribute to or 
























The Role of State Governments in Energy Transitions 
 
In previous chapters, I demonstrated the Brazilian government’s willingness to diversify 
the electricity supply with wind and solar energy. Against the backdrop of an electricity system 
shaped by large-scale hydroelectric power, the energy regulatory agency, Aneel, has devised 
regulatory strategies that promote non-hydro technologies. While regulations are often construed 
as barriers to technological change, Aneel has been a protagonist in building regulatory 
frameworks that ensure the development of wind and solar technologies.  
By employing a geographical lens, the aim of this chapter is to examine under what 
conditions states and regions engage in the development of wind and solar markets. The three 
states of Pernambuco, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Norte were selected as comparative case 
studies. The chapter begins by summarizing the administrative changes that have placed states in 
a more decentralized pattern of decision-making and energy planning. For each case, I 
systematically outline the state-level planning context and implementation processes that have 
facilitated or precluded policy developments in wind and solar. I then show how local actors and 
institutions interact in and coordinate policy processes. The main conclusion is that there is wide 
subnational variation in terms of how states develop policies that respond to their local energy 
and economic priorities. Consequently, while natural resource potential is important, it should be 





6.1. Decentralization and State-level Energy Planning 
State-level engagement with renewable energy governance has occurred within broader 
national shifts that have increased regional responsibilities for national policy and planning. The 
military dictatorship had limited the importance of federalism in Brazilian politics by 
constraining subnational governments' political and fiscal autonomy (Samuels & Abrucio, 2000). 
During the 1990s, the movement towards less government involvement in the economy had 
several implications for states. Many states had accumulated high debts, stemming from the use 
of state-level banks as loan agents. A national law consequently required that subnational 
governments control their public expenditures and indebtedness.40 While a focus on fiscal 
accountability initially limited state activities, the outcome of these measures was a reshaping of 
Brazilian federalism. States and municipalities were granted their own financial resources and 
administrative authority. In particular, subnational governments were to use tax resources and 
discretionary transfers to implement public policies (Soares & Neiva Pereira, 2011).  
In terms of fiscal policy, taxes are an important source of state revenue and tax 
exemptions can be used to attract energy-related businesses and investments. The development 
of local energy resources can present long-term economic development opportunities for a state, 
such as job creation and oil and gas royalties. Currently, a significant number of states have acted 
through the Brazilian tax code to exempt renewable energy generators from the ICMS 
(Merchandise and Services Circulation Tax), a state government value-added tax. The original 
imposition of the ICMS tax was blamed for the slow adoption of solar installations. São Paulo 
and Pernambuco were among the first states to provide this exemption. In 2015, the Brazilian 
Council for Financial Policy (CONFAZ), a department of the Ministry of Finance, approved the 
                                                          
40 The Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) in 2000 has become the cornerstone of this adjustment process. 
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exemption of ICMS for all states. However, states can still choose to opt out of exempting the 
tax.  
The decentralization of administrative responsibilities has still required provincial 
planning authorities to operate under national guidelines. In the case of constructing power 
facilities, energy businesses need formal and informal local consent for their developments (e.g. 
planning permits) (Smith, 2007). An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is required to 
address the potential social and environmental impacts of large energy projects. Many aspects of 
the environmental licensing process are decentralized to state and municipal governments. In 
2011, the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) drafted special regulations to standardize the 
licensing of wind farms. State governments are thus obligated to align their institutional 
understandings with federal provisions (Hochstetler, 2011). 
In addition, advocates of renewable energy can form partnerships with local actors and 
institutions to coordinate the diffusion of alternative energy technologies. Universities use their 
capacities in research and educational training to support technological advances and regional 
economic development. In this regard, universities in the Northeast have been experimenting 
with the development of wind and solar technologies since the 1980s, unlike universities in the 
Southeast which have focused on R&D for hydro and sugarcane biomass. Given their role in 
regional development policy, Northeastern universities have a strong incentive to build on these 
existing capacities when more resources and legitimacy are given to wind and solar. Wind 
manufacturers in particular have an interest in locating their production facilities nearest to wind 
energy markets, given the cost and infrastructural demands to transport large wind turbines and 
towers to site locations.  
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Finally, existing energy infrastructures can exert significant influence over how states 
develop and use energy. While regional energy transitions depend on the availability of sufficient 
resources for energy generation, infrastructures influence how energy sources can be exploited. 
For instance, large investments in the national electricity grid were intended to build out the 
country’s hydroelectric potential. Consequently, transmission planning focused on erecting an 
expansive, country-wide interconnection to enable the exchange of energy between regions, 
theoretically allowing the electricity system to draw on several river regimes and basins. This 
type of system, however, did not anticipate technological change and significant increases in 
non-hydro sources of energy. States which lacked the potential to generate hydroelectricity were 
often conceived as energy “recipients,” even though they possessed favorable wind and solar 
resources. In sum, the transmission infrastructure can be an important factor in mediating the use 
of physical resources and regional energy governance.  
The following state-level case studies highlight how different political, economic, and 
natural resource contexts influence how states frame their strategies in developing wind and solar 
resources. Since the first energy auctions in 2009, policy entrepreneurs in Pernambuco and Rio 
Grande do Norte have tested the potential of wind and solar when such energy sources were 
viewed as marginal by the national government. In São Paulo, similar initiatives have been 
eclipsed by the state’s drive to exploit offshore oil reserves and support the regional sugarcane 
industry. While not an instance of a “successful” case, state-level activities in São Paulo 
underline how well-established advantages in natural resources and regional priorities influence 


















Rio Grande do Norte 




6.2. Pernambuco  
The state of Pernambuco is located in the Brazilian Northeast, a poor region susceptible 
to periods of severe droughts. During the 1990s, with the movement toward privatization and 
less public sector involvement in the economy, the federal government began to withdraw its 
support of programs to support poverty alleviation, agriculture, and employment in the 
Northeast. Pernambuco and neighboring states had to seek new approaches to economic 
development based on establishing competitive advantages (Feferman, 2014). South of the 
Pernambucan capital of Recife, the Port of Suape is an industrial complex and an important 
logistical center. To foster a local petrochemical industry, the Abreu and Lima Petrobras refinery 
was constructed near the port in 2013 which has been hailed as the most modern and technically 
advanced refinery constructed in the country. Pernambuco produces approximately 70% of its 
electricity from diesel oil and natural gas, and has a moderate amount of installed capacity in 
wind and solar energy. 
The Governor’s Office and the Economic Development Secretariat (Sdec) are responsible 
for guiding energy policies and priorities in Pernambuco. Sdec, the state’s economic 
development agency, promotes industrial and commercial development by forming public-
private partnerships (Sdec, 2017). Previously, state electricity supply planning had prioritized 
building more fossil fuel-powered thermoelectric plants and potentially a nuclear plant. Recent 
governors have supported renewable energy projects, especially solar energy. Viewing hydro and 
wind as relatively mature technologies, one former Pernambucan governor, Eduardo Campos 
(2007-2014), was cited by several interviewees as having been a vocal supporter of a local solar 
industry which would create regional growth and a local manufacturing industry for renewable 
technologies (Sdec, Interviewe, July 12, 2017; Semas, July 13, 2017). The current governor has 
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continued political support by viewing renewable energy as part of a comprehensive plan to 
exploit the local economic benefits of energy projects. 
In devising energy policy for Pernambuco, the Executive Secretary of Energy, a division 
within Sdec, proclaimed its objective to consolidate the state as a generator of clean energy and 
productive pole for equipment, technology, and knowledge in the sector (Abinee, 2015). In 
collaboration with the Energy Secretary, the Pernambuco State Secretary of Environment and 
Sustainability (SEMAS) formulates and carries out environmental policies for the state 
government (SEMAS, 2017). SEMAS representatives have stated that their priority is to create a 
vision and strategies to transition to a low-carbon economy, an agenda that gained momentum 
following the Earth Summit 2012 on sustainable development held in Rio de Janeiro (Semas, 
July 13, 2017). With its strong focus on decarbonization, SEMAS oftentimes partners with the 
Energy Secretary on renewable energy projects.  
6.2.1. The implementation process in Pernambuco 
 
The initial efforts to incentivize solar energy within the state emerged as a partnership 
between the state government and the Energy Secretary at Sdec. Around 2012, then Executive 
Energy Secretary, Eduardo Azevedo (2010-2016), observed that Pernambuco had the potential to 
develop solar energy that was not being recognized at the federal level. Despite Brazil’s high 
levels of solar radiation, public policies for stimulating renewable energy sources, such as 
Proinfa, did not include solar energy. Compounding this issue was the Energy Planning 
Enterprise’s low estimates of annual added capacity for utilities-scale solar, which were 
insufficient to attract investors to build up the solar supply chain. For technology suppliers, the 
national auction system provides a pipeline of planned and approved projects on which they base 
their future operations. To feel secure about their investments, manufacturers were calling for a 
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guaranteed 1 GW of solar to be contracted per year for the next ten years. This departed from 
national planning targets to contract 3.5 GW within four years (MME, Interview, March 21, 
2017). In general, federal policymakers had low expectations for solar energy as a viable supply 
technology.  
State energy planners observed that they could provide guarantees for solar developers 
and manufactures that were not being adequately signaled by national-level plans. Policy 
supports, such as a state solar auction, could produce lower prices than what was being stated in 
official government figures. In December 2012, the EPE published a study which estimated that 
the average cost for solar energy in Brazil was around $US201 per MWh. According to the 
Energy Secretary, this price seemed unusually high, so he decided to conduct his own study. The 
calculations provided by the energy division at Sdec revealed that the price for solar was actually 
in the order of $US124 per MWh. With these new estimates in hand, he approached the state 
governor to convince him that solar energy could present opportunities for regional economic 
development. After initial conversations, the governor took on an important facilitating role in 
“opening doors” to support solar energy in the state (MME, Interview, March 21, 2017).  
 In December 2013, the first state-led auction in Pernambuco resulted in several 
successful policy lessons regarding the price and performance of the nascent solar market. The 
auction contracted the largest amount of solar energy in the country at the time, awarding six 
successful tenders which accounted for nearly 123 MW of solar projects. The resulting price, 
which was lower than the federal government’s estimates, contradicted the predominant view 
that solar power could not compete with conventional forms of power generation. This new price 
signal convinced federal policymakers to hold a reserve auction that included solar energy in 
2014. Other states also considered local auctions as way to attract investments in renewable 
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energy (Neves, 2015), although no new state-level auctions have been held.  41 The state solar 
auction in Pernambuco thus broke much of the political inertia and thinking surrounding the 
potential of utilities-scale solar. 
The experience gained from resolving the procedural issues which followed the first state 
auction encouraged energy policymakers to plan for large-scale solar energy. To manage the 
negotiation of energy contracts, the government of Pernambuco created its own power trading 
company, the Pernambuco State Economic Development Agency (AD Diper), linked to the State 
Secretariat of Economic Development (Sdec) and the national Electric Power Trade Board 
(CCEE).42 The purpose of the agency is to mediate between the purchase and sale of energy in 
state solar auctions under Brazil's unregulated market rules, which permit consumers to buy 
power directly from generators or traders through bilateral contracts. To absorb any excess 
electricity, public agencies in Pernambuco have been encouraged to migrate to the free market 
system managed by AD Diper. Public authorities and buildings are often large consumers of 
electricity through the operation of hospitals, schools, offices, and street lighting, and can 
stimulate demand for electricity generated from renewable energy sources. For example, the 
Convention Center of Pernambuco was the first to switch to the new system and receives 
electricity directly from the hybrid Tacaratu wind-solar plant. Sdec has begun to map 100 of the 
most energy-intensive buildings in the state, which it eventually hopes to bring into the free 
market for locally-produced renewable energy (MME, Interview, March 21, 2017; Sdec, 
Interview, July 13, 2017).  
                                                          
41 The state of Minas Gerais planned to hold a solar energy auction at the end of 2016. The states of São Paulo and 
Piaui have also expressed interest in hosting renewables-only auction, but have yet to taken any action. 
 
42 Following the example set by Pernambuco, the state of Parana created a power commercializer. However, it was 
eventually absorbed by Copel, the state distribution company. 
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Pernambuco also focuses on helping regional and international firms and businesses enter 
renewable energy supply chains to attract inward investment. According to one interviewee, the 
majority of businesses that decide to move to Brazil seek out state representatives to weigh the 
advantages and disadvantages of locating their operations in one state over another (MME, 
Interview, March 21, 2017). For instance, companies ask why they should go to Pernambuco 
rather than São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which are more widely known outside of Brazil as 
industrial and financial hubs. A part of the state’s entrepreneurial activities is leveraging the Port 
of Suape as an attractive hub for wind and solar manufacturing businesses. The Port of Suape has 
the advantage of geographical proximity to the Recife metropolitan region and is well-connected 
by interstate highways that allow manufactures to transport equipment to the main areas of high 
wind generation potential in the Northeast.  
The use of market-oriented policies for renewable electricity feeds into broader strategies 
for regional economic development. As an extra form of public support, the power trading 
company, AD Diper, buys electricity directly from wind, solar, biomass, and biogas plants and 
resells electricity at a competitive price for companies seeking to relocate to Pernambuco. The 
offer to provide cheaper prices for electricity and discounts on the ICMS tax is another attraction 
for companies, especially energy-intensive industries. These companies are also motivated to 
purchase renewable energy to improve their socio-environmental indicators and performance 
benchmarks for their stocks, many of which are publically traded on the New York and London 
stock exchanges (Sdec, Interview, July 13, 2017). The fact that AD Diper is part of Sdec has 




Finally, the state has created policies to overcome barriers to the local uptake of solar 
distributed generation systems. The national regulatory framework for distributed generation had 
initially resulted in a smaller number of installations than regulators had predicted. To encourage 
the use of small-scale PV solar systems, the Government of Pernambuco partnered with state 
agencies and government-owned development banks to create the PE Solar Program. The aim of 
the program is to provide local financing for residential consumers and business. Banco do 
Nordeste, a regional development bank responsible for economic development in the Brazilian 
Northeast, provided the initial resources for the program. With a grace period until the 
distributed generation system is running, the eight-year loans have competitive interest rates of 
4.5% to 7% – very low compared to interest rates for commercial loans of more than 50% a year. 
This program has generated learning about how to improve the payback period on small-scale 
solar PV systems. 
6.2.2. Supporting regional actors and institutions 
 
The competences of existing local economic and technological organizations have been 
further mobilized to build up the state renewable energy industry. The State Development 
Agency of Pernambuco (Agefepe) provides credit for small enterprises, cooperatives, and rural 
producers, and was given the task of administrating the project financing for the PE Solar 
Program. These programs are supported by the Secretariat of Small and Micro Enterprises, 
Work, and Qualification (SEMPETQ) which provides workforce training, and manages a 
professional network of solar energy installers and other solar-related services.  
At the scientific and technological level, several universities and research institutions 
have historically carried out R&D activities and installed local demonstration projects for 
renewable energy technologies. The Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) has pioneered 
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studies in photovoltaic technology since the 1980s and in wind energy since the early 1990s. The 
Brazilian Center for Wind Energy (CBEE) has worked independently as well as formed 
partnerships with the federal government to launch demonstration projects to test sensors and 
other instruments. The wind and solar energy industry are closely connected to Pernambuco’s 
universities. For example, the previous head of the Brazilian Center for Wind Energy, Everaldo 
Feitoso, left the Federal University system to create the largest investment company in wind and 
solar energy in Pernambuco, Eólica Tecnologia.  
Furthermore, in partnership with local distribution companies, Pernambuco has 
developed prominent demonstration projects for solar and wind energy. Notably, Fernando de 
Noronha, an archipelago of 21 islands off the coast of Pernambuco, is used by policymakers, 
researchers, and firms to learn about how to adapt new energy technologies to the islands’ unique 
characteristics. According to a representative of the State Environmental and Sustainability 
Secretary who works on developing projects in Fernando de Noronha (Interview, June 13, 2017): 
The Fernando de Noronha archipelago, which is where we are creating these projects, is  
really a concrete action plan. We have a partnership with the state government of  
California and the American Consulate so that we can better develop a low-carbon  
economy and transition process…Since it’s an isolated territory, this makes it possible to  
validate technologies along the line of sustainability and, when proven successful, these  
products, services, we can migrate them quickly to the continent. The island also is  
widely visible not only in Brazil, but globally, and can serve as a point of reference. 
 
Since the archipelago generates most of its electricity from diesel fuel, it presents an interesting 
site to test renewable technologies while improving local energy security. The first operational 
wind turbine in the country was installed on the island in June 1992 by the Wind Energy Group 
at UFPE, in conjunction with the Pernambuco Electric Company (CELPE) and Folkecenter, a 
Danish research institute. Electricity generated from the turbine accounted for around 10% of the 
energy generated on the island, which saved approximately 70,000 liters of diesel per year. A 
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second turbine was installed on the island in May 2000. Together, these projects have made 
Fernando de Noronha the home of the largest hybrid wind-diesel system in Brazil (Aneel, 2005). 
Since 2014, solar energy has come to supply about 4% of the island's consumption. The state 
government also intends to use wind and solar projects there to test energy storage technologies 
(Sdec, Interview, June 12, 2017). The state-owned generation company, The San Francisco 
Hydroelectric Company (Chesf), has also used R&D funds to build solar energy plants in sunny 
areas of the state’s interior (Chesf, Interview, July 13, 2017).  
6.2.3. Summary 
While Pernambuco has developed an innovative public procurement system to stimulate 
renewable energy, the program has run into several procedural issues. Only one project from 
Enel Green Power, the hybrid wind-solar plants located in the municipality of Tacaratu, was 
ready to start generating electricity within the original timeframe. The state environmental 
licensing process had caused delays that were prolonged by the issuing of federal operating 
permits. Furthermore, following the national reserve auction hosted by Aneel in October 2014, 
the states of Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte have surpassed Pernambuco in terms of planned 
installed capacity for solar energy. This second generation of solar projects has benefitted from 
policy lessons and changes in the expectations for utilities-scale solar energy that were first 
initiated in Pernambuco. The state’s initiatives prompted Aneel to introduce solar energy into 
future auctions and to design auction contracts that more strictly took into account access to 
transmission infrastructure to facilitate interconnection (Sdec, Interview, July 12, 2017). 
Distributed generation is an emerging technology which is also framed to address locally 
specific-problems. In Pernambuco, distributed generation takes on a more comprehensive role in 
Pernambuco’s solar policy agenda compared to other states.  
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In summary, the state’s energy planners have focused on testing and developing solar 
technologies at a time when federal policymakers had low expectations for it. Policy 
entrepreneurs have had considerable latitude in crafting a significant set of policies to foster a 
protective space for solar and wind energy.  The current Secretary in charge of the Energy 
Division at Sdec, however, has expressed reluctance to provide subsidies for solar energy, 
viewing solar as still relatively immature and expensive (Sdec, Interview, July 12, 2017). Despite 
the decrease in enthusiasm for creating special supports for solar in the energy planning division, 
the view of the state government administration is that these policies have become part of a more 
comprehensive vision to develop renewable energy and industry. This is reflected in an interview 
with a former State Secretary of Economic Development (PE, 2015): 
We can combine three important movements. First, we help the small and medium  
business owner reduce their electricity bill. Second, we have increased the use of  
renewable energies in the State, strengthening Pernambuco as a pole of development in  
this area. If we can expand that base by using many photovoltaic power plants in the  
state, the next step is to start building an industry base in the state that can provide such  
equipment. Thirdly, we fulfill our role in helping to expand the country's energy matrix. 
 
 
In Pernambuco, progressive solar energy policies eventually gained the support of other 
government agencies. Policy experiments conducted at the state-level have gradually evolved 
into shared expectations and practices for solar energy at the national level. The various 
demonstration projects in the Fernando de Noronha archipelago are held as a symbol of the 
state’s commitment to renewable energy and a low-carbon economy.  Local institutions, such as 
research groups at the University of Pernambuco and the local distribution company, Celpe, 
tested wind and solar technologies well before they were considered viable sources of electricity 
generation in Brazil. Their growing role in developing new renewable technologies has resulted, 
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in part, from the state government’s regional mandate to consolidate wind and solar into 
economic development. 
6.3. Rio Grande do Norte 
Rio Grande do Norte is in Brazil’s Northeastern Region at the eastern tip of the South 
American continent. The state’s geographical position and port infrastructure furnish it with an 
important position in terms of logistics for the wind industry in the Northeast. Rio Grande do 
Norte is the national leader in wind energy, representing approximately 32% of national installed 
capacity. Strong and stabilized trade winds, which blow in across the Atlantic from Africa, are 
responsible for the state’s favorable wind resources. The 2014 reserve auction attracted solar 
energy for the first time to the state (Aneel, 2018).   
Historically, Rio Grande do Norte has been an administrative center for the oil industry in 
the Northeast, being the third-largest state in Brazil in terms of oil production and the fifth for 
natural gas (MDIC, 2014). Located at Petrobras' industrial hub in the city of Guamaré, the 
Potiguar Clara Camarão Refinery produces diesel fuel, petrochemical naphtha, jet fuel and, 
automotive gasoline. While the state is a regional hub for oil extraction and processing, the state 
has relatively few thermoelectric plants that burn fossil fuels for electricity. Petrobras’s 
Northeastern operations located its oil refining facilities in Pernambuco in 2013 for political 
reasons (IFRN, Interview, July 27, 2017). Petroleum extracted in the state travels roughly 500 
kilometers southward to be refined in Pernambuco’s Abreu e Lima oil refinery. This effectively 
diminished Rio Grande do Norte’s capacity to generate electricity from its abundant oil deposits.  
Strategic energy planning is carried out in partnership between the Secretary for 
Economic Development (SEDEC) and the Center for Strategies in Natural Resources and Energy 
(CERNE), a third-party organization and think tank based in the state capital, Natal. With the 
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advent of Proinfa, the state government recognized the potential of wind power for regional 
economic development. In addition to being more labor-intensive than fossil fuel power 
generation, wind power could create jobs in wind park operation and construction as well as 
attract outside investors. SEDEC’s purpose is to facilitate the implementation process by 
ensuring a favorable investment environment. CERNE, managed by a staff with technical 
experience in the energy sector, mediates between private energy companies and the state 
government while providing market research on the Northeastern market (CERNE, Interview, 
July 20, 2017).   
6.3.1. The implementation process in Rio Grande do Norte 
The development of the state wind industry emerged in the context of a regional reliance 
on electricity imports. According to Aneel, until 2003, no power plants had been installed in Rio 
Grande do Norte and the state generated no electricity. The state was essentially a net energy 
importer located at the Northern tip of the national transmission system. A milestone for the 
state’s supply planning was the first operating wind farm inaugurated in the municipality of 
Macau in 2003. The electricity produced is transported through underground cables to power two 
oil platforms owned by Petrobras. Petrobras was thus an early actor in experimenting with wind 
energy for large-scale generation in the state. 
The history of wind power in Brazil is directly related to Rio Grande do Norte.43 In the 
early 2000s, the state began to create policies and regulations to introduce wind energy as an 
alternative form of centralized generation of electricity. Several interviewees cited Jean-Paul 
Prates as instrumental to shaping the nascent wind industry in the state. A former Petrobras 
                                                          
43 Ceará and Rio Grande do Sul are also considered “vanguard” states in wind power, constructing wind farms 
before the creation of a national auction system. For information on wind development in Ceará, see Gorayeb 
and  Brannstrom (2016).  
176 
 
engineer and founder of an energy consulting company, Prates acquired the sobriquet “the lone 
wolf” of the Brazilian wind industry (Sciaudone, 2010; CERNE, Interview, June 22, 2017). He 
observed that the state, which had no power plants, lacked the planning which could develop the 
state’s untapped wind resources. As an early believer in the development benefits of a regional 
wind sector, the governess of Rio Grande do Norte at the time, Wilma de Faria (2003-2010), 
created a Secretary of Energy especially for Prates to administrate the state’s energy-related 
issues. In 2010, a statewide budget cut eliminated the Secretary of Energy. To fill the void of a 
state-level representative to articulate the needs of the growing wind industry, CERNE, led by 
Prates, was created as a private entity to carry the role of a state energy division. This pattern of 
private sector leadership combined with state government backing has been characteristic of the 
wind energy sector in Brazil, and in Rio Grande do Norte.  
While the strong wind energy potential in the Brazilian Northeast had long been 
recognized, federal policymakers and planners thought that wind was too expensive and would 
never compete financially with hydropower and biomass. As Secretary of Energy at the time, 
Prates, along with representatives from Pernambuco, Ceará, and Rio Grande do Sul state in the 
South, challenged the government to create a technology-specific auction for wind energy. States 
with well-endowed wind resources wanted to prove that wind energy was a technologically 
viable option for long-term supply planning (Eólica Tecnologia, Interview, July 17, 2017).  
Furthermore, industrial interests in Rio Grande do Norte have drawn attention to the 
state’s willingness to consolidate a local manufacturing and industrial pole for wind energy. For 
turbine and wind equipment suppliers, regular auctions provide investment stability by providing 
a guaranteed pipeline of planned and approved wind projects. In addition to its high and reliable 
wind currents, the state is located in a strategic position between Ceará, Pernambuco, and 
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Paraiba, states that are also active in developing their wind energy potentials. In forming a 
coalition with CERNE, The Federation of Industries of Rio Grande do Norte (Fiern), which 
supports industrial and commercial development in the state, worked with neighboring states to 
attract wind industry manufacturers to supply the growing industry. Notably, before creating 
state solar polices at the Energy Secretary in Pernambuco, Sergio Azevedo presided over the 
Committee for Renewable Energy at Fiern. Until 2011, he worked alongside Jean-Paul Prates to 
expand the state’s incipient wind industry and attract international investors (MME, Interview, 
March 20, 2017).  
The realization of wind power potential also depends on the development of better 
infrastructure to move electricity from its point of generation in wind turbines to the point of 
consumer demand. While Rio Grande do Norte is the state with the greatest potential for wind 
power in terms of average wind speeds, the ability to export wind-generated electricity across 
state and regional lines is limited by the its unique position within the national transmission 
system. As previously mentioned, national energy planners conceived the state as a net importer 
of electricity, rather than an exporter, because its semi-arid climate prohibited it from developing 
hydropower. Consequently, the transmission and distribution networks did not extend to the 
areas where wind developers wanted to construct their projects. As another consequence, the 
Transmission System Use Tariff (TUST), comparable to a state “toll” paid by investors to 
transmit their electricity to the grid, made it more expensive for investors to generate electricity 
in Rio Grande do Norte. At the time, the state’s TUST charge varied between 2.57 and 2.89 
USD/MWh. In neighboring Ceará state, which also has wind energy potential, the tariff cost 
ranged from 1.59 to 1.90 USD/MWh (Moura, 2009). In sum, Rio Grande do Norte was impaired 
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in exporting renewable wind energy because of assumptions embedded in the original 
transmission system.  
The first “wind only” auction was organized by the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and 
Energy and Aneel in December 2009. To the surprise of the federal government, which had low 
expectation for wind energy, the final price was much lower than government estimates (Eólica 
Tecnologia, Interview, July 17, 2017). The auction’s initial price was 59.90 USD/MWh; the final 
average price was 46.95 USD/MWh, 21% less than the initial price (Bezerra et al., 2010). Wind 
also underpriced natural gas-fired power projects, where the price was USD 65/MWh for natural 
gas. Furthermore, the majority of contracted wind projects would be built in Rio Grande do 
Norte, representing 657 MW of the 1,805.7 MW of contracted electricity. These favorable 
auction results contradicted the view that wind power could not be fully competitive, and that it 
would need subsidies or special auctions rules for its insertion in the energy supply. As a result, 
wind energy advocates and investors argued for fix a regular schedule to include wind in energy 
auctions.  
Since wind energy secured a place in the auction system, the state government created 
conditions to facilitate the infrastructure planning and interconnection process and align Aneel’s 
contractual requirements with anticipated in-state investments. While Ceará state had already 
developed a local wind supply industry, Fiern and CERNE collaborated on a report for the 
recently elected governess, Rosalba Ciarlini, highlighting Rio Grande do Norte’s role in 
attracting businesses that could supply secondary products to the renewable energy industry, 
such as transformers and inverters. The partnership between Fiern and CERNE was an important 
impetus for developing the wind energy sector. It fell upon them to convince the new state 
government administration and legislature that wind could be a lucrative and viable industry 
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(CERNE, Interview, June 22, 2017. This union of industrial interests and energy investors was 
crucial to the beginning in securing a wider base of support for wind energy as well as sustaining 
political resources for CERNE in lieu of a state energy secretary.  
The first two rounds of wind energy-specific auctions doubled installed capacity in the 
state from 50MW to more than 1GW. In a few short years, Rio Grande do Norte became a net 
exporter of energy, supplying electricity to other Northeastern states. In particular, 2011 
represented a turning point for Rio Grande do Norte, where it became the largest state to 
generate electricity from wind energy. In that year, five wind parks were installed and began to 
operate commercially. Four more parks were installed in 2012 (Neto, 2015).  
Furthermore, Rio Grande do Norte has been active in adapting environmental regulations and 
licensing procedures to the technical specifics of wind projects. Over time, the Institute for 
Economic Development and the Environment (IDEMA) and The National Institute for Historical 
and Artistic Patrimony (IPHAM), state agencies in charge of environmental licensing, 
collaborated to simplify the often time-consuming and complex environmental licensing process 
(Hochstetler, 2011). In 2011, IDEMA created a department dedicated to carrying out the 
environmental licensing of energy projects. The Institute’s Wind Farms Division was carved out 
specifically to handle the rising influx of wind project licensing requests. The fact that the state 
has no hydroelectric plants and relatively few fossil fuel-powered thermoelectric plants has made 
it easier for the agency to focus on licensing wind projects and the few licensing requests for 
solar plants (IDEMA, Interview, July 21, 2017). Since wind energy has become critical to 
regional development, state governors have encouraged IDEMA to modernize its environmental 
licensing process to facilitate the development of wind projects (IDEMA, 2015).44 Interviewees 
                                                          
44 Interviewees from state environmental agencies asserted that the streamlining of environmental licensing 
procedures did not change the quality of wind projects. Critics of wind projects, however, argue that the wind 
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mentioned that they exchange environmental licensing practices with other states that have 
experienced significant growth in wind energy (IDEMA, Interview, July 21, 2017).  
While environmental licensing is often characterized as bureaucratic and time-consuming, 
representatives from IDEMA claim to facilitate the development of wind projects. According to 
interviewees, when a date for an energy auction is scheduled, employees focus their efforts on 
giving early licensing approval (IDEMA, Interview, July 21, 2017): 
We put in a big effort [before auctions], we extend our work hours, to make sure that 
everything happens on time….We have a conversation with investors here beforehand, we 
schedule meetings, so that they are already familiar with the type of study and they have 
already begun the process, precisely to shorten the time it would take to grant a license.  
 
These early interactions with investors ensure compliance with Aneel’s auctions rules in which 
candidate projects have to demonstrate that they are able to connect to a nearby high-voltage 
transmission line or distribution network. A close relationship with state environmental agencies 
also confers more credibility to a project’s viability, showing that it can be successfully 
implemented. An expedited environmental licensing process further supports the state’s 
economic and political priorities. Since wind energy has become a critical industry in the state, 
IDEMA has been encouraged by the state governor, Robinson Faria (2015-present), to 
modernize its environmental licensing process to facilitate the development of energy projects 
(IDEMA, 2015). IDEMA’s reflections on the environmental licensing process conform to 
preliminary interviews with representatives from the Secretary of Energy in Rio Grande do Sul 
state, who claimed to have attuned their administrative capacity to the state’s energy investment 
environment (RS SME, Interview, Sept. 23, 2016).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
industry often minimizes the environmental and social impacts caused by wind farms, which can lead to conflicts 
between wind developers and local communities. See da Costa (2016).  
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At the national level, regional actors have lobbied to attract international investments in 
renewable energy. Like Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte has been proactive in capturing 
businesses to build up the regional wind and solar supply chains. The state governor’s office has 
been eager to negotiate with international investors who have considered locating their 
businesses in the Northeast. In 2015, the Danish wind energy developer Vestas inaugurated a 
logistical center in Natal to supply equipment to its wind parks. Wobben Windpower, a German 
turbine company, created a wind tower factory near the city of João Câmara. The Chinese solar 
company Chint Electrics, the second largest manufacturer of solar panels in the world, set up a 
manufacturing center in the greater Natal metropolitan region instead of in Ceará state, another 
potential candidate (Governo do RN, 2017).  
By 2015, wind energy in Rio Grande do Norte had already received investments in the 
order of 7.42 billion USD. The implantation of a regional supply chain has generated 
employment and income for various classes of professionals, especially during the construction-
intensive phase of wind parks. In interviews with researchers, the long-term operational stage 
was criticized for having a much smaller team of technicians needed to monitor wind park 
operations (UFRN, Interview, July 27, 2017). The accrual of taxes to municipalities that house 
wind parks also significantly decreases once construction has ceased. Therefore, while the 
development of wind energy has brought investments and financial capital to the state, the 
distribution and long-term sustainability of economic benefits is smaller than industry leaders 
tend to suggest (da Costa, 2016; Wind Energy Developer, Interview, July 24, 2017). 
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6.3.2. Supporting regional actors and institutions 
Technological partnerships between industry and research institutions promote joint 
development and implementation of wind and solar-related activities in Rio Grande do Norte. 
The National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI), which is closely linked to the Brazilian 
Industry Federation (CNI), was the first organization to offer professional courses to qualify 
specialized technicians for the wind energy sector. Sharing its facilities in Natal with SENAI, 
Petrobras’s CTGAS-ER research and development center was part of the Brazilian government’s 
original effort to foster the natural gas industry in the country. The CTGAS-ER center has also 
steadily shifted its internal resources to carry out research in the field of renewable energy and is 
well-known in Brazil for its research laboratories (CTGAS-ER, Interview, July 24, 2017; Pires et 
al., 2013). Following the state’s participation in the first wind energy auctions, CTGAS-ER and 
SENAI sought out investors to learn what types of training and qualifications they were looking 
for in their employees. SENAI also has a cooperative arrangement with GIZ (Germany 
Corporation for International Cooperation), a German Development Agency, to analyze industry 
training needs and define occupational standards and training curricula.  
The Federal Institute of Science and Technology of Rio Grande do Norte (IFRN) has also 
undergone a transition to support workforce training and research in the renewables sector.45 
Wind and solar energy-related vocational courses were created when developing these 
technologies became significant industries in the state (IFRN, Interview, July 27, 2017): 
During the government of Fernando Henrique, the school had some financial 
problems…With the arrival of President Lula, he gave a new life to the institutes. That’s 
when expansion began to happen and we be began to evolve. These federal institutes 
continued to grow, the courses grew to meet the demand for local industry and productive 
arrangements. And there was also this question of creating corresponding programs for 
                                                          
45 The main campus of the IFRN trade school system was founded in 1909 in Natal, and presently has several 
campuses throughout the state. 
183 
 
energy. After a while we noticed that there was a demand to have professionals in the area of 
energy.  
 
Before the first wind energy auction in 2009, the school had been training technicians to meet the 
demand for labor in the local petrochemical and mining industry, providing courses in fields 
such as basic mechanics, geology, and electrical. For large-scale wind generators, the initial 
construction phase is civil engineering-intensive, requiring technical expertise in road 
construction, metalwork, and molding concrete for wind towers and bases. The Institute first 
concentrated on adapting its previous experience in related vocational areas to train technicians 
and specialists in infrastructure construction. Over time, the Institute created other courses that 
focus on the installation and maintenance of solar and wind technologies, installing solar PV 
systems on campus rooftops to generate electricity and allow students, professors, and research 
to conduct research. Professors and academics in the state also claim that the technical institutes 
are more involved in research and training in renewables than the Federal University of Rio 
Grande (UFRN), which is known to have a less hands-on and more theoretical focus in its 
engineering courses (IFRN, Interview, July 27 2017).  
6.3.3. Summary 
Rio Grande do Norte has been an important regional driver in consolidating the national 
wind energy sector. Different actors at the state-level have advanced ideas about alternative 
sources of energy which have been viewed with deep-seated skepticism at the federal level. 
Many oft-cited policy figures have worked within existing political and resource constraints to 
nurture ideas and coalitions that have led to the broader, national support of wind policies. Their 
task has been to persuade others that renewable energy is a vital component in the region’s 
development. Unlike Pernambuco, where the state governor demonstrated a strong, early 
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commitment to renewable technologies, wind advocates in Rio Grande do Norte had to convince 
state administrations and the state legislature of wind’s economic development potential. The 
state has also had to actively engage with the federal government. After persuading the 
government to schedule an auction for wind energy, state representatives became active in 
arguing for the siting of new transmission lines to facilitate the export of wind power to 
neighboring states. In effect, state officials and wind stakeholder have had to find ways to get 
around the inertia created by the broader political and technical system that has favored the 
development of hydroelectricity.  
Rio Grande do Norte’s involvement in wind and solar has been supported by regional 
research and training institutions. Place-based sources of knowledge and technological 
innovation have been important to the development of the national energy system. IFRN and 
CTGAS-ER have historically had a strong regional focus in their research and training, and have 
played a significant role in the regional transition to renewables. Within the Lula government’s 
broader shift to more redistributive policies, renewable energy-oriented vocational programs in 
Natal emerged to attend to the needs of the regional wind industry where graduates are often sent 
to work on energy projects across the country. Petrobras’s has also notably transformed its 
research and development units to involve renewable energy. Public agencies in charge of 
environmental licensing have also internalized the state’s entrepreneurial approach to renewable 
energy. Civil servants employed by these agencies maintain working relationships with investors 
to secure wind and solar projects in the state. 
6.4. São Paulo 
The state of São Paulo is situated in the Southeast where most of the country’s financial 
and commercial economic activities are concentrated. In addition to being the wealthiest region 
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in the country, accounting for 60% of national GDP, it has one of the highest numbers of 
installed residential and commercial PV systems (Aneel, 2017). This is due, in part, to high 
household incomes and the relative cost of electricity in the region. The energy mix for the state 
of São Paulo contains a considerable amount of renewable sources from small hydroelectric 
plants and biomass facilities. Sugarcane biomass in particular is responsible for 19% of state 
electricity production, and corresponds to 53% of installed capacity in biomass in Brazil (Investe 
SP, 2017). 
State energy planning is conducted in a partnership between the São Paulo Secretary of 
Energy and Mines (SEM) and the state political administration represented by the governor’s 
office. The São Paulo SEM was founded based on the concern that the state needed to redefine 
its energy model within the national context (Moraes & Simone, 2015). SEM is also in charge of 
hosting the State Committee for Energy Policy (Cepe), which is responsible for drafting the 
Energy Plan for the State of São Paulo. The Energy Plan defines the state’s long-term planning 
and public policy goals related to the energy sector. The compatibility of proposed measures is 
also evaluated in view of the State Policy on Climate Change (PEMC). The current Energy Plan, 
referred to as “PPE 2030,” is under revision, and will establish long-term state commitments to 
less polluting and carbon emitting energy sources. 
6.4.1. The implementation process in São Paulo  
The need to strengthen regional energy security in São Paulo has been an important 
driver in planning the state electricity supply. A reliable electricity supply is a critical issue for 
energy-intensive industrial activities that are of great importance to the Paulista economy (SP 
SEM, Interview, Dec. 8, 2016). As the state became more urbanized, and industry expanded 
from the 1930s onward, São Paulo became a net importer of electricity. The state draws about 
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63.8% of its electricity from the interconnected grid system. The strong dependence on 
hydroelectricity from far-way locations has worried energy policymakers in the state because of 
the increased risk of supply shortages, especially after periods of severe droughts that reduced 
the water levels of hydroelectric reservoirs and resulted in power rationing in the Southeast. With 
the depletion of the regional hydroelectric potential in the South and Southeastern states, state 
energy policymakers have been looking towards diversifying the regional energy supply to guard 
against future disruptions (SP SEM, Interview, Jan. 5, 2016; SP SEM, Interview, Dec. 8, 2016). 
In contrast to Northeastern states, policymakers in São Paulo emphasize that the state 
lacks the potential to develop wind and solar energy on a large scale. Instead, they are more 
interested in developing natural gas and the state biomass program.46 Massive undersea oil and 
gas deposits off of the state’s coast could potentially make it the second largest producer of oil 
and natural gas in Brazil. In addition, given its industrial background, São Paulo is the largest 
production of machinery and equipment for petroleum exploration. The extraction of the 
offshore deposits is beneficial for regional oil and gas companies, refineries, and equipment 
manufacturers. Representatives from the Secretary of Energy and Mines tend to draw attention to 
the economic development and environmental benefits of the state’s proposal to expand natural 
gas production. The increased use of natural gas, which, though not a renewable source of energy 
like wind and solar, is argued by public officials to be relatively clean, and the construction of 
natural gas-fueled power plants is argued to be less harmful to the environment than 
hydroelectric plants. Both the state government and the Secretary of Energy and Mines see 
natural gas as an ideal alternative fuel for high-efficiency thermoelectric plants, with lower 
pollution rates in comparison to diesel generators.  
                                                          
46 State energy planners have also expressed interest in using municipal waste for electricity generation and biogas. 
However, planning difficulties arise because the concession is authorized by municipalities, not the state 
government, so they have less room to act.  
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The increased use of sugarcane biomass and biogas in electricity generation would 
further support the regional sugarcane ethanol industry (Furtado, Scandiffio, & Cortez, 2011). 
São Paulo has the largest gas pipeline network in the country, transporting natural gas from 
Bolivia and from the Santos Basin off of the state’s coast, which it then redistributes to the 
neighboring states of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Paraná. There are currently 201 
cogeneration plants which operate in São Paulo, 66 of which are 20 km away from the state gas 
network. A part of the plan is to inject the biogas from these plants into the gas network. The 
SEM also contends that the use of biomass and biogas also has important synergies for the 
transport sector. The trucks that transport the sugarcane into the cane fields could run on 
biomethane, transforming them into flex-fuel vehicles. Simultaneous investments in biomass and 
biogas are thus characterized as complementing natural gas investments as a “bridge fuel” on the 
path to more low-carbon and renewable energy sources. 
In light of the state’s natural gas potential, state policymakers are less committed to 
developing solar and wind energy. While annual levels of solar irradiation are high in the state, 
between 5.61 and 5.70 kWh/m²/day (SEM, 2013), many policymakers claim that the current lack 
of storage technology combined with lower solar irradiation rates in comparison to more 
Northern states, make solar energy less ideal for utilities-scale generation in São Paulo. The 
recent deployment of solar photovoltaic and wind power plants near existing hydroelectric plants 
is considered a way to test the complementarity between the two energy sources. State energy 
planners underscore the energy efficiency and technical gains from wind and solar while playing 
down their use for large-scale renewable energy deployment.  
Similarly, the use of small-scale distributed solar generation systems is framed primarily 
as reinforcements for broader goals of regional energy security and efficiency.  In Southern 
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Brazil, where electricity tariffs are high, locating small-scale systems near areas of consumption 
provides additional security and precludes the need for transmission infrastructure (SP SEM, 
Interview, Dec. 8, 2016). Like the state of Pernambuco, government officials in São Paulo have 
been working with public agencies to integrate distributed generation systems in their public 
building operations. Cogeneration systems, energy storage, and a solar photovoltaic power plant 
have been installed at the Butantan Institute, the largest producer of vaccines in the southern 
hemisphere, and the hospital complex of Hospital das Clínicas. The Secretary of Energy and 
Mines has also worked with the local distribution company, Cesp, to install solar distributed 
generation systems in the Villa-Lobos and Cândido Portinari municipal parks in the city of São 
Paulo. Unlike the market-oriented approach of Pernambuco, however, these projects are demand-
side measures to improve efficiency in energy-intensive public infrastructure. Small-scale 
systems are depicted as a supplementary benefit to the overarching mission of regional energy 
security while providing economic benefits in terms of building up the regional supply chain in 
solar manufacturing and installation. 
6.4.2. Supporting regional actors and institutions 
Interestingly, state policymakers claim to be less active than their Northeastern peers in 
terms of attracting firms to the regional renewable energy market. According to one interviewee 
involved in public project financing, São Paulo is often seen as a natural choice for international 
firms interested in investing in Brazil. The quality transport and energy infrastructure and 
proximity to a large capital goods market are sufficient for companies to decide to locate their 
operation in the region (DesenvolveSP, Interview, June 28, 2017). GE Renewable Energies and 
Wobben Windpower have two of their major factories in São Paulo and supply wind energy 
turbines and related equipment to the Southern and Northern wind markets. State officials 
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consider wind and solar manufacturing industries as a boost to economic development (Calixto, 
2014), but view their role as maintaining a favorable investment environment vis-à-vis the 
prerogatives of the Secretary of Energy and Mines.  
Lastly, São Paulo hosts the country’s leading research institutes and universities which 
conduct research and development in energy. Representatives from the industrial sector and 
science and research sectors are frequently invited to advise statewide energy planning efforts. 
Many of these representatives are policymakers and researchers who focus on sugarcane 
cultivation and ethanol production, such as the Federation of Agriculture of the State of São 
Paulo (Faesp) and researchers from the state’s public universities. In particular, the São Paulo 
Research Foundation (FAPESP) is a public taxpayer-funded research foundation and a national 
leader in R&D for sugarcane cultivation. FAPESP’s Bioenergy Research Program aims to 
promote ethanol technologies, allotting public resources to sustain São Paulo’s regional 
commitment to bioenergy, primarily from sugarcane (FAPESP, 2017). 
6.4.3. Summary 
In summary, growing concerns about supply reliability have prompted policymakers to 
develop long-term strategies for energy. In formulating a response to meet state electricity 
demand, they strategically downplay the natural resource potential of wind and solar. The 
discovery of the pre-salt oil reserves has placed pressure on state policymakers to promote 
natural gas and potentially biogas. This is made clear by a Secretary of Energy and Mines 
representative: 
So, this is the paradigm that we have to confront. On the one hand, we have a gigantic  
potential of pre-salt coming in. It would be unfair to not use this fuel that has a very low  
price to leverage our development. So, this is the great challenge that we have at the  
moment – to find an  equilibrium point so as not to compromise our matrix which is  
comprised of renewables, but also not to compromise our economic development.  
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Because there are no other cheaper sources than natural gas. This is our great challenge.  
 
 
The long-term energy planning challenge is framed as a tradeoff between exploiting the pre-salt 
potential while also stimulating the renewable energy base. São Paulo policymakers are aware 
that the state’s undersea deposits can lead to local profits for the state government in terms of tax 
revenue, royalties, and job creation, and have attempted to reframe their energy supply strategies 
in ways that do not ostensibly undermine the state’s climate change goals and environmental 
image. Interviewees also concede that a natural gas expansion can also have substantial negative 
effects, perhaps enough to offset its expected benefits, given the large amount of carbon dioxide 
emissions that are estimated to be present in these fields (Almeida, et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, due to the high potential of sugarcane biomass and biogas in São Paulo, the 
state’s energy transition was strongly conditioned by energy infrastructure projects and regional 
energy generation. The state’s commitment to biomass and biogas for electricity generation 
demonstrates the contextualized way in which resources are negotiated as politically compatible 
with strategic priorities at the regional level. The sugarcane industry induces a certain degree of 
path dependency, being a mature technology that has been historically favored. This regional 
lock-in has created inflexibility when faced with a need to adapt to changing energy supply 
circumstances or considering other socially-beneficial technological options to generate 
electricity.   
6.5. Conclusions 
In general, state governments have exercised relative autonomy to set policy agendas and 
intervene in the broader market formation of solar and wind technologies. In particular, 
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policymakers and policy entrepreneurs draw on regional resource endowments, institutional 
capacities, and industrial bases in ways that structure the renewable energy options available.  
The policy environment at the national level has recognized state-level participation in 
energy planning and the development of renewable energy projects. For example, the current 
administration at the Ministry of Mines and Energy is distinguished by a greater effort to interact 
with state governments, especially for the siting of long-distance transmission lines for wind 
energy projects (MME, Interview, March 20, 2017). The fact that governors and politicians in 
the Northeast now directly engage in lobbying for the scheduling of regular auctions for wind 






















“Indeed, if technology is understood in its broad sense - as not just hardware or  
equipment or sprockets or chips, but as any device or system for converting inputs  
into outputs, for changing the production function - then regulation is itself a 
technology…Regulation is the technology of governance.” 
 




Over the past decades, the trend in energy regulatory reforms has been toward 
privatization and greater efficiency. This restructuring strategy frames regulators as apolitical 
entities managing the electricity sector. Within this context, regulatory bodies are understood as 
strictly economic institutions that are not to become involved in social or environmental 
concerns. That is, any concern that deviates from the goal of improving competition and 
managing regulated industries is seen as outside the purview of regulators. Such deviation would 
undermine the standard model for electricity reform by ostensibly reducing efficiency, burdening 
regulated industries, and discouraging private investors.  
Moreover, while deregulation and market-oriented reforms imply that the lowest-cost 
technologies should supply electricity, this logic overlooks that fact that new energy technologies 
must compete with well-established systems. In this way, entrenched energy systems and 
associated institutional frameworks often prevent the adoption of potentially superior 
alternatives. Incumbent energy technologies operate by leveraging economies of scale and 
thereby make entry into the industry difficult for potential new actors. They further co-evolve 
with institutions and social practices that build, manage, and sustain them. As societal 
preferences change over time, pre-existing technologies, which were built around a set of 
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assumptions concerning appropriate ways to supply and consume electricity, might not be able to 
meet emergent social and policy objectives. In this light, renewable energy policies have been 
developed to stimulate new technological offerings that address growing concerns about energy 
security and climate change. 
While industrialized and industrializing countries have focused their efforts to replace 
carbon-intensive energy sources, few insights have been generated concerning the relationship 
between the transition to more renewable energy systems and the underlying regulatory and 
institutional framework. Instead, public support for renewable energy has centered on 
subsidizing new technologies and reducing their costs in relation to conventional sources of 
generation. While regulations are recognized as defining the “rules of the game,” the academic 
literature on technological innovation has characterized regulations as market barriers that 
reinforce the status quo. Technology and regulation are posed as adversaries (Wiener, 2004). 
Similarly, but from another view, in popular discourse regulations manifest as “red tape” and 
administrative hurdles that a persevering private sector must overcome (Mazzucato, 2013). In a 
free market context, regulations inhibit businesses’ innovative edge and competitiveness, rather 
than encourage technological innovation. 
This dissertation contributes a critical perspective to our understanding of the relationship 
between market-oriented reforms and the adoption of renewable energy. Despite having 
privatized its energy sector and established independent regulatory agencies, Brazil has not 
abandoned social and environmental concerns in the electricity sector. Looking inside the world 
of energy regulators, this dissertation research shows how the regulatory process bears directly 
on renewable energy deployment. While both policymakers and regulators emphasize Aneel’s 
role as a neutral arbiter, the energy regulatory agency has an instrumental place within 
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policymaking. In making policy through regulating, Aneel develops procedures that respond to 
its organizational needs for authority and legitimacy. This case shows that energy auctions and 
net-metering regulations for wind and solar energy illustrate how regulators ensure compliance 
and assert their authority in ways that enable, rather than hinder, the development of these 
technologies.  
Furthermore, state governments have identified economic and political benefits in 
deploying non-hydro renewable energy technologies. They have created a number of initiatives 
to encourage new technologies and facilitate the effectiveness of federal energy auctions to 
ensure that wind and solar energy develop within their borders. This analysis thus provides a 
more encompassing explanation of wind and solar development than alternative accounts which 
merely focus on favorable natural resource conditions and federal incentives. 
Since regulatory agencies tend to draw attention to their detached, technical façade when 
officially discussing politically sensitive decisions (Dubash & Rao, 2008), finding out what 
regulators actually do is not a simple task. I had the rare opportunity to access key actors 
involved in energy planning in Brazil. By talking with state-level policy-makers, I was able to 
trace how more “local” processes have influenced federal decision-making and how state 
responses are conditioned by national policies, or their absence.  
7.1. Electricity Market Reforms and Renewable Energy 
7.1.1. Understanding Regulatory Governance for Renewable Energy Development 
Brazil continues to invest in large hydropower dams, but intense droughts have 
convinced successive governments over the last fifteen years that there is a need to diversify the 
country’s energy resources. The uncertainty about the performance of the country’s hydrological 
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resources has provided an opening for wind and solar technologies. In this sense, Aneel is an 
innovative and responsive actor with an active role in reshaping the energy supply. Energy 
regulators have devised lines of regulatory action that target different facets of the well-
established hydroelectric system, carving out an opening for wind and solar energy within the 
broader policy context.  
This study’s focus on the socio-technical qualities of wind and solar energy shows how 
existing arrangements in the electricity sector influence the development paths of new, 
alternative energy technologies. In this regard, technological compatibility with the existing 
system greatly influenced political decisions about energy supply. Specifically, policymakers 
framed a technology’s suitability based on how it relates to hydroelectric power. Owing to its 
intermittency, wind energy is widely promoted as a superior complement to the underlying 
hydropower base. Over time, successive wind auctions have reduced its costs and allowed the 
government to learn about the technical characteristics of wind power (Arthur, 1988), further 
reinforcing the notion among policymakers that wind energy is an ideal alternative. In contrast to 
wind power, energy technologies that do not fit with the existing infrastructure have had less 
political sponsorship. In the case of solar energy, the Brazilian government has yet to release a 
clear statement of policy. Brazil has high average levels of solar irradiation, and technology costs 
have fallen, but the government’s public position on solar energy (or lack thereof) has prevented 
the deployment of photovoltaic technologies. The planning problem for energy diversification is 
thus one of materiality (Beauregard, 2015), where the pre-existing hydroelectric infrastructure 
actively frames decision-making about the energy supply, although the political discourse is 
typically framed in terms of costs.  
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Reframing wind and solar energy policies as implementation issues shows that regulators 
base their support for these technologies on criteria or rationale different from those of most 
policymakers or advocates. As previously noted, current energy regulators’ education and 
experience have made them receptive to alternatives to hydroelectric technologies in comparison 
to their predecessors. While regulators expressed intellectual and professional interest in 
renewable technologies during interviews (Aneel, Interview, March, 20, 2017; Aneel, Interview, 
September 19, 2017), policy preferences were insufficient to explain their motivation and efforts 
to enforce wind and solar policies. Rather, the regulatory process and shared control over 
electricity issues shaped regulators’ implementation strategies. This explanatory theory accounts 
for why Aneel prioritizes its resources and regulatory activities to ensure the development of 
wind and solar energy, even when there is no pre-existing policy and when political support and 
resources have waned.  
The regulatory environment structures the extent to which energy regulators interpret 
policies and how they engage with regulated interests. In the Brazilian electricity sector, 
policymakers and the regulatory agency make and implement policy. The MME and Aneel share 
the day-to-day governance of the electricity sector, where Aneel is officially subordinate to the 
MME. In practice, Aneel has expanded its authority over several policy areas and interacts 
closely with market participants. To maintain their authority, regulators must fight over 
jurisdiction with other agencies and interests. The MME and incumbent administrations have 
administrative power, but the capacity to effectively govern the electricity sector is contested. 
Since the quality of rules and regulations becomes a crucial condition for judging effectiveness 
(Schmelzle, 2011), Aneel’s approaches toward enforcement and collaborative rule-making 
attempt to reinforce its legitimacy and claims to authority. In other words, the regulatory 
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agency’s struggle to prove that it is consequential for good outcomes is a core process that 
governs the electricity system. This has several implications for renewable energy development.  
For wind energy, an auction’s success is judged based on immediate results, namely if it 
lowers the price of electricity. However, delayed or abandoned wind projects are prevalent and 
frequently lead to high transaction costs. These costs are only revealed after an auction has 
occurred and political leadership has taken credit for the auction’s initial low prices and sector 
growth. In this context, policy enforcement has emerged as a proxy for quality in administering 
auction schemes. The Ministry of Mines and Energy is responsible for scheduling auctions, but 
Aneel achieves the goals that auctions were designed to accomplish–the delivery of wind energy 
projects. That is, the MME plans for new renewable capacity, but Aneel ensures that that 
capacity is actually developed, which is not a given. By taking a strict approach to enforcing 
contractual obligations, the regulatory agency reconciles competing political interests with its 
brand as a policy enforcer and collaborative decision-maker. Aneel’s strategy for contract 
enforcement improves the implementation of wind projects, but also communicates to private 
developers that they must be able to deliver projects if they wish to participate in auctions. The 
fact that regulators have indicated their willingness to bar non-compliant developers from future 
auctions allows the agency to secure its regulatory objectives (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). In 
addition to auction design elements, regulatory behavior attempts to address the risk of unwanted 
strategic behavior and avoid non-implementation of projects. 
At the same time, the agency’s interpretation of its mandate and the public interest 
motivate its implementation strategy. The agency makes judgments about what constitutes 
legitimate reasons to provide flexibility for project developers, but maintains its posture as an 
enforcer of contracts. This rigid approach, in comparison to other political actors in the 
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electricity sector, demonstrates its intolerance for project developers that are unable to develop 
their hard-won auction concessions, thus compromising the public use of scarce resources. 
Considering the jurisdictional picture, such an approach is also meant to defend the agency’s 
authority in cases where its powers or autonomy have been impeded.  The desire to defend its 
authority and enforce its priorities is translated into strategies that the regulator uses to attain 
good regulatory outcomes. Ensuring that private sector actors fulfill their contractual obligations 
is not a straightforward procedure, but depends on how regulators signal their willingness to take 
action and engage in enforcement (Kovaic, 2015). In sum, when safeguarding jurisdiction and 
policy objectives are aligned, the effect is a more credible wind sector that signals a low 
tolerance for less “serious” bidders.  
The implementation of auctions also provides opportunities to learn about how to 
coordinate the expansion of generation and transmission. The regulator’s case-by-case handling 
of wind projects revealed that the closing price for wind energy in future auctions would have to 
incorporate transmission planning, rather than assume that transmission lines would be ready to 
connect constructed projects. While the regulated wind industry criticized Aneel’s decision to 
make project developers responsible for future delays causes by transmission, the regulator 
viewed its decision as responding to information that was previously unavailable. In effect, the 
regulator was accounting for information and risks that were not reflected in the low auction 
prices. Energy auctions thus serve as learning processes where successful and unsuccessful 
examples are incorporated into future auction designs. Policymakers in charge of designing 




Furthermore, the case of small-scale solar energy illustrates how regulators create and 
shape markets for renewable energy. The absence of government policy for solar energy has 
provided a space for Aneel to take a more proactive approach toward small-scale generation 
systems. In the case of distributed generation, Aneel has taken the role of conductor in the niche 
development process, using a gap in policy action to gain authority over an emerging policy area. 
Rather than developing distributed generation systems through a feed-in tariff, which would have 
required the involvement of other public authorities, Aneel opted for a net-metering scheme. 
This allowed the agency to develop distributed generation regulations within its jurisdiction and 
without formal subsidies. With each revision of the net-metering framework, Aneel identified 
and changed regulations and standards, gradually making space in the centralized generation 
system for smaller distributed generation systems. The nature of the regulatory process has 
allowed Aneel to take an adaptive approach to implementation, adjusting net-metering 
regulations over time as new information became available.  
Aneel’s prioritization of distributed generation and wind energy extends into other 
aspects of its regulatory activities. In addition to creating and modifying rules, Aneel has 
selectively used its R&D programs to support solar and wind energy, demonstrating its 
commitment to developing both technologies. Aneel attempts to anticipate how the regulatory 
framework will need to adapt to technological change. Rather than choosing to stay behind 
technological change, regulators are responsive to shifting market conditions. In essence, the 
regulatory process is where new technological choices confront the incumbent electricity system. 
The incorporation of small-scale solar technologies, which deviate from a planning model 
that has favored large-scale hydroelectric power, could critically alter the electricity grid. 
Distributed generation presents an innovative change to the regulatory structure as it significantly 
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challenges the traditional electric utility business model and how the grid is planned and 
operated. By taking the lead on distributed generation, Aneel’s regulatory procedures and public 
hearings have realigned actors into coalitions that support distributed generation. In advocating 
for distributed generation, these alliances present new visions of what they see are economically 
and politically appropriate ways to generate electricity. In the Brazilian context, small-scale solar 
energy systems are framed as benign alternatives to large-scale hydroelectric generators and 
thermoelectric plants. Since they remain in the decentralized control of consumers, distributed 
generation technologies embody a more ethical vision of producing electricity compared to 
large-scale hydroelectric projects that the Brazilian government and private construction 
companies often built in environmentally vulnerable areas. 
Regulatory activities will differ from what the designers of policy expect, and knowledge 
of this fact causes consternation and allegations of regulatory “capture” and private agendas 
(Wilson 1989; Lin, 2002). Indeed, this tension between rules and discretion underlies the debate 
on the design of regulatory agencies (Sitkin & Bies, 1994). A perennial concern is that flexibility 
and discretion may lead to enforcement that reflects regulators’ personal objectives, rather than 
the goals of regulation (Stigler, 1971). Framing regulation as policy implementation, however, 
draws attention to the activity of those excluded or absent from traditional fora of policymaking 
(Yanow, 1996). What a policy actually is, therefore, is as much about context as it is about 
original intent. In the electricity sector, the context is about earning legitimacy in governing 
market participants. 
The implementation of renewable technologies, therefore, requires an understanding of 
the regulator’s organizational context. Under certain conditions, regulatory politics can have 
positive implications for renewable energy policies. The relative “unease” that exists between 
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public authorities that co-manage the electricity sector has created an environment that motivates 
Aneel to affirm its position in ways that support wind and solar. This understanding recasts the 
debate about the purpose of regulations in energy transitions: policy attention needs to focus on 
cultivating regulatory strategies and not just deploring regulatory barriers. The transition to 
renewable energy can either be undermined or facilitated by how regulators conceive of their 
role in supporting renewable technologies. In situations where renewable technologies are at 
odds with vested interests embedded in the institutional and physical infrastructure, regulatory 
strategies may be a fundamental source for structural change.  
7.1.2. Governing Energy Transitions and Regional Economic Development 
The cases of São Paulo, Pernambuco, and Rio Grande do Norte point to a number of 
factors that explain how states pursue different energy policies, and how renewable energy 
policy interacts with natural resource endowments. First, referring back to Rabe’s (2008) basic 
framework for understanding a state’s motivations to engage in environmental policy-making, 
these findings suggests that these state governments are primarily driven by opportunities for 
economic development and regional energy security. State renewable energy policies are often 
proposed with explicit goals for job creation and industrial development (Rabe, 2004a). Pre-
existing infrastructures, such as road networks and ports, are local advantages which contribute 
significantly to attracting businesses to locate in certain regions. In Pernambuco and Rio Grande 
do Norte, well-developed port infrastructure and the industrial complexes that have formed 
around them have been repurposed for wind and solar energy fabrication plants that wish to be 
more strategically located in relation to the Northeastern energy market. Since state governments 
want to ensure that these potential benefits are borne out within their jurisdictions, this dynamic 
can result in inter-regional competition for the renewable energy economy (Stokes, 2013). For 
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example, state governors in the Northeast are now known to travel internationally to attract 
renewable energy technology manufactures to their regions (Tribuna do Norte, 2017).  
Furthermore, regional energy security and self-sufficiency were cited as common 
planning goals across interviews. Many state governments depend on importing electricity and 
are consequently vulnerable to the reduced water levels of hydroelectric reservoirs in other 
locations. The hydro-based electricity system is operated centrally, but the national transmission 
system creates supply risks and elevated electricity prices that are often shouldered regionally. 
As a result, states such as São Paulo and Rio Grande do Norte have taken more active measures 
to mitigate their energy insecurity. Thus, a lack of electricity generation at the regional level 
cannot be fully explained by a lack of natural resource endowments, but by how states have 
become embedded in the national transmission system that was planned around hydroelectric 
expansion. 
This is not to suggest that environmental considerations do not factor into statewide 
energy decision-making. In fact, in Pernambuco there is a strong coalition of public officials who 
support renewable energy on both environmental and economic grounds. Pernambuco’s diesel 
and natural gas-fired plants were traditionally regarded as a regional economic advantage. Yet, 
fossil fuels became problematic after a state governor took a more resolute approach to 
mitigating climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, while being eager to seize the 
economic development advantages of early involvement in solar energy. Given its institutional 
focus on cultivating a low-carbon economy, the Secretary for Environmental and Sustainability 
has also been enthusiastic about renewable energy policies in the state. In contrast, in Rio Grande 
do Norte, policy entrepreneurs and wind advocates have accentuated the economic development 
benefits of stimulating wind energy with any environmental improvements from greenhouse gas 
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reduction “framed” as supplemental benefits. While concerns for the environmental and climate 
change come into play, the promises and opportunities for economic development and improving 
supply planning have been dominating factors in regional approaches to renewable energy. 
Second, decisions to promote non-hydro sources of energy that were seen as marginal at 
the national levels have often originated from individual actions. In all three cases, policy 
“entrepreneurs” as well as commitment from state politicians are crucial drivers in regional 
energy transitions (Hauber and Ruppert-Winkel, 2012; Hecher et al., 2012). A handful of energy 
civil servants and professionals were repeatedly mentioned when interviewees were describing 
the origins of certain programs and policy processes. As one interviewee from a diplomatic post 
explained about renewable energy activities: “Forward-thinking policies in Brazil depend on 
certain people and resources” (U.S. Gov., Interview, July 19, 2017).  In the cases here, a few 
ambitious policymakers with professional experience in the energy sector drove the initial stages 
of policy formulation. Given their professional networks and backgrounds, they were often well 
positioned to see opportunities for new policy and to safeguard political support for their ideas 
(Rabe, 2004). Policy entrepreneurs in these states have tailored policies to the political and 
economic realities of their particular settings and have built coalitions. While state government 
administrations often depend on small staffs to carry out their day-to-day administrative 
activities, they often act on the information and persuasion of policy entrepreneurs to redirect 
their administrative capacities to facilitate the regional uptake of renewable energy, especially 
when broader economic development opportunities are identified. 
Third, while some regions have better access to renewable energy resources than others 
(e.g., wind speed, solar irradiation), resource potential and capacity interact with the contextual 
conditions in which renewables are developed and deployed. As De Laurentis, Pearson, and 
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Eames (2016) observe, although these resource assessments are presented by policymakers as 
essentially “objective,” they are strongly influenced by the purposes of the assessment and the 
actors involved. In São Paulo, for instance, state officials tend to publicize the advantages of 
natural gas as a clean and locally-produced source of energy that can simultaneously stimulate 
sugarcane-derived bioenergy. At the same time, they deflect any criticism for espousing an 
energy path which relies on a non-renewable source of energy. Yet, São Paulo’s focus on 
stimulating the natural gas and sugarcane biomass industries at the expense of deploying wind 
and solar is not an inevitable outcome. For example, the state of Texas is the largest producer of 
wind power in the United States, but is also a global hub for oil and gas development (Rabe, 
2004a, p. 49; Zarnikau, 2011). Consequently, the way that state policymakers frame energy 
issues and economic development priorities is an important aspect of guiding choices among 
different energy futures (Rabe, 2004a, p. 31). 
The absence of infrastructure can further influence investments in new energy 
technologies. The lack of an advanced oil refinery is one reason which prohibited the state of Rio 
Grande do Norte from generating electricity from fossil fuels. Furthermore, some of the windiest 
states are serviced by grids that cannot support large inputs from wind farms. Since the National 
Interconnected System was intended to expand the nation’s hydropower potential, energy 
planners had assumed that Rio Grande do Norte would remain a net importer of electricity. With 
the successive scheduling of renewable auctions, the high penetration of wind energy in the state 
has highlighted the importance and challenges of strategic investments in transmission and 
distribution networks. In response to difficulties in building transmission lines, a number of 
states with less suitable physical features for wind power have attempted to develop their own 
wind sources. In a similar manner, the transmission system has also affected the expansion of 
205 
 
large-scale solar in Pernambuco, an early promoter of solar energy. There are currently few pre-
existing transmission lines that connect to areas of high solar irradiation located in the state’s 
interior. Because of interconnection and transmission issues, the states of Bahia and Rio Grande 
do Norte have surpassed Pernambuco in terms of planned installed capacity for solar energy. 
Fourth, the regional energy context needs to be understood in terms of wider institutional, 
economic, and governance dimensions. In this regard, these findings have a significant 
theoretical and conceptual overlap with economic geography and studies of regional innovation 
systems (De Laurentis, Pearson, & Eames, 2016; Mattes, Huber, & Koehrsen, 2015), which 
emphasize how energy transitions are shaped by different individual and organizational actors as 
well as institutions. For instance, prior investments in knowledge formation may be redirected 
towards emerging technologies (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). Science and technology 
institutions, universities, and distribution companies that engage in R&D and technical training 
may allocate more resources for renewable technologies as they become increasingly 
consequential to regional development. In this view, existing regional capabilities can be 
mobilized through the purposive actions of agents, resulting in the wider development, diffusion, 
or, in the case of São Paulo, devaluing of a technology (Kemp et al., 1998). 
The importance of regional institutions is evident when considering the rapid 
development of wind and solar energy in the Northeast. While São Paulo has a central role in 
Brazil’s political and economic system, Northeastern states have had an advantage in state and 
federal universities and institutions that have supported research, development, and job training 
in wind and solar technology since the 1990s. According to a former university professor turned 




…Brazil is a little atypical. Everything revolves around São Paulo. But, for example, 
from Rio to São Paulo, nobody understands wind energy. For all that they have, for all of 
the university institutions, it is difficult to find people that really understand the context 
of an aerodynamic project, structurally, to really understand it. One of the strong points 
of Pernambuco is the Federal University. University is knowledge, and from there you’re 
able to develop projects.  
 
Research on the connections between institutions and economic development has pointed to the 
role of universities in technological innovation and local and regional development. Universities 
and educational institutions become “task-oriented,” taking on specific tasks such as greater 
technology transfer, more patenting, and visible employment (Srinivas & Viljamaa, 2008). 
Universities in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte had already built regional expertise in 
wind and solar before state policy-makers decided to push for wind and solar in large-scale 
electricity production. These well-established specializations allowed university initiatives to 
follow once these “new” energy sources gained legitimacy nationally and were consolidated into 
regional development strategies (Srinivas & Viljamaa, 2008). While national investment and 
innovation are typically associated with São Paulo, and to a lesser extent Rio de Janeiro, “less 
favored” regions have developed technology policies and training to attend to regional wind and 
solar markets.  
Lastly, states can serve as strategic spaces for the niche development of renewable energy 
sources. Verheul and Vergragt (1995) note that niches and associated experiments are promoted 
by groups which disagree with the conventional interpretations and evaluations of these 
technologies. In this sense, states have an underappreciated role in demonstrating that wind and 
solar could compete with incumbent technologies. Pernambuco has been a critical agenda-setter 
in solar energy policy-making, testing market support ideas that had yet to gain traction at the 
national level. Interacting within the national policy framework, Rio Grande do Norte has also 
had a strong impact on wind energy policy by paving a path for other states in terms of 
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environmental licensing and using state resources to help guide interested investors in the 
competitive bidding process. These policy experiments have provided “decentralized feedback to 
national policies” (UNCED, 1992), especially for policymakers who administer the rules and 
oversight for regulated auctions.  
7.1.3. Policy Implications: In Support of Adaptive Regulation 
Studying regulatory approaches to implementing wind and solar energy policies tells us 
that we should be circumspect about leading theories of regulatory politics and reform. These 
theories express valid concerns in conceding authority on public policy issues to regulatory 
agencies. Such agencies could be used as mere “arms of the state” or pursue an unrestrained 
range of aims at the cost of sectoral performance. However, policy analysts should not 
unquestioningly concede that agencies involved in policymaking are necessarily “captured” or 
afflicted with weak legitimacy, which could mean a reaffirmation of regulatory reform models 
which may do better at describing the last decades than predicting the next (Wiener, 2004, p. 
496). On the contrary, regulations can be crafted in ways that guide emerging technological 
alternatives. We may thus need new theories to explain the evolution of regulatory institutions in 
policymaking. 
Returning to the stark line often drawn between policy and regulation, there is a long-
standing tension between acquiring new renewable resources and regulating markets. In this 
sense, policymakers develop and refine feed-in tariffs and auction schemes to “acquire” 
renewable energy as a way to increase its share within the electricity supply. In managing 
markets, regulators monitor renewable energy policies and engage with market participants in 
both punitive and collaborative ways. They also change conditions in the market so that new 
renewable technologies are developed without the need for subsidies or other interventions. As I 
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discussed in this dissertation, regulating and managing markets and renewable resource 
acquisition are, in fact, complementary strategies. Renewable energy programs create conditions 
that demand new approaches to regulation, and regulation creates conditions that lead to 
participation and the implementation of renewable energy programs.  
In Brazil, supply auctions for wind energy are biased in favor of strategies that are easy to 
quantify. Policy analysts focus on increasing project developers’ financial and technical 
qualifications to participate in auctions. This would not be a serious issue if verifying that a 
project developer is “good on paper” were all (or most of) what needs to be done. In practice, 
regulators play a critical role in defining the quality of market participation. This depends, 
however, on the commitment of regulators to enforce contracts and transparently collaborate 
with stakeholders. Characteristics like these may be difficult to quantify, but they are certainly 
observable and important to take into account when assessing renewable energy outcomes.  
Moreover, policymakers should critically view definitions of regulatory stability that 
prioritize the interests of private investors over other policy claims. A common argument is that 
regulatory stability is a key factor in attracting new investments to any sector (Bellantuono, 
2017). In the energy sector, both private investors and advocates of renewable energy argue the 
transition to a low-carbon economy requires an almost exclusive focus on measures that could 
increase regulatory stability. In challenging and elaborating on this concept, I argue that both the 
goal of regulatory stability and the means to obtain it are in need of clarification. While investors 
are naturally interested in reducing the risks stemming from regulatory changes, regulatory risks 
can be managed even when the public interest requires changing the regulatory framework 
(Bellantuono, 2017, p. 274). The challenge of increasing investments in renewable energy does 
not rest exclusively on a lack of stability.  
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To improve outcomes for renewable energy, regulators at Aneel provide reasonable 
levels of predictability for market participants while adapting regulations to keep pace with 
social and technological change. Striking a balance between these two objectives is difficult but 
critical for the long-term governance of wind and solar energy. Consequently, adaptive 
regulation does not necessarily have an adverse impact on investors or imply an infringement on 
their legitimate expectations. This dissertation argues that a much more realistic goal is to 
increase the credibility of the regulatory framework for renewable energy investors (Bellantuono, 
2017, p. 292). What matters is not only the formulation of renewable energy policy, but how 
regulators respond to changing market conditions according to procedures that are transparent. 
Recognition that the stability of a regulatory system is not always desirable or necessarily 
















Abers, R.N., & Keck, M.E. (2006). Muddy Waters: The Political Construction of Deliberative  
River Basin Governance in Brazil. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 30(3), 601–622. 
 
Abinee. (October 2015). Pernambuco derrubou paradigmas de que não seria destino viável para a  
geração de energias eólica e solar. Informativo da Associação Brasileira da Indústria  
Elétrica e Eletrônica – Regional Nordeste. Retrieved from  
http://www.abinee.org.br/informac/arquivos/infne40.pdf 
 
ABRADEE. (2017). Quem Somos. Retrieved from  
http://www.ABRADEE.com.br/ABRADEE/quem-somos 
 
ABRADEE. (Dec. 3, 2015). Requerimento de Reconsideração da REN 687/15 para devidos 
encaminhamentos dessa Agência. Personal communication from ABRADEE to ANEEL. 
 
ABSOLAR. (2017a). Quem Somos. Retrieved from http://www.absolar.org.br/quem-somos.html 
 
ABOLSAR. (2017b). Diretoria e Conselho. Retrieved from http://www.absolar.org.br/diretoria- 
e-conselho.html 
 
Abbott, A. (1995). Sequence Analysis: New Methods for Old Ideas. Annual Review of  
Sociology, 21(1), 93–113.  
 
Agassi, J. (1975). Institutional individualism. British Journal of Sociology, 26(2), 144-155. 
 
Almeida, E., & Colomer, M., & Vitto, W.A.C. (2017). Gás do Pré-Sal: Oportunidades, Desafios  
e Perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro: The Brazilian Institute for Petroleum, Gas, and Biofuels  




Alves, J.J.A. (January/April 2010). Análise regional da energia eólica no Brasil. Revista  
Brasileira de Gestão e Desenvolvimento Regional, 6(1), 165-188. Retrieved from 
http://rbgdr.net/012010/artigo8.pdf 
 
Amann, E., & Baer, W. (2005). From the developmental to the regulatory state: the  
transformation of the government’s impact on the Brazilian economy. The Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance, 45(2-3), 421-431.  
 
Anaya, K.L., & Pollitt, M.G. (2014, December). The Role of Distribution Network Operators in  
Promoting Cost-Effective Distributed Generation: Lessons from the United States for  





Aneel. (1998). Resolução Aneel nº 395, de 4 de dezembro de 1998. Retrieved from  
http://www2.Aneel.gov.br/cedoc/res1998395.pdf 
 
Aneel. (1999, October 1). Resolution No. 281/1999. Retrieved from  
http://www2.Aneel.gov.br/cedoc/res1999281.pdf 
 
Aneel. (2005). Atlas de energia elétrica do Brasil. 2. ed. Brasília, Brazil: Aneel. Retrieved from 
http://www2.Aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/atlas/download.htm 
 





Aneel. (2012, April). RESOLUÇÃO NORMATIVA Nº 482, DE 17 DE ABRIL DE 2012.  
Retrieved from http://www2.Aneel.gov.br/cedoc/ren2012482.pdf 
 
Aneel. (2015). Proposta de abertura de Audiência Pública para o recebimento de contribuições 
visando aprimorar a Resolução Normativa nº 482, de 17 de abril de 2012 e a seção 3.7 do 




Aneel. Histórico. Retrieved from 
http://www2.Aneel.gov.br/area.cfm?idArea=8&idPerfil=3 
 
Aneel. (2016a). Os Conselhos de Consumidores de Energia Elétrica. Retrieved from 
http://conselhodeconsumidores.Aneel.gov.br/ 
 
Aneel. (2016b). Companhamento diferenciado de empreendimentos de expansão da rede  









Aneel. (2017). Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento (P&D) e Eficiência Energética. Retrieved from  
http://www.Aneel.gov.br/ped-eficiencia-energetica 
 











Aneel. (2017, March 29). Agência aprova 23 propostas da chamada de P&D sobre  




Aneel. (2018a). Geração Distribuída. Retrieved from  
http://www2.Aneel.gov.br/scg/gd/GD_Classe.asp 
 
Aneel. (2018b). Resultado de Leilões. Retrieved from http://www.Aneel.gov.br/resultados-de- 
leiloes 
 
Archer, M. S., & Bhaskar, R. (1998). Critical Realism: Essential Readings. New York, NY:  
Psychology Press. 
 
Arthur, W. B. (1988). Competing technologies. In: Dosi, G., C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G.  
Silverberg, and L. Soete (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory. London: Pinter,  
pp. 590-607.  
 
Ayres, I. & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive regulation : transcending the deregulation debate.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Azumendi, S.L. (2016, July). Governança das Agências Reguladoras Federais do Brasil: Análise  
das Tendências de Configuração das Diretorias durante os Últimos Vinte Aanos de  
Reformas. Centro de Regulação e Infraestrutura da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV- 




Bacon, R. W., & Besant-Jones, J. (2001). Global electric power reform, privatization, and  
liberalization of the electric power industry in developing countries. Annual Review of  
Energy and the Environment, 26(1), 331–359.  
 
Baldwin, R., & Cave, M., & Lodge, M. (2012). Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy,  
and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Batista da Silva, M. (July/Aug. 2012). Mecanismos de participação e atuação de grupos de  
interesse no processo regulatório brasileiro: o caso da Agência Nacional de Energia 





Bateman, C.J., & Tripp, J.T.B. (2014). Toward greener FERC regulation of the power industry.  
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 38, 275-333.  
 
Batlle, C., Barroso, L.A., & Perez-Arriaga, I.J. (2010). The changing role of the State in the  
expansion of electricity supply in Latin America. Energy Policy, 28, 7152–7160.  
 
Bajay, S.V. (2006). Integrating competition and planning: A mixed institutional model of the  
Brazilian electric power sector. Energy, 31, 865–876.  
 
Bayer, B. (2018). Experience with auctions for wind power in Brazil. Renewable and  
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 81(Part 2), 2644–2658.  
 
Beauregard, R.A. (2015). Planning and the politics of resistance. In L. Lieto & R.A. Beauregard 
(Eds.), Planning for a Material World. Routledge. 
 
Beck, F., & Martinot, E. (2004). Renewable energy policies and barriers. In Cutler Cleveland  
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of Energy (pp. 365-383). San Diego, CA: Academic Press/Elsevier  
Science. 
 
Bellantuono, G. (2016). Regulatory Stability in the Energy Sector: The Italian Experience.  
Retrieved from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2790980 
 
Benevides, M. C. de S. e, Suni, A., & Guerra, J. B. S. O. de A. (2017). Renewable Distributed  
Generation and Its Stakeholders’ Engagement Contributing to Climate Change Mitigation  
and Adaptation in Brazil Unisul—Universidade Do Sul de Santa Catarina, Brazil. In  
Handbook of Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development in Higher Education (Vol.  
3) (pp. 343–354). Springer, Cham.  
 
Bergek, A., & Jacobsson, S. (2010). Are tradable green certificates a cost-efficient policy driving  
technical change or a rent-generating machine? Lessons from Sweden 2003–2008.  
Energy Policy, 38(3), 1255–1271.  
 
Black, J. (2000). Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 20, 597- 
614.  
 
Black, J. (2002). Critical Reflections on Regulation. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 27,  
1–35. 
 
Black, J. (2006). Chapter 1: What is regulatory innovation? In J. Black & M. Lodge & M.  
Thatcher (Eds.), Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative Analysis (pp. 1-15). Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
 
Black, J. (2006). The development of risk-based regulation in financial services: just “modelling  
through”? In J. Black & M. Lodge & M. Thatcher (Eds.), Regulatory Innovation: A 




BNDES. (2017). The BNDES. Retrieved from  
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES/ 
 
Boadle, A. & Soto, A. (2016, March 31). Brazil's Temer eyes pro-business plan but has scant  




Borges, A. (2014, April 1). Leilão emergencial de energia terá audiência pública só de cinco  
dias. Valor Econômico. Retrieved from http://www.valor.com.br/brasil/3502216/leilao- 
emergencial-de-energia-tera-audiencia-publica-so-de-cinco-dias 
 
Brasil. (1996). DECRETO Nº 2.003, DE 10 DE SETEMBRO DE 1996. Retrieved from  
<http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/D2003.htm> 
 
Bresser, Pereira. (2009). From Old to New Developmentalism in Latin America. In José Antonio  
Ocampo, ed. Handbook of Latin America Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Breukers, S. (2006). Changing Institutional Landscapes for Implementing Wind Power: A  
Geographical Comparison of Institutional Capacity Building: The Netherlands, England  
and North Rhine-Westphalia. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University  
Press. 
 
Brown, A. (June 2003). Regulators, Policy-Makers, and the Making of Policy: Who Does What  
and When Do They Do It? International Journal of Regulation and Governance. 3(1), 1- 
11. 
 
Brown, L. R. (2015). The Great Transition: Shifting from Fossil Fuels to Solar and Wind  
Energy. New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Bridge, G., Bouzarovski, S., Bradshaw, M., & Eyre, N. (2013). Geographies of energy transition:  
Space, place and the low-carbon economy. Energy Policy, 53, 331–340. 
 
Bulkeley, H., & Bertsill, M.M. (2003). Cities and climate change : urban sustainability and  
global environmental governance. New York: Routledge. 
 
Bulkeley, H., Broto, V. C., Hodson, M., & Marvin, S. (2010). Cities and Low Carbon 
Transitions. New York: Routledge. 
 
Bulkeley, H., & Newell, P. (2015). Governing Climate Change. New York: Routledge. 
 
Buzbee, W.W. (2016). Federalism-Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in a Time  





Calixto, B. (2017, January 16). Plano do governo para descontratar energia pode afetar indústrias  




Camargo, M. (2017, October 3). Consumidor pagou R$ 1,8 bi a mais na conta de luz em 2016;  




Cardoso, F.H. (1998). Notas Sobre a Reforma do Estado. Retrieved from 
<http://www.e-law.net.br/ensaios/Notas_sobre_a_reforma_do_Estado.pdf>  
 
Carlsson, B., & Stankiewicz, R. (1991). On the nature, function and composition of  
technological systems. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1(2), 93–118. 
 
Cavaliero, C.K.N., & da Silva, E.P. (2005). Electricity generation: regulatory mechanisms to  
incentive renewable alternative energy sources in Brazil. Energy Policy, 33, 1745–1752.  
 





CERNE. (2016). Eólicas: panorama atual e os desafios do setor no Brasil. Retrieved from: 
http://cerne.org.br/eolicas-panorama-atual-e-os-desafios-do-setor-no-brasil/ 
 




Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law & Economics, 3, 1–44. 
 
Coelho, J. (Nov. 26, 2015). Revisão da Resolução Normativa n. 482/2012: isenção da TUSD.  
Personal communication to ABRADEE.  
 
Coenen, L., Raven, R., & Verbong, G. (2010). Local niche experimentation in energy transitions:  
A theoretical and empirical exploration of proximity advantages and disadvantages.  
Technology in Society, 32(4), 295–302. 
 
Corbin, J. M., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and  
evaluative criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13(1), 3–21. 
 
Costa, J.J. (2015, December 18). ProGD: muita fumaça, pouco fogo. National Front for a New  





Costello, L. (2009). Some Basic Concepts of Market Power for State Public Utility Commissions  
to Consider. National Regulatory Research Institute. Retrieved from  
http://nrri.org/research-papers/ 
 
Cowell, R. (2017). Decentralising energy governance? Wales, devolution and the politics of  
energy infrastructure decision-making. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 
35(7), 1242–1263.  
 
Creswell, J. W. (2014). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods  
Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
 
Cunha, G., & Barroso, L.A., & Porrua, F., & Bezerra, B. (2012). Fostering Wind Power Through  
Auctions: the Brazilian Experience. IAEE Energy Forum, Newsletter of the International  
Association for Energy Economics, 25-28. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaee.org/documents/2012SpringEnergyForum.pdf 
 
de Castro, F., & Koonings, K., & Wiesebron, M. (2014). Brazil Under the Workers’ Party:  
Continuity and Change from Lula to Dilma. Springer: London, UK. 
 
da Costa, R.F. (2016). Ventos que transformam? Um estudo sobre o impacto econômico e social  
da instalação dos Parques Eólicos no Rio Grande do Norte/BrasilNATAL-RN2015  
(master’s thesis). Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, Brazil. Retrieved  
from https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/23017 
 
de Laurentis, P.P., & Eames, M. (2016). Renewable energy innovation systems  
at the regional level: a conceptual framework to address materiality and spatial scale.  
Working Paper, Welsh School of Architecture. Retrieved from  
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/architecture/files/2015/03/WSA-Working-Paper-02-20161.pdf 
 




de Oliveira, A. (2007). Political Economy of the Brazilian Power Industry Reform. 
In D. Victor & T.C. Heller (Eds.), The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform: The 
Experiences of Five Major Developing Countries (pp. 31-75). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Del Río Gonzalez, P., & Unruh, G. (2007). Overcoming the lock-out of renewable energy  
technologies in Spain: The cases of wind and solar electricity. Renewable and  
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 11(7), 1498–1513.  
 
Del Rio Gonzalez, P. (2008).Ten years of renewable electricity policies in Spain: an analysis of  
217 
 
successive feed-in tariff reforms. Energy Policy, 36(8), 2917–2929. 
 
Doern, G.B., & Gattinger, M. (2003). Power Switch: Energy Regulatory Governance in the  
Twenty-first Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
 
Dubash, N.K. (2003). Revisiting electricity reform: The case for a sustainable development  
approach. Utilities Policy, 11, 143–154.  
 
Dubash, N.K. (2005). Regulation as an arena for social policy: Examples from electricity in  
Asia. Arusha Conference,“New Frontiers of Social Policy”– December 12-15, 2005 
 
Dubash, N.K., & Rao, D.N. (2008). Regulatory practice and politics: Lessons from independent  
regulation in Indian electricity. Utilities Policy, 16, 321-331.  
 
Dubash, N.K., & Morgan, B. (2012). Understanding the rise of the regulatory state of the South.  
Regulation & Governance, 6, 261–281.  
 
Dubash, N.K., & Morgan, B. (Eds.). (2013). The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South:  
Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Edquist, C., & Johnson, B. (1997). Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innovation. In  
Edquist, C. (Ed.), Systems of innovation – Technologies, institutions and organizations  
(pp. 41-60). London, UK: Pinter Publishers/Cassel Academic. 
 
Elizondo Azuela, G., & Barroso, L., & Cunha, G. (2014). Performance of renewable energy  
auctions: Experience in Brazil, China and India. Policy research working paper of the  
World Bank Group. Retrieved from:  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/842071468020372456/pdf/WPS7062.pdf 
 






EPE. (2016). PDE - Plano Decenal de Expansão de Energia. Retrieved from  
 http://www.epe.gov.br/pdee/forms/epeestudo.aspx 
 
EPE. (2016). National Energy Balance – 2016. Retrieved from  
https://ben.epe.gov.br/default.aspx?anoColeta=2016 
 
Essletzbichler, J. (2012). Renewable Energy Technology and Path Creation: A Multi-scalar  
Approach to Energy Transition in the UK. European Planning Studies, 20(5), 791–816. 
 





Feferman, F. (2014). Brazil: good governance in the tropics – the rise of the Porto Digital Cluster  
of Innovation. In Engel, J. S. Clusters of Innovation: Entrepreneurial Engines of  
Economic Growth around the World (pp. 296-340). New York: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Ferroukhi, R., & Hawila, D., & Vinci, S. (2015). Renewable Energy Auctions: A Guide to  





Foster, C.D. (1992). Privatisation, Public Ownership and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly.  
Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Förster, S., & Amazo, A. (March 2016). Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in Brazil:  
Instruments and lessons learnt (Report D4.1-BRA). AURES Project. Retrieved from  
http://www.auresproject.eu/pfid/183 
 
Forsyth, A. (1999). Administrative Discretion and Urban and Regional Planners’ Values.  
Journal of Planning Literature, 14(1), 5-15.  
 
Foxon, T. J., & Pearson, P. J. G. (2007). Towards improved policy processes for promoting  
innovation in renewable electricity technologies in the UK. Energy Policy, 35(3), 1539– 
1550. 
 
Foxon, T. J. (2011). A coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a sustainable low  
carbon economy. Ecological Economics, 70(12), 2258–2267.  
 
Furlong, K. (2012). Good Water Governance without Good Urban Governance? Regulation,  
Service Delivery Models, and Local Government. Environment and Planning A:  
Economy and Space, 44(11), 2721–2741.  
 
Furtado, A. T., Scandiffio, M. I. G., & Cortez, L. A. B. (2011). The Brazilian sugarcane 
innovation system. Energy Policy, 39(1), 156–166. 
 
Furtado, C. (1964). Development and Underdevelopment. Los Angeles, CA: University of  
California Press. 
 
Gausch, J.L., & Spiller, P. (1999). Managing the Regulatory Process: Design, Concepts, Issues,  
and the Latin American and Caribbean Story. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.  
 
Geels, F.W. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a  
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31(8), 1257–1274.  
 
Geels, F.W. (2011). The role of cities in technological transitions: Analytical clarifications 
219 
 
and historical examples. In: Bulkeley, H., Castán Broto, V., Hodson, M., 
Marvin, S. (Eds.), Cities and Low Carbon Transitions. London: Routledge, 13–28. 
 
Gephart, M., &  Klessmann, C., & Wigand, F. (2017). Renewable energy auctions – When are  
they (cost-)effective? Energy & Environment, 28(1-2), 145–165. 
 
Gilardi, F. (2004). Institutional Change in Regulatory Policies: Regulation Through Independent  
Agencies and Three New Institutionalisms. In J. Jordana & D. Levi-Faur (Eds.), The  
Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance 
(pp. 57-89). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Gilbert, R.J., & E.P. Kahn, & D.M. Newbery. (1996). Introduction: International Comparisons of  
Electricity Regulation. In R.J. Gilbert and E.P. Kahn (Eds.), International Comparisons  
of Electricity Regulation (pp. 1-24). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Goldemberg, J., & Lèbre La Rovere, E., & Coelho, S.T. (2004). Expanding access to  
electricity in Brazil. Energy for Sustainable Developmen, 8(4), 86-94. 
 
Goldman, M. (2006). Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the  
Age of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Gorayeb, A., & Brannstrom, C. (2016). Toward Participatory Management of Renewable Energy  
Resources in Northeastern Brazil. Revista Mercator, 15(1), pp. 101-115. 
 
Governo do RN. (2016, August 9). Governador e comitiva chinesa visitam terreno da fábrica da  




Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering urbanism : networked infrastructures,  
technological mobilities and the urban condition. New York: Routledge. 
 
Grant, W.P., & Chandler, D., & Bailey, A., & Greaves, J., & Tatchell, M., & Prince, G. (2010).  
Biopesticides: Pest Management and Regulation. Oxfordshire, UK: CAB International.  
 
Gratwick, K.N., & Eberhard, A. (2008). Demise of the standard model for power sector reform  
and the emergence of hybrid power markets. Energy Policy, 36, 3948–3960. 
 
Gray, G.C. & Silbey, S.S. (2014). Governing Inside the Organization: Interpreting Regulation  
and Compliance. American Journal of Sociology, 120(1), 96-145. 
 
Greenpeace Brazil. (2016). Alvorada Como o incentivo à energia solar fotovoltaica pode  






Haas, R., Panzer, C., Resch, G., Ragwitz, M., Reece, G., & Held, A. (2011). A historical review  
of promotion strategies for electricity from renewable energy sources in EU countries.  
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 15(2), 1003–1034. 
 
Haber, H. (2010). Regulating-for-Welfare: A Comparative Study of “Regulatory Welfare 
Regimes” in the Israeli, British and Swedish Electricity Sectors. Law and Policy, 33, 
116–148. 
 
Hall, P.A. (April 1993). Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic  
Policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3), 275-296.  
 
Hauber, J., & Ruppert-Winkel, C. (2012). Moving towards Energy Self-Sufficiency Based on  
Renewables: Comparative Case Studies on the Emergence of Regional Processes of  
Socio-Technical Change in Germany. Sustainability, 4(4), 491–530. 
 
Hecher, M., Vilsmaier, U., Akhavan, R., & Binder, C. R. (2016). An integrative analysis of  
energy transitions in energy regions: A case study of ökoEnergieland in Austria.  
Ecological Economics, 121, 40–53. 
 
Hempling, S. (2013). Regulating Public Utility Performance: The Law of Market Structure,  
Pricing and Jurisdiction. Chicago: American Bar Association.  
 
Hess, D. J. (2016). The politics of niche-regime conflicts: Distributed solar energy in the United  
States. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 19, 42–50.  
 
Heymann, M. (1999). A Fight of Systems? Wind Power and Electric Power Systems In  
Denmark, Germany, and the USA. Centaurus, 41(1–2), 112–136.  
 
Hirschman, A.O. (1981). The Rise and Decline of Development Economics. In Essays in  
Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Hirsh, R. F. (1999). Power loss : the origins of deregulation and restructuring in the American  
electric utility system. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
 
Hochstetler, K. (2011). The Politics of Environmental Licensing: Energy Projects of the Past and  
Future in Brazil. Studies in Comparative International Development, 46(4), 349–371. 
 
Hochstetler, K., & Kostka, G. (August 2015). Wind and Solar Power in Brazil and China:  
Interests, State–Business Relations, and Policy Outcomes. Global Environmental 
Politics, 15, 74-94. 
 
Hochstetler, K., & Trajan, J.R. (July 2016). Environment and Consultation in the Brazilian  




Hoppmann, J. (2015). The Role of Deployment Policies in Fostering Innovation for Clean  
Energy Technologies: Insights From the Solar Photovoltaic Industry. Business & Society,  
54(4), 540–558.  
 
Hughes, T.P. (1983). Networks of Power. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
IBGE. (2017a). Regional Accounts of Brazil 2010-2014. Retrieved from  
http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/2014/default.shtm 
 
IBGE. (2017b). Population Statistics. Retrieved from  
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/mapa_site/mapa_site.php#populacao 
 
IDEAL Institute. (2017). América do Sol Program. Retrieved from  
http://americadosol.org/en/more-about-us/ 
 





IEA. (2017a). Renewables 2017. Retrieved from  
https://www.iea.org/publications/renewables2017/ 
 
IEA. (2017b). World Energy Balances. Retrieved from https://www.iea.org/bookshop/753- 
World_Energy_Balances_2017 
 
IEA. (2014). Statistics. Retrieved from http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/ 
 
IEA. (2015). Brazil. Retrieved from  
http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/brazil/ 
 
Investe SP. (2017). Renewable Energy. Retrieved from  
http://www.en.investe.sp.gov.br/business-sectors/green-economy/renewable-energy 
 
Jacobson, M. Z., & Delucchi, M. A. (2011). Providing all global energy with wind, water, and  
solar power, Part I: Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure,  
and materials. Energy Policy, 39(3), 1154–1169. 
 
Jacobsson, S., & Johnson, A. (2000). The diffusion of renewable energy technology: an  
analytical framework and key issues for research. Energy Policy, 28(9), 625–640.  
 
Jacobsson, S., & Bergek, A. (2004). Transforming the energy sector: the evolution of  
technological systems in renewable energy technology. Industrial and Corporate  
222 
 
Change, 13(5), 815–849.  
 
Jacobsson, S., & Lauber, V. (2006). The politics and policy of energy system transformation— 
explaining the German diffusion of renewable energy technology. Energy Policy, 34(3),  
256–276.  
 
Jamasb, T. (2002). Reform and regulation of the electricity sectors in developing countries. DAE  
Working Paper WP 0226, CMI Working Paper 08, University of Cambridge. Retrieved 
from http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep08.pdf 
 
Jannuzzi, G. M., & de Melo, C. A. (2013). Grid-connected photovoltaic in Brazil: Policies  
and potential impacts for 2030. Energy for Sustainable Development, 17(1), 40–46. 
 
Jannuzzi, G.M., & Goldemberg, J. (2014). Modern Energy Services to Low Income Households  
in Brazil: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead. In A. Halff & B.K. Sovacool & J. 
Rozhon (Eds.), Energy Poverty: Global Challenges and Local Solutions (pp. 257-270). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jegen, M., & Wüstenhagen, R. (2001). Modernise it, sustainabilise it! Swiss energy policy on the  
eve of electricity market liberalisation. Energy Policy, 29(1), 45–54.  
 
Jordana, J., & Levi-Faur, D. (Eds.). (2004). The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and  
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D., & Marín, X. F. i. (2011). The Global Diffusion of Regulatory  
Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion. Comparative Political Studies,  
44(10). 
 
Joskow, P. L. (2008). Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization. The Energy  
Journal, 29(Special Issue #2), 9–42. 
 
Kapur, D. & J. Lewis & R. Webb. (1997). “Introduction.” In The World Bank: Its First Half  
Century: Vol. 2: Perspectives. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Kemp, R., Schot, J., & Hoogma, R. (1998). Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of  
niche formation: The approach of strategic niche management. Technology Analysis &  
Strategic Management, 10(2), 175–198.  
 
Kenning, T. (2017, August 4). Brazil hits 100MW of micro and mini-generation solar PV. PV- 
Tech. Retrieved from https://www.pv-tech.org/news/brazil-hits-100mw-of-micro-and- 
mini-generation-solar-pv 
 
Kern, F., & Smith, A. (2008). Restructuring energy systems for sustainability? Energy transition  
223 
 
policy in the Netherlands. Energy Policy, 36(11), 4093–4103. 
 
King, P. (2004). Relativism, subjectivity and the self. A critique of social constructionism. In  
K. Jacobs, J. Kemeny and T. Manzi (Eds.), Social Constructionism in Housing  
Research (pp. 32–48). Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Knee, J. (2011). Rational electricity regulation: environmental impacts and the "public interest."  
West Virginia Law Review, 11, 739-790.   
 
Kovacic, W. E. (2014). Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal Quality.  




Lal, D. (1983). The poverty of development economics. Albuquerque, NM: Transatlantic Arts. 
 




Levi-Faur, D., & Jacinct, J. (2007). Toward a Latin American Regulatory State? The Diffusion  
of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies Across Countries and Sectors. International 
Journal of Public Administration, 29(4-6), 335-366.  
 
Levine, M.E. & Forrence, J.L. (April 1990). Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public  
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 6, 167-198.  
 
Lin, A.C. (2002). Reform in the Making: The Implementation of Social Policy in Prison.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy : dilemmas of the individual in public services.  
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Lock, R. (2005). The New Electricity Model in Brazil: An Institutional Framework in Transition.  
The Electricity Journal, 18(1), 52–61. 
 
Locke, L. F., Spirduso, W. W., & Silverman, S. J. (2013). Proposals That Work: A Guide for  
Planning Dissertations and Grant Proposals. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
Macfarlane, A. M. & Miller, M. (2007). Nuclear energy and uranium resources. Elements 3(3),  
185-192. 
 
MaisRN. (2018). Energia. Retrieved from http://www.maisrn.org.br/perfil- 
rn/infraestrutura/energia/ 
 




Majone, G. (1997). From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of  
Changes in the Mode of Governance. Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139–167. 
 
Matland, R.E. (1995). Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict  
Model of Policy Implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory:  
J-PART, 5(2), 145–174. 
 
Mattar, C.A.C, & Vieiera, D., & Carneiro, J.S.A., & Lamin, H., & Albuquerque, J.M.C. Net- 
Metering Scheme in Brazil: Regulation and Perspectives. 23rd International Conference  
on Electricity Distribution Lyon, 15-18 June 2015. Retrieved from  
http://cired.net/publications/cired2015/papers/CIRED2015_0831_final.pdf 
 
Mattes, J., Huber, A., & Koehrsen, J. (2015). Energy transitions in small-scale regions – What  
we can learn from a regional innovation systems perspective. Energy Policy, 78, 255– 
264. 
 
Maurer, L., & Barroso, L. (2011). Electricity auctions: An overview of efficient practices. World  
Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8a92fa004aabaa73977bd79e0dc67fc6/ 
 
Mazzucato, M. (2013). The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public Vs. Private Sector Myths.  
London, UK: Anthem Press. 
 
Meadowcroft, J. (2009). What about the politics? Sustainable development, transition  
management, and long term energy transitions. Policy Sciences, 42(4), 323–340. 
 
Medeiros, C. (2014, August 8). Governo de Pernambuco monta comercializadora para negociar  
energia do leilão solar. Agência CanalEnergia. Retrieved from 
http://www.abraceel.com.br/zpublisher/materias/clipping_web.asp?id=102789 
 
Melo, E. (2013). Fonte eólica de energia: aspectos de inserção, tecnologia e competitividade.  
Estudos Avançados, 27(77), 125–142. Retrieved from 
 https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-40142013000100010 
 
Menanteau, P., Finon, D., & Lamy, M.-L. (2003). Prices versus quantities: choosing policies for  
promoting the development of renewable energy. Energy Policy, 31(8), 799–812. 
 
Metri, P. (2009). Pré-Sal: riqueza, poder e discórdia, Tensões Mundiais, 5(9) 
(2009), 141-165. Retrieved from  
http://www.tensoesmundiais.net/index.php/tm/article/view/102/143 
 
Monteiro, T., & Moraes Moura, R. (2013, January 23). Dilma anuncia redução maior na conta de  






Moraes, J. & de Simone, R. (2015, August 17). Entrevista com João Carlos de S. Meirelles,  
secretário de Energia do estado de São Paulo, SindiEnergia. Retrieved from  
http://www.sindienergia.org.br/noticia.asp?cod_not=2725&verificado=1 
 
Moura, R. (2009, September 13). Ventos da mudanca sopraman no RN. Tribuna do Norte.  
Retrieved from http://www.tribunadonorte.com.br/noticia/ventos-da-mudanca-sopram- 
no-rn/134631 
 
Mowery, D. C., Nelson, R. R., & Martin, B. R. (2010). Technology policy and global warming:  
Why new policy models are needed (or why putting new wine in old bottles won’t work).  
Research Policy, 39(8), 1011–1023.  
 
Munsell, M. (2017, July 18). Europe, Once the Bastion of Feed-In Tariffs, Now Leads the World  




Murillo, M.V. (2009). Political Competition, Partisanship, and Policy Making in Latin American  
Public Utilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
National Institute for Space Research. (2006). Brazilian Atlas of Solar Energy. Retrieved  
from http://ftp.cptec.inpe.br/labren/publ/livros/brazil_solar_atlas_R1.pdf 
 
National Research Council. (2007). Environmental Impacts of Wind-Energy Projects.  
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
 
Negro, S. O., Hekkert, M. P., & Smits, R. E. (2007). Explaining the failure of the Dutch  
innovation system for biomass digestion—A functional analysis. Energy Policy, 35(2),  
925–938.  
 
Nemet, G. F. (2009). Demand-pull, technology-push, and government-led incentives for non- 
incremental technical change. Research Policy, 38(5), 700–709.  
 
Neto, J.A. (2015). Políticas públicas de incentivo ao desenvolvimento da energia eólica no Rio  
Grande do Norte (master’s thesis). Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal,  




Neves, L. (2015, July). O sol nasce em Pernambuco. Brasil Energia. 
 
Ninio, A., Batmanian, C., Bonilla, J.P., Margulis, S., Quintero, J., & Maurer, L. (2008).  
Environmental Licensing for Hydroelectric Projects in Brazil: A Contribution to the  






Nunes, E.O. (2007). Agências reguladoras e reforma do Estado no Brasil: inovação e  
continuidade no sistema político institucional. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Garamond.  
 
Odendahl, T., & Shaw, A.M. (2002). Interviewing Elites. In  J.F. Gubrium & J.A. Holstein,  
Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
 
OECD. (2008). OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform -Brazil: Strengthening Governance for  




Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1993). Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is  
Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Plume.  
 
Owen, G. (2006). Sustainable development duties: New roles for UK economic regulators.  
Utilities Policy, 14, 208-217.  
 
PE. (2015). Pernambuco avança na geração de Energia Solar. Retrieved from  
http://www.pe.gov.br/b/12176 
 
Peci, A., & Sobral, F. (2011). Regulatory Impact Assessment: How political and organizational  
forces influence its diffusion in a developing country: Regulatory Impact Assessment  
diffusion in a developing country. Regulation & Governance, 5(2), 204–220.  
 
Pereira Junior, E. (2015). Industrial dynamics and urbanization in the Northeast of Brazil.  
Mercator (Fortaleza), 14, 63–81. 
 
Peters, M., Schneider, M., Griesshaber, T., & Hoffmann, V. H. (2012). The impact of  
technology-push and demand-pull policies on technical change – Does the locus of  
policies matter? Research Policy, 41(8), 1296–1308.  
 
Petrobras. (2017). Pre-Salt. Retrieved from http://www.petrobras.com.br/en/our- 
activities/performance-areas/oil-and-gas-exploration-and-production/pre-salt/ 
 
Pires, de B., Maria, A., Lima Cruz Teixeira, F., Filho, H., Nelson, H., Oliveira, G., & Ricardo, S.  
(2013). Innovation in Innovation Management: the Experience of Petrobras Centers and  
Networks of Excellence Program. Journal of Technology Management & Innovation, 8,  
49–60. 
 
Pollitt, M. G. (2012). The role of policy in energy transitions: Lessons from the energy  
liberalisation era. Energy Policy, 50, 128–137.  
 
Portinari, N. (2017). Empresas privadas já detêm 60% da geração de energia do Brasil. Folha de  
227 
 
São Paulo. Retrieved from http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2017/09/1923143- 
empresas-privadas-ja-detem-60-da-geracao-de-energia-do-brasil.shtml 
 
Prado, M.M. (2012). Implementing Independent Regulatory Agencies in Brazil: The  
Contrasting Experiences in the Electricity and Telecommunications Sectors. Regulation 
& Governance, 6(3), 300–326. 
 
Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. B. (1973). Implementation: how Great Expectations in  
Washington are Dashed in Oakland: Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work  
at All, this Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two  
Sympathetic Observers who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes.  
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Prosser, T. (March 1999). Theorising Utility Regulation. The Modern Law Review, 62(2), 196- 
217.  
 
Prosser, T. (2000). Public Service Law: Privatization’s Unexpected Offspring. Law and  
Contemporary Problems: Public Perspectives on Privatization, 63(4), 63-82.  
 
Prosser, T. (2010). The Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation, and Legitimacy.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Rabe, B.G. (2004a). Statehouse and greenhouse [electronic resource] : the stealth politics of  
American climate change policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Rabe, B.G. (2004b). North American federalism and climate change policy: American state and  
Canadian provincial policy development. Widener Law Journal, 14, 121-172. 
 
Rabelo, D. (October, 28, 2014). Resolução Normativa 482: Cenário Atual. Presentation at  
“ExpoGeração 2014: I Seminário sobre Micro e Minigeração Distribuída.” 
 
Ragin, C. C., & Becker, H. S. (1992). What Is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social  
Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Revesz, R.L., & Unel, B. (2017). Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed  
Generation and Net Metering. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 41(1), 2017, 44-108.  
 
Ribeiro, L.M., & Peixoto, V.M., & Burlamaqui, P.O. (2009). Processo Decisório e Inovação  
institucional no Presidencialismo de Coalizão: um estudo a partir da gênese das agências  




Rittner, D. (2014, September 14). Em manifesto, servidores da Aneel criticam 'volta ao passado'  





Rokkan, S. (1970). Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the  
Processes of Development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
 
Ru, P., Zhi, Q., Zhang, F., Zhong, X., Li, J., & Su, J. (2012). Behind the development of  
technology: The transition of innovation modes in China’s wind turbine manufacturing  
industry. Energy Policy, 43, 58–69.  
 
Rutherford, J., & Coutard, O. (2014). Urban Energy Transitions: Places, Processes and Politics  
of Socio-technical Change. Urban Studies, 51(7), 1353–1377.  
 
Samuels, D., & Abrucio, F. L. (2000). Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The “New”  
Politics of the Governors in Brazil. Publius, 30(2), 43–61.  
 
Sanyal, B. (1994). From the Benevolent to the Evil State: History of the Rise of the Anti- 
Government Sentiment in Developmental Discourse. In Cooperative Autonomy: The 
Dialectic of State-NGO Relationship in Developing Countries. Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Institute for Labor Studies. 
 
São Paulo Secretaria de Energia e Mineração. (17/02/2017). “Procura por certificados de energia  




Saxenian, A. (1994). Regional advantage : culture and competition in Silicon Valley and Route  
128. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
Sayer, R. A. (1992). Method in social science : a realist approach. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Schreurs, M. A. (2008). From the Bottom Up: Local and Subnational Climate Change Politics.  
The Journal of Environment & Development, 17(4), 343–355. 
 
Schot, J., & Geels, F. W. (2008). Strategic niche management and sustainable innovation  
journeys: theory, findings, research agenda, and policy. Technology Analysis & Strategic  
Management, 20(5), 537–554.  
 
Sciaudone, C. (2010, April 22). The lone wolf of wind power. Recharge News. Retrieved from  
http://www.rechargenews.com/magazine/849521/the-lone-wolf-of-wind-power 
 
Sdec. (2017). Retrieved from http://www.sdec.pe.gov.br/ 
 








Silbey, S. (1984). The Consequences of Responsive Regulation. In K.O. Hawkins & J.M.  
Thomas (Eds.), Enforcing Regulation (pp.147-170). Netherlands: Kluwer-Nijhoff.  
 
Sitkin, S., & Bies, R. (1994). The Legalistic Organization. New York, NY: Sage Publications. 
 
Smith, A. (2007). Emerging in between: The multi-level governance of renewable energy in the  
English regions. Energy Policy, 35(12), 6266–6280.  
 
Smith, S.R., & Lispky, M. (1993). Nonprofits for hire : the welfare state in the age of  
contracting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 Snyder, R. (2001). Politics after Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico. Cambridge, MA:   
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Soares, M., & Neiva, P. (2011). Federalism and resources publics in Brazil: discretionary  
transfers to States. Brazilian Political Science Review, 5(2): 94-116. 
 
Solar potential in Brazil. (n.d.). Instituto IDEAL. Retrieved from  
http://americadosol.org/en/solar-potential-brazil/ 
 
Spatuzza, A. Brazil axes December renewable tenders amid power glut. Recharge Magazine.  
Retrieved from http://www.rechargenews.com/solar/1199367/brazil-axes-december- 
renewable-tenders-amid-power-glut 
 
Spiller, P.T., & Martorell, L.V. (1996). How Should it Be Done? Electricity Regulation in  
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile. In R.J. Gilbert and E.P. Kahn (Eds.), International  
Comparisons of Electricity Regulation (pp. 1-24). New York: Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
Srinivas, S., & Viljamaa, K. (2008). Emergence of Economic Institutions: Analysing the Third  
Role of universities in Turku, Finland. Regional Studies, 42(03), 323–341.  
 
Stern, J. (2012). The relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries:  
Regulation as ordered renegotiation. Regulation & Governance, 6(4), 474–498.  
 
Stigler, G. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and  
Management, 2(1):3–21. 
 
Stokes, L. C. (2013). The politics of renewable energy policies: The case of feed-in tariffs in  
Ontario, Canada. Energy Policy, 56, 490–500.  
 
Storper, M. (1995). The Resurgence of Regional Economies, Ten Years Later: The Region as a  





Street, P., & Miles, I. (1996). Transition to alternative energy supply technologies: The case of  
windpower. Energy Policy, 24(5), 413–425.  
 
Tankha, S. (2008). From market to plan: Lessons from Brazilian power reforms on reducing  
risks in the provision of public services. Policy and Society, 27(2), 151–162. 
 
Toke, D. (2015). Renewable Energy Auctions and Tenders: How good are they? International  
Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management, 8, 43-56.  
 
Tolmasquim, M. (2000). As origens da crise energética brasileira. Ambiente & Sociedade,  6-7,  
180-183. Retrieved from 
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1414-753X2000000100012 
 
Toni, G. (2017, March 28). Na Fiesp, secretário de Energia e Mineração de SP fala em future  




Tribuna do Norte. (2017, April 5). Chinese confirmam fábrica para energia solar no RN.  
Retrieved from http://www.tribunadonorte.com.br/noticia/chineses-confirmam-fa-brica- 
para-energia-solar-no-rn/378938 
 
Trost, J. E. (1986). Statistically nonrepresentative stratified sampling: A sampling technique for  
qualitative studies. Qualitative Sociology, 9(1), 54–57.  
 
Truffer, B., & Coenen, L. (2012). Environmental Innovation and Sustainability Transitions in  
Regional Studies. Regional Studies, 46(1), 1–21. 
 
Truffer, B., Murphy, J. T., & Raven, R. (2015). The geography of sustainability transitions:  
Contours of an emerging theme. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 17,  
63–72.  
 
UNCED. (1992). Earth Summit Agenda 21. Retrieved from  
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/outcomedocuments/agenda21 
 
Unruh, G. C. (2000). Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 28(12), 817–830. 
 
Unruh, G. C., & Carrillo-Hermosilla, J. (2006). Globalizing carbon lock-in. Energy Policy,  
34(10), 1185–1197. 
 
van Eijck, J., & Romijn, H. (2008). Prospects for Jatropha biofuels in Tanzania: An analysis with  
Strategic Niche Management. Energy Policy, 36(1), 311–325.  
 
Verbong, G., & Geels, F. (2007). The ongoing energy transition: Lessons from a socio-technical,  
231 
 
multi-level analysis of the Dutch electricity system (1960–2004). Energy Policy, 35(2),  
1025–1037. 
 
Verheul, H., & Vergragt, P. J. (1995). Social experiments in the development of environmental  
technology: a bottom-up perspective. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management,  
7(3), 315–326. 
 
Viana, A. (2017). Reverse Auctions to Scale Renewable Energy: Brazilian Approach  
[PowerPoint Slides]. Retrieved from https://d2oc0ihd6a5bt.cloudfront.net/wp- 
content/uploads/sites/837/2017/06/4_Auctions_Renewables_Brazilian_Approach.pdf 
 
Victor, D. G., & Heller, T. C. (2007). The political economy of power sector reform: the  
experiences of five major developing countries. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Vieira, M. A., & Dalgaard, K. G. (2013). The energy-security–climate-change nexus in Brazil.  
Environmental Politics, 22(4), 610–626.  
 
Vogel, S.K. (1996). Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial  
Countries. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.  
 
Von Schnitzler, A. (2016). Democracy’s infrastructure : techno-politics and protest after  
apartheid. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Weiss, R. S. (1995). Learning from strangers : the art and method of qualitative interview  
studies. New York, NY: Free Press. 
 
Wene, C.O. (2008). A cybernetic perspective on technology learning. In Foxon, T., Köhler, J., &  
Oughton, C. (Eds.). Innovation for a low carbon economy: economic, institutional and  
management approaches (pp. 14-44). Cheltenham, UK ; Edward Elgar. 
 
Whitfield, D. (2001). Public Services or Corporate Welfare: Rethinking the Nation State in the  
Global Economy. Pluto Press: London.  
 
Wiener, J. (2004). The Regulation of Technology, and the Technology of Regulation.  
Technology in Society, 483–500. 
 
Wilks, S. (1996). Regulatory Compliance and Capitalist Diversity in Europe. Journal of  
European Public Policy, 3(4), 536-559.  
 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, A  
Study in the Economics of Internal Organization. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Williamson, O.E. (1998). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.   
 
Wiser, R., Barbose, G., & Holt, E. (2011). Supporting solar power in renewables portfolio  




Wolsink, M. (1996). Dutch wind power policy: Stagnating implementation of renewables.  
Energy Policy, 24(12), 1079–1088. 
 
World Bank. (2017). World Development Indicators. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/ 
 
World Bank. (2016). Electricity production from oil, gas and coal sources (% of total). Retrieved  
from https://data.worldbank.org/ 
 
World Energy Council. (October 2016). World Energy Sources 2016 – Wind. Retrieved from  
https://www.worldenergy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/WEResources_Wind_2016.pdf 
 
Yanow, D. (1996). How Does a Policy Mean?: Interpreting Policy and Organizational Actions.  
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Zarnikau, J. (2011). Successful renewable energy development in a competitive electricity  

































List of Interviews 
 
Table A1. List of Interviews 
No. Date Location Title Affiliation 
1 7/20/17 Natal Engineer CERNE 
2 1/5/16 São Paulo Secretary of Energy State energy agency (SP SEM) 
3 6/5/17 São Paulo Partner Totum Institute 
4 9/19/17 Brasilia 
Superintendent of 
Generation Aneel 
5 11/10/16 São Paulo 
Project Developer, Trade 
Association Board Member Solar Energy Company 
6 3/21/17 Brasilia Secretary of Planning Ministry of Mines and Energy 
7 7/13/17 Recife Program Manager 
Secretary of Sustainable Development 
and Environment 
8 7/26/17 Natal Professor 
Federal University of Rio Grande do 
Norte 
9 9/14/17 Brasilia Director Aneel 
10 7/21/17 Natal Environmental Coordinator 
Institute of Sustainable Development 
and Environment 
11 7/13/17 Recife Director State Economic Development Agency 
12 1/5/16 São Paulo Program Manager State energy agency (SP SEM) 
13 6/22/17 Natal 
Director of Technology 
and Research CERNE 
14 9/25/17 São Paulo 
Scientist/Technical 
Manager SP State Environmental Agency 
15 7/14/16 Campinas Professor 
State University of Campinas 
(Unicamp) 
16 3/20/17 Brasilia Regulatory Specialist Aneel 
17 7/12/17 Recife Secretary of Energy 
Pernambuco Secretary of Energy 
(Sdec) 
18 6/28/17 São Paulo Managing Director DesenvolveSP 
19 7/17/17 Recife Principal/Founder Eolica Technology 
20 7/27/17 Natal Professor 
Federal Institute of Rio Grande do 
Norte 
21 7/27/17 Natal Professor 
Federal University of Rio Grande do 
Norte 
22 3/24/17 Brasilia 
Public Affairs 
Representative  BNDES 
23 10/7/15 Campinas Professor Emeritus 




24 9/19/17 Brasilia Regulatory Specialist Aneel 
25 3/21/17 Brasilia Representative APINE 
26 12/6/16 São Paulo 
Sub-secretary of 
Renewable Energy State energy agency (SP SEM) 
27 7/27/17 Natal Director 
Federal Institute of Rio Grande do 
Norte 
28 1/7/16 São Paulo Superintendent  
State energy regulatory agency 
(ARSESP) 
29 9/23/16 Porto Alegre Economist 
Bank of Regional Development 
(BRDE) 
30 9/19/17 Brasilia Regulatory Specialist Aneel 
31 7/21/17 Natal 
Environmental Licensing 
Coordinator 
Institute of Sustainable Development 
and Environment 
32 7/27/17 Natal 
Executive Director of 
Projects CTGAS-ER 
33 2/3/16 São Paulo Executive 
Wind industry trade association 
(Abeeolica) 
34 7/24/17 Natal 
Environmental Services 
Manager Wind Energy Development Company 
35 7/19/17 Recife Foreign Services Officer U.S. State Department 
36 7/5/16 São Paulo Program Manager Greenpeace Brazil 
37 7/13/17 Recife Director and Engineer 
Hydroelectric Company of San 
Franciso (Chesf) 
38 4/3/17 Rio de Janeiro Representative EPE 
39 6/22/17 Natal Data Coordinator CERNE 
40 3/20/17 Brasilia 
Superintendent of 
Regulations Aneel 
41 4/24/17 Rio de Janeiro 
Manager of Project 
Financing  BNDES Energy Division 
42 3/20/17 Brasilia Representative ABRADEE 
43 9/23/16 Porto Alegre Director of Energy 














Projected number of net-metering customers in Brazil  
(2017-2024) (Aneel, 2017) 
 
Year Residential Commercial Total 
2017 23,794 3,040 26,834 
2018 51,683 5,917 57,600 
2019 94,310 10,196 104,506 
2020 157,776 16,434 174,210 
2021 250,758 25,362 276,120 
2022 383,010 37,903 420,913 
2023 565,448 55,156 620,604 




Projected amount of installed capacity (MW) from  
distributed generation in Brazil (2017-2024) 
 
Year Residential Commercial Total 
2017 71 30 102 
2018 155 59 214 
2019 283 102 385 
2020 473 164 638 
2021 752 254 1,006 
2022 1,149 379 1,528 
2023 1,696 552 2,248 








Sample Recruitment E-mail 
 
Original Format in Portuguese: 
 
Prezado(a) Senhor(a) ________, 
 
Bom dia. Tudo bem? 
 
Sou pesquisadora e estudante de doutorado na Columbia University in New York City. O 
objetivo geral das minhas pesquisas é entender melhor as políticas públicas e regulatórias que 
vão desenvolvendo as fontes alternativas no Brasil, em particular a energia solar e eólica. 
 
Dado o seu histórico em trabalhar com essas questões no ______, estou entrando em contato para 
ver se existe a possibilidade de fazer uma entrevista com o(a) senhor(a). Se a resposta for 
positiva, poderiamos marcar um encontro no dia e hora que for conveniente para ambos.  A 
entrevista demoraria entre 30 minutos e 1 hora, dependendo da sua disponibilidade. 
 
Imagino que o/a senhor(a) tenha outras prioridades, mas, acho que a sua colaboração seria 
fundamental para o entendimento do mercado de energias alternativas no Brasil. É essencial 
analisar a perspectiva do _____, já que a agência tem um papel importante na gestão do setor e 
também na disseminação dessas fontes. 
 
Apenas para constatar, a sua participação seria anônima e voluntária. Estou à disposição para 
quaisquer esclarecimentos. Se tiver alguma dúvida sobre esse estudo, pode ficar em contato 
também com meu orientador na Columbia, Dr. Robert Beauregard, no rab48@columbia.edu.  
 








Dear Sir/Madam ________, 
 
Good morning. How are you doing? 
 
I am a researcher and doctoral student at Columbia University in New York City. The general 
objective of my research is to better understand the public policies and regulations that develop 
renewable sources of energy in Brazil, in particular solar wind.  
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Giving your background in working with these issues at ______, I was wondering if it would be 
possible to conduct an interview with you. If you agree, we could schedule a date and time that 
works for you. I estimate that the interview would last in between 45 minutes and 1 hour, 
depending on your availability.  
I imagine that you must have other obligations, but I think you’re participation would be 
fundamental for understanding the renewable energies market in Brazil. It’s essential to 
understand your organization’s perspective, since it has an important role in the energy sector 
and also in the dissemination of these sources of energy. 
 
Just to let you know, your participation in this study is anonymous and voluntary. I am available 
for any clarifications. If you have any questions about this study, you can also contact my adviser 
at Columbia, Dr. Robert Beauregard, at rab48@columbia.edu. 
 





















Sample Interview Outline No. 1 
 
Note: This interview guide was tailored for an early interview with someone who had 





Em primeiro lugar, agradeço sua participação nessa entrevista. 
 
Sou estudante de doutorado na Columbia University em Nova Iorque. Também sou orientada por 
um professor da Unicamp que trabalha na área de planejamento energético.  
 
O objetivo geral dessas pesquisas, que fazem parta da minha tese de doutorado, é entender 
melhor como as fontes renováveis não hidráulicas estão sendo desenvolvida aqui no Brasil. 
Estou fazendo entrevistas com pessoas que trabalham nesse âmbito porque queria saber como 
isto acontece na prática, além de saber suas opiniões como as políticas estão funcionado. As 
informações que você fornece estarão protegidas e só disponíveis para mim e meu orientador nos 
Estados Unidos, o Professor Robert Beauregard. Só ele e eu temos acesso a esses dados. Se tem 
uma pergunta que não queria responder, não precisa, ok? Também queria gravar essa entrevista, 





1. Qual é o papel do seu departamento dentro do ______? Por favor, descreva as atividades da 
sua organização com relação ao setor de energia renovavel.  
 
 
FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY 
 
2. Um dos objetivos principais do meu estudo é entender melhor a participação do governo 
federal em estimular o crescimento de fontes renováveis. Enfim, na sua visão, o que esta 
funcionando e o que não esta funcionando?  
 
3. Na sua opinião, qual eh o papel da Aneel para fomentar a participação de fontes renováveis?  
 
4. Na sua avaliação, como eh que as leiloes de transmissão que o governo esta planejando vão 
afetar o setor eólica?  
 
5. Você tem observado se o atual ambiente econômico já esta impactando as fontes renováveis?  
 
6. Na sua avaliação, qual é a experiência do setor de energia eólica com o modelo atual de 









7. Eu também gostaria de entender a importância dos governos regionais no planejamento de 
energia eólica e solar no Brasil. Na sua opinião, as politicas energéticas desses estados são 
importantes? 
 






Tem mais outra observação que você gostaria de colocar? 
 







Before beginning, I’d like to thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. 
 
I'm a doctoral student at Columbia University in New York. I am also associated with a professor 
at Unicamp who works in the area of energy planning. 
 
The general objective of my study, which is based on my PhD thesis, is to better understand how 
non-hydro renewable energy sources are being developed in Brazil. I am conducting interviews 
with people who work in this field because I would to know how this happens in practice, and 
also know your opinions about how these policies are working out. The information you provide 
is protected and only available to me and my adviser in the United States, Professor Robert 
Beauregard. Only he and I have access to this data. If there is a question you did not want to 
answer, you don’t have to respond, okay? If it’s ok with you, I also would like to record this 





1. What is the role of your department within ______? Please describe your organization's 





FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY 
 
2. One of the main objectives of this study is to better understand the role of the federal 
government in stimulating the growth of renewable sources. In your view, what are some 
policies that are working, and not working? 
 
3. In your opinion, what is the role of Aneel in promoting renewable sources? 
 
4. In your assessment, how will the transmission auctions that the government is planning affect 
the wind sector? 
 
5. Have you noticed if the current economic environment is already impacting the growth of 
renewables? 
 
6. In your assessment, what is the experience of the wind power industry with the current model 




7. As part of this study, I would also like to understand the importance of regional governments 
in wind and solar planning in Brazil. In your opinion, are the energy policies of these states 
important? 
 







Is there anything else you would like to say before we finish the interview?  
 











Sample Interview Outline No. 2 
 
Note: This interview guide was tailored for an interview conducted during the middle of 






Em primeiro lugar, agradeço sua participação nessa entrevista. 
 
Sou estudante de doutorado na Columbia University em Nova Iorque. Também sou orientada por 
um professor da Unicamp que trabalha na área de planejamento energético.  
 
O objetivo geral dessas pesquisas, que fazem parta da minha tese de doutorado, é entender 
melhor como as fontes renováveis não hidráulicas estão sendo desenvolvida aqui no Brasil. 
Estou fazendo entrevistas com pessoas que trabalham nesse âmbito porque queria saber como 
isto acontece na prática, além de saber suas opiniões como as políticas estão funcionado. As 
informações que você fornece estarão protegidas e só disponíveis para mim e meu orientador nos 
Estados Unidos, o Professor Robert Beauregard. Só ele e eu temos acesso a esses dados. Se tem 
uma pergunta que não queria responder, não precisa, ok? Também queria gravar essa entrevista, 





1. Qual é o papel do seu departamento dentro do ______? Por favor, descreva as atividades da 
sua organização com relação ao setor de energia renovavel.  
 
 
REGULATIONS FOR 482 (DISTRIBUTED GENERATION) 
2. Então, para começar, o(a) senhor(a) pode falar um pouco sobre seu papel na criação e revisão 
da 482? 
 
3. O(A) senhor(a) prevê algumas novidades com essa próxima revisão da 687 que está 
chegando?  
 
4. Será que a Aneel vai seguir uma estratégia ou postura diferente essa vez? Por exemplo, eu 
ouvi falar que nessa próxima revisão, não vai ter tanto subsidio para geração distribuída. 
O(A) senhor(a) pode comentar um pouco sobre isso? 
 




6. O(A) senhor(a) tem percebido alguns “conflitos” entre os grupos que apóiam fontes 
diferentes para geração distribuída? Porque parece que tem pessoas que apóiam biomassa, 
eólica, etc. além do energia solar. 
 
7. Já que a geração distribuída está crescendo no Brasil, o(a) senhor(a) acha que outros atores 
do governo se envolverão mais em sua gestão? 
 
STATES AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
 
8. O(A) senhor(a) observou se os governos estaduais estão desenvolvendo iniciativas para 
apoiar a geração distribuída? Por exemplo, além de isentar o ICMS, alguns estados estão 






Tem mais outra observação que você gostaria de colocar? 
 







Before beginning, I’d like to thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. 
 
I'm a doctoral student at Columbia University in New York. I am also associated with a professor 
at Unicamp who works in the area of energy planning. 
 
The general objective of my study, which is based on my PhD thesis, is to better understand how 
non-hydro renewable energy sources are being developed in Brazil. I am conducting interviews 
with people who work in this field because I would to know how this happens in practice, and 
also know your opinions about how these policies are working out. The information you provide 
is protected and only available to me and my adviser in the United States, Professor Robert 
Beauregard. Only he and I have access to this data. If there is a question you did not want to 
answer, you don’t have to respond, okay? If it’s ok with you, I also would like to record this 








1. What is the role of your department within ______? Please describe your organization's 
activities in relation to the renewable energy sector. 
 
REGULATIONS FOR 482 (DISTRIBUTED GENERATION) 
 
2. So, to begin, can you tell me a bit about your role in creating and revising amendment 482? 
 
3. Do you foresee some new changes with this upcoming revision of amendment 687 that is 
coming? 
 
4. Do you think Aneel is going to follow a different strategy or posture at this time? For 
example, I heard that in this next review, there will not be a subsidy for distributed 
generation. Can you comment a little on this? 
 
5. Are distribution companies behaving differently? 
 
6. Have you noticed "conflicts" between groups that support different sources for distributed 
generation? Because it seems that there are people who support biomass, wind, etc. besides 
solar energy. 
 
7. Since distributed generation is growing in Brazil, do you think other government actors will 
be more involved in its management? 
 
STATES AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
 
8. Have you looked at whether state governments are developing initiatives to support 
distributed generation? For example, in addition to exempting state value-added taxes, some 





Is there anything else you would like to say before we finish the interview?  
 
Thank you so much for the opportunity to talk with you today. 
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